The Passions of the Will and the Passion of Christ in Franciscan Theology from the *Summa Halensis* to Duns Scotus

Abstract: This chapter examines how the *Summa Halensis*’ analysis of Christ’s sorrow was adopted and modified by later Franciscan theologians. According to the teaching of Jerome, which Peter Lombard made available to medieval theologians, Christ’s sorrow arose from an involuntary reaction to his physical suffering. In order to expand upon Jerome’s account, the *Summa Halensis* develops an elaborate map of Christ’s soul by drawing on psychological principles found in Augustine and John Damascene. 13th century theologians debated whether Christ could experience sorrow over his own suffering not just as a natural and instinctual reaction, but also as the result of freely willing that he not suffer. An obstacle to asserting this would be any implication that Christ did not will by his human will what God willed him to will. Richard of Middleton, Matthew of Aquasparta, and Duns Scotus do affirm that Christ in some way freely willed his own suffering, and experienced sorrow over it because of that. In different ways they employ the account of Christ’s soul outlined in the *Summa Halensis* to avoid any implication that Christ fell into sin by freely nilling his own suffering.

The Gospel of Matthew reports that Jesus experienced sorrow in the Garden of Gethsemane (26:37–38): “he began to be sorrowful [coepit contristari] and troubled. Then he said to them, “My soul is sorrowful [tristis] to the point of death.”” Jerome offered an influential interpretation of this passage when he stated that Christ experienced the propassion of sorrow rather than a full-fledged form of that passion. One difference between a propassion and a full-fledged passion is that a propassion does not overwhelm one’s ability to use reason. A propassion, moreover, is an involuntary reaction, and thus not morally blameworthy. Peter Lombard made Jerome’s interpretation of Matthew 26:37–38 available to 13th-century theologians, who widely accepted it.¹

Yet in the *Summa Halensis* the analysis of Christ’s sorrow is not limited to Jerome’s idea of a propassion. While the *Summa Halensis* certainly maintains that Christ’s reason is not disturbed or overwhelmed by his sorrow, it describes Christ as experiencing sorrow in ways that go beyond an involuntary reaction to suffering.

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The *Summa Halensis* identifies a soteriological motive for its way of exploring Christ’s sorrow. Drawing on its interpretation of Anselm’s *Cur Deus homo*, the *Summa* teaches that Christ had to suffer in every part of his soul in order to make satisfaction for sin. Christ experienced not only bodily suffering, but also suffering over the sins of others and suffering over the misfortunes that befell others. To determine how this suffering led to sorrow in Christ, the *Summa* provides a map of Christ’s soul that is based on psychological principles drawn from Augustine and John Damascene. It takes from Augustine the distinction between higher and lower reason. Following John Damascene, the *Summa* further distinguishes between *ratio ut ratio* and *ratio ut natura*.

While the account of Christ’s sorrow in the *Summa* proved influential, later Franciscans also made various modifications to what they received from the *Summa*. The main area of disagreement concerns how to explain Christ’s sorrow over his own physical suffering. Is his sorrow over this only the result of a natural reaction to bodily harm or does it in any sense arise from a reasoned judgment about his suffering? The Franciscans considered below resolve that question by considering how Christ’s human will stands in relation to that suffering. Over time there is a transition from thinking of Christ’s sorrow over his own bodily suffering as arising only from a natural wish for union between his body and soul to an account that also attributes sorrow over this to Christ because of what he freely wills. This transition begins with Richard of Middleton’s account of sorrow in the lower part of Christ’s will, but Matthew of Aquasparta and Duns Scotus even attribute sorrow to the higher part of Christ’s will as his will is a free power. For these later Franciscans there is a sense in which Christ freely wishes not to suffer, and this becomes one of the sources for the sorrow he experiences on the Cross.

