A Proposal for the Fulfillment of Catholic
Liberal Education
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III. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
This conception of the intellectual life, which is the orthodox
Catholic position, seems contrary to the prevailing view of
modern society and of those Catholics who are becoming increasingly
secularized in their thoughts and their actions. The prevailing
view holds as a principle that the uncritical acceptance of
religious doctrine not only inhibits, but even destroys the
life of intelligence. The statement of this principle takes
many forms, but they are finally reducible to the single contention
that the believing Christian, since he refuses to submit his
belief to rational examination and hence to the possibility
of rejecting it, has traded the freedom of his mind for the
blind security of unquestioned authority. The consequence
is that Christian schools, in so far as they are subject to
Christian Doctrine, are thought to be less free, and the education
they offer is thought to be necessarily inferior. It is well,
therefore, since this is the root objection, to consider it
in some detail.
Since the Christian faith involves undoubting belief in certain
assertions for which there is no natural evidence, but which
are nevertheless taken as the ruling principles of thought
and action, the intellectual life of a Christian is generally
assumed to be less free. This is because intellectual freedom
is customarily defined by the mentality of free inquiry, the
mentality which sees itself as not enslaved to any fixed conception
but free to subject every doctrine to critical examination
and possible rejection. Academic freedom is supposed to be
the protection and promotion of this intellectual freedom
by institutions of learning. Accordingly, schools whose academic
policies are based on religious doctrine limit academic freedom
and thereby depress the intellectual life of the scholarly
community. Such a view, for example, has been expressed by
the American Association of University Professors:
Freedom of conscience in teaching and research is essential
to maintain academic integrity and fulfill the basic purposes
of higher education; consequently, any restriction on academic
freedom raises grave issues of professional concern.
(Statement on Academic Freedom In Church-Related
Colleges and Universities; A.A.U.P. Bulletin, Winter,
67)
It is clear that they hold religious doctrine to be a restriction
on academic freedom, for later in the same statement, the
conditions upon which a religious school insists when it appoints
a teacher are described as "institutional limitations
on his academic freedom."
Now inasmuch as this conception of intellectual and academic
freedom is based on the principle of free inquiry--i.e. the
position that every doctrine is subject to critical examination
and possible rejection--it is suitable (and hardly unfair)
to examine critically the general principle itself. If it
claims to be a dogma, the only dogma immune to criticism,
by what right does it claim its exemption from the general
principle? Or, on the other hand, if it too is open to question,
by what principle are we to justify our examination of it?
Not by the principle of free inquiry, for it is presently
under judgment and therefore in suspense.
To proceed further, free inquiry is usually justified by
its effect in the pursuit of truth. More truths will be discovered,
and more surely held, it is said, if all beliefs are subject
to question and possible reversal. But such an assertion,
if it is not a "dogma," must be grounded on the
actual examination of the issues upon which men have disagreed,
a judgment where the truth lies in each case, and then
a determination of whether and how much the principle of free
inquiry was an advantage. It would then follow that the resolution
of those issues--the test cases of intellectual progress--would
be immune to criticism under the principle of free inquiry,
since the value of the principle is predicated on their resolution.
A further difficulty is that the principle of free inquiry
would be nullified by the achievement of its stated purpose.
As long as a man is ignorant, it is consistent with his condition
to remain open to both the affirmative and negative answers
to the issue in question. But when and if he comes to know
(which is the purpose of his investigation) the matter ceases
to be doubtful to him, and his mind closes to the possibility
that the opposite might be true. He is no longer free to doubt,
except willfully. Thus by the assumed definition ignorance
makes free, while knowledge enslaves. A reply to this objection
might assume that knowledge is simply unattainable, inasmuch
as all things are in all respects always changing, or inasmuch
as our minds, not being omniscient, cannot reach the certain
truth about anything. But this, as before, would base the
principle of free inquiry on particular and controversial
philosophical theories, which as a consequence would be immune
to criticism under the principle.
Also, every criticism, unless it be simply an expression
of the will to criticize, must finally be based on premises
not subject to criticism. For if the premises of some criticism
are themselves to be criticized, and the premises of this
second criticism are in turn to be criticized, and so on,
then either the process must rest in premises not subject
to criticism, or all criticism is a game which begins anywhere
and ends nowhere, advancing not a step towards the truth.
Not even logical consistency can be established, for presumably
the principles of logic are subject to criticism as is everything
else.
Since academic freedom is thought to derive from and be justified
by the principle of free inquiry, and since in turn considerations
of academic tenure are supposed to be governed by the principles
of academic freedom, the college professor comes to be judged
by standards which have no relation to the purposes of his
life as a scholar and a teacher. For it is usually maintained
that the academic standing of a scholar should be determined
by his "competence," while at the same time academic
freedom requires that competence be judged in abstraction
from what is true and what is false in the area of his competence.
But since knowledge of the truth is the end of all study and
teaching, to judge a scholar in this way is comparable to
judging a doctor while abstracting from all consideration
of health and disease, or to judging a cook without tasting
what he cooks.
As a result, when scholars must determine the professional
standing of one of their colleagues, they must find some definition
of competence which prescinds from the very purpose of competence;
thus, they are compelled to fall back upon "accepted
standards" of competence, standards which are either
based on what is altogether secondary, or so vaguely and generally
described as to be nearly useless as directives, or which
even carry in disguise definite views of the true and
the false in the various disciplines. But what is worse, the
standards are thought to be standards precisely insofar as
they are accepted; in other words, the accepted rather
than the true is the standard not only in fact (because
of human fallibility) but also by intent. Thus the consistent
application of academic freedom becomes by definition the
very tyranny which it is supposed to prevent.
Indeed, it would seem that the government of any institution
by rules which prescind (or pretend to prescind) from all
differences of belief, or which negate in principle the possibility
of governing by the truth, must of necessity be tyrannical.
For concrete and particular decisions must be made, about
the curriculum, student life, hiring and firing, promotion
and so forth, but cannot be directed by rules which by their
abstract and negative character in effect deny that there
are any rules. Thus, no individual decision can be really
justified or condemned out of principle, leaving an infinite
latitude in practice to the men who actually make the decisions,
who thus rule by their own absolute discretion.
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