**Summa Halensis**

According to the *Summa Halensis* there are three ways that Christ could experience sorrow or sadness over his own bodily suffering:

There is sorrow [*tristitia*] from a will of dispensation or according to propassion, which is turned toward sensuality without a disturbance in reason, and in this way there was sorrow in Christ. In addition to this, as will become clear, we can consider reason-as-nature [*ratio ut natura*] and reason-as-reason [*ratio ut ratio*]. If *ut natura*, then in this way there was sorrow according to his reason; but if *ut ratio*, then in this way there was not sadness in his reason.²

In this passage the *Summa* uses Jerome’s category of propassion to describe one form that Christ’s sorrow can take. This form of sorrow arises from pain in the sensitive

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2 Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis minorum Summa theologica* (SH), 4 vols (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924–48), IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 39), Respondeo, p. 63b.
powers of the soul. For Christ it occurs as a result of a ‘will of dispensation’ since he freely took on a human nature that could experience physical pain.

The other forms of sorrow ascribed to Christ are described in terms drawn from John Damascene. His distinction between ‘reason’ and ‘nature’ roughly amounts to the distinction between the natural appetite for certain goods and the reasoned choice to pursue certain goods.³ Reason-as-nature concerns reason insofar as it united to the body, and it is because of this union that reason suffers when the body suffers.⁴ It is natural for reason to react to any bodily harm by wishing that that harm was not occurring.⁵ This natural nilling of bodily suffering can give rise to passions such as fear and sorrow. The *Summa* does not comment on how this form of sorrow is related to the propassion of sorrow, even though the way that each is described makes them seem to be either identical or at least closely connected. As we shall see, Bonaventure considers the connection between these two descriptions of Christ’s sorrow.

Taking reason in the sense of reason-as-reason, however, is to consider reason as it is capable of transcending the body. Reason in this sense includes free acts of the will.⁶ In this way, there is no sorrow in the reason of Christ insofar as he freely wills his own suffering for the sake of human redemption. Thus, even though the *Summa* frames the issue of Christ’s sorrow as a question of whether it is in his reason, it resolves this question by reference to what Christ wills by his human will.

Following Augustine, the *Summa* adds a further distinction to its consideration of reason according to which reason is divided into a higher and lower part.⁷ Augustine makes this distinction in his *De Trinitate* XII. It is also found in the *De spiritu et anima*, a 12th-century work that 13th-century Franciscans often attributed to Augustine.⁸ The distinction between higher and lower reason is also mentioned by Peter Lombard in the second book of his *Sentences*, where the Lombard is examining

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⁴ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 40), Ad objecta 3, p. 64b: ‘Item, timor secundum rationem est dupliciter: quia est considerare rationem ut naturam, secundum quam unitur corpori et naturaliter per hoc compatitur.’
⁵ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 40), Solutio, p. 64a: ‘Est enim timor naturalis per modum naturae, quo modo dicit Ioannes Damascenus quod “timor naturalis est, nolente anima dividit a corpore” etc., “propter quod anima naturaliter timet et agoniam patitur et refugit mortem” velut natura morbum.’
⁶ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr1, Q4, Ti1, M2, C1, Ar3 (n. 40), Ad objecta 3, p. 64b: ‘Et est considerare rationem ut rationem, secundum quod non se habet ad corpus, immo actum habet extra corpus. Primo modo habet naturalem ordinem ad corpus, secundo modo est in ordine ad Deum voluntarie.’
⁷ *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo, p. 200b: ‘Dicendum sine praejudicio, quod est considerare rationem dupliciter, secundum quod dicit Augustinus quod ratio dividet se in duo, in superiorem et inferiorem secundum duplicem comparationem.’
⁸ *De spiritu et anima* 11 (PL 40:787).
the human soul. Peter Lombard characterizes the distinction between higher and lower reason in the following way: ‘Reason is a higher power of the soul, which, so to speak, has two parts or differences: the higher and the lower. According to the higher it attends to the contemplating and consulting of heavenly things; according to the lower it attends to the disposition of temporal things.’

While the Lombard himself does not employ Augustine’s distinction when writing about Christ’s human soul, the distinction was commonly employed in 13th-century Christological writings. Nevertheless, the distinction between higher and lower reason does not play a prominent role in either Augustine’s philosophy of mind or the cognitive theories of medieval theologians, and for this reason it can be difficult to understand precisely what distinction is being made. Moreover, in the Middle Ages some authors associated the distinction with Avicenna’s doctrine of the ‘two faces of the soul.’ The distinction between higher and lower reason in the Summa’s treatment of Christ, however, does not correspond exactly to either Augustine’s distinction or Avicenna’s. For Augustine lower reason was concerned with the historical and the particular, but for the Summa that falls under the domain of sensation and imagination. For Avicenna one face of the soul was theoretical reason, the other face practical reason. Yet according to the Christology of the Summa, the higher/lower distinction is not one between theoretical and practical reason. To make sense of how the Summa employs the distinction, we should construe higher and lower reason as including both theoretical and practical reason, but distinguished in terms of their object. Thus, higher reason involves the intellect and will knowing and loving God, an eternal object, while lower reason involves knowing about and choosing created objects. The Summa incorporates this distinction into its own Christology because it can help explain how Christ was simultaneously a comprehensor and a viator. He was a comprehensor insofar as the higher portion of reason enjoyed the beatific vision, but a viator through his lower reason which was focused on thinking about and judging temporal matters and created realities.

When examining whether sorrow can be located in the higher or lower part of Christ’s reason, the Summa indicates that it has a soteriological motive for considering this question. According to an objection, Adam sinned in both the higher and lower parts of reason, and was punished in each part. The objection concludes, therefore, that ‘Christ ought to satisfy according to each part.’ To answer the objec-

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9 Peter Lombard, Sententiae II, d. 24, c. 5 (n. 1) (Brady, 1:453–54).
11 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar5 (n. 146), p. 203b.
12 On the joy of the beatific vision in the higher part of Christ’s reason, see SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo 3, pp. 200b-1a; SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar4 (n. 145), Contra, p. 202a-b, and Respondeo, p. 202b.
13 SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Ad quod sic obicitur 1, p. 200a. Similar arguments are found in Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton, Matthew of Aquasparta, and Duns Scotus.
tion, the Summa joins the distinction between higher and lower reason to the distinction between reason-as-reason and reason-as-nature.\(^\text{14}\) Thus, higher and lower reason can each be construed \textit{ut natura} and \textit{ut ratio}.

The Summa uses this way of dividing Christ’s reason to interpret Matthew 26:38, where Christ says there is sadness in his soul unto death. The Summa cites Jerome’s claim that Christ experiences sadness over the effect that his suffering will have on his apostles. His apostles will be scandalized by this suffering, and it is this that causes sadness in Christ.\(^\text{15}\) The Summa aligns Jerome’s interpretation to the divisions of the rational part of the soul that it has introduced. This sadness is in the reason of Christ insofar as reason is taken \textit{ut ratio}. For Christ freely wishes his apostles not to be scandalized, and insofar as what he desires does not come about, he experiences sorrow. This sorrow, moreover, is in the lower portion of reason.\(^\text{16}\) Thus, in the lower portion of Christ’s reason \textit{ut ratio} there is sorrow over the sufferings of others.

Christ’s intellect and will were united to God in the beatific vision in the higher portion of his reason, and more specifically, in the higher portion taken \textit{ut ratio}. Thus, there could be no sorrow in this part of Christ’s soul. Yet the Summa allows that there is sorrow over his own bodily suffering in the higher portion insofar as the higher portion is construed \textit{ut natura}. For even the higher portion of reason \textit{naturally} wishes to remain united to its body, and thus sorrows over the opposite.\(^\text{17}\)

There is one remaining way that sorrow can be attributed to Christ, according to the Summa Halensis. On the Cross, Christ utters the opening words of Psalm 21, when he cries out, ‘my God, my God why have you forsaken me?’ According to the Summa, this indicates some type of painful separation from God. It does not indicate any severing of the hypostatic union, but rather separation from the consolation of the beatific vision. This separation, however, does not occur in the higher part of his human reason, which continues to fully enjoy the beatific vision even at this moment on the Cross.\(^\text{18}\) It occurs in Christ’s lower powers. According to the Summa, the joy of the beatific vision that Christ experiences in the higher part of reason in some way provided consolation to his lower powers, but this consolation ceased on the Cross.\(^\text{19}\)

\(^\text{14}\) SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), p. 200b.
\(^\text{15}\) This aspect of Jerome’s interpretation is not included in Lombard’s Sentences, but it is found in Jerome’s commentary on Matthew. Peter Lombard, however, does attribute a similar interpretation to Hilary of Poitiers (see Peter Lombard, Sententiae III, d. 15, c. 4 [Brady, 2:102–3]).
\(^\text{16}\) SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo 1, p. 200b: ‘Unde Hieronymus Matt. 26:38, \textit{Tristis est anima mea} etc.: “Contristatur propter scandalum Apostolorum:” Et hoc intelligendum est de inferiori ratione; scandalum vero non est solum in ratione ut natura, sive metus scandal, quem habebat, ut dicit Hilarius, sed in ratione ut ratio.’
\(^\text{17}\) SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo 1, p. 200b: ‘In superiori autem parte fuit passio ut est natura, non ut est ratio.’
\(^\text{18}\) SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo 3, p. 201a. See also SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar5 (n. 146), p. 203a-b.
\(^\text{19}\) SH IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo 3, p. 200b.
The type of sorrow that Christ experiences at this moment does not neatly fit into the schema the *Summa* has developed for analyzing Christ’s sorrow. Indeed, instead of employing the *ut natura -* *ut ratio* distinction, or even the full distinction between higher and lower reason, the *Summa* highlights the distinction between higher reason and the lower powers. Prior to the resurrection the grace of the beatific vision did not fully spill over to Christ’s body. Yet the *Summa* seems to be claiming that for most of his earthly life, Christ’s sensitive powers enjoyed some diminished share in the fruits of the beatific vision. Although Christ’s body did not enjoy full impassibility, it enjoyed greater impassibility than a normal human body. It seems, therefore, that the *Summa* is not interpreting the cry of dereliction in a way that makes it about psychological suffering that would arise from a belief that one has been distanced from God. Instead the cry of dereliction seems to indicate an intensification of bodily suffering that results from his lower powers not benefiting from the grace of the beatific vision. That this is so is also suggested by the *Summa*’s reference to Psalm 34, where the psalmist says, ‘All my bones shall cry out: Who, O Lord, is like me?’ If the bones of this passage stand for the whole body, then the cry of dereliction is an expression of sorrow arising from bodily suffering rather than psychological distress.

Some elements of how the *Summa Halensis* examines Christ’s sorrow are found in Alexander’s *Glossa* and his *Quaestiones disputatae ‘antequam esset frater’*. Yet there are also notable differences in how Christ’s sorrow is treated in these earlier works. For example, his *Glossa* makes a distinction between Christ’s higher and lower reason, but, when speaking of Christ’s sorrow, it does not introduce a distinction between his reason-as-reason and reason-as-nature. Also, the *Glossa* uses the term *tristitia* in a different way from the *Summa*. The *Glossa* reserves the term *tristitia* to refer to the compassion Christ felt for the suffering of others, while it uses the term *dolor* to refer to the passion Christ experiences on account of his bodily suffering. Thus, *dolor* is linked to sorrow arising from the sensitive appetite, and *tristitia* to sorrow arising from the rational part of Christ’s soul. The *Glossa* locates *tristitia* in the

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20 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo 3, p. 200b: ‘Dicendum quod Christus ante passionem gaudebat in superiori parte rationis, et ex hoc erat influentia ipsis viribus inferioribus, a quibus remota est consolationis influentia in passione.’


22 *SH* IV, P1, In1, Tr5, Q1, M2, C1, Ar2 (n. 143), Respondeo 3, p. 201a: ‘Sed constat quod non intelligit de separatione unionis, sed de separatione consolationis influentis super inferiores vires, quam etiam spirituales viri bene sentiunt, dicentes secundum Psalmum: *Omnia ossa mea dicent: Domine quis similis tibi* etc.’

lower part of Christ’s reason. Finally, the *Glossa* does not attribute suffering in any way to the higher part of Christ’s reason, thus indicating that Alexander at this stage did not consider it imperative to attribute suffering to every part of Christ’s soul.

In his *Disputed Questions*, Alexander undertakes an extensive examination of Christ’s passibility. In its explanation of where suffering was located in Christ’s soul, the *Disputed Questions* not only makes use of the distinction between higher and lower reason, but also the distinction between reason-as-reason and reason-as-nature. Also, the *Disputed Questions* emphasizes the passibility of each part of Christ’s soul because of a concern to show that Christ makes adequate satisfaction. Thus, even Christ’s higher part of reason can suffer insofar as that part is considered *ut natura*.

Even though Alexander’s *Disputed Questions* examines the passibility of Christ’s soul, it says much less than the *Summa* about specific passions like sadness and fear. In a few places in the *Disputed Questions*, Alexander does speak of the *dolor* Christ experiences because of his physical suffering. There is also mention of the ‘*dolor of compassion*’ that Christ experiences over the suffering of others, but this is not explicitly placed in Christ’s lower reason. A passing reference is made to *tristitia* in an objection directed against attributing suffering to the higher part of Christ’s reason, where he experienced the joy of beatitude. Indeed, the passion that receives the most explicit attention in the *Disputed Questions* is joy. Alexander often mentions Christ’s joy and asks whether it compatible with suffering (*passio*) in the soul without attending to any specific negative passions such as fear or sadness. Thus, one of the main developments in the *Summa* over the *Disputed Questions* is its more extensive examination of the particular negative emotional reactions of Christ to his suffering and a more systematic examination of where emotions like sorrow are located in Christ’s soul.

Boyd Taylor Coolman has proposed a different way of describing the change that occurs in how the *Glossa* understands Christ’s sorrow from the account given in the *Disputed Questions* and the *Summa*. According to Coolman, Alexander’s *Glossa* limits

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27 Alexander of Hales, QD, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 3 (n. 48), p. 246.
28 Alexander of Hales, QD, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 3 (n. 44), p. 244; see also QD, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 5 (n. 52), p. 248.
29 Alexander of Hales, QD, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 3 (n. 48), p. 246.
30 Alexander of Hales, QD, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 6 (n. 56), pp. 249–50.
31 Alexander of Hales, QD, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 3 (n. 46), p. 245.
32 Alexander of Hales, QD, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 3 (nn. 74–77), pp. 259–60.
Christ’s sorrow to the sensible part of his soul and thus limits his sorrow to his own bodily suffering. Coolman writes,

In his Glossa, then, Alexander neatly divides Christ’s continual beatitude from his emerging sadness, confining the former to the superior part of reason, the latter to the inferior part, the sensible soul, associated directly with the body. Christ’s sadness, moreover, is largely self-referential, pertaining to his own sense of immanent suffering and death.³³

Coolman bases his interpretation on what Alexander writes in Glossa III, distinction 15 (n. 4).³⁴ Coolman further argues that it is only in the Disputed Questions that Alexander first posits any type of sorrow in the rational part of Christ’s soul, and also the first time Alexander claims that the suffering of others becomes an object of Christ’s sorrow.³⁵

My disagreement with Coolman’s interpretation of this part of the Glossa is based partly on a more fundamental difference over how to interpret what the Glossa means by the lower and higher parts of reason. Coolman takes lower reason to be identical to the sensitive powers of the soul, and higher reason with the rational powers of the soul. Yet it seems that the Glossa takes higher and lower reason as both different aspects of the rational part of the soul. In support of this, I would point out that in the passage from the Glossa under examination, Alexander asserts that Christ did have compassion for his brothers, but denies that this compassion is either in his sensuality or in the higher part of reason. It is not in his sensuality because this compassion does not originate in the sensitive powers of the soul, and it is not in his higher reason because that part of his soul was absorbed by the joy of the beatific vision. Thus, it was in his lower reason, and thus in the Glossa there is indeed a rational form of sorrow attributed to Christ that is other-directed.³⁶ What is new beginning with the Disputed Questions is attributing some form of sorrow to the higher portion of Christ’s reason, but that requires uniting the distinction between higher and lower reason to the distinction between ratio ut natura and ratio ut ratio, which does not occur in the Glossa’s treatment of Christ’s sorrow.³⁷

³³ Coolman, ‘The Salvific Affectivity of Christ according to Alexander of Hales,’ p. 15.
³⁴ Ibid., p. 15.
³⁵ Ibid., p. 19.
³⁷ There is, however, an allusion to that distinction in the treatment of Christ’s fear in Alexander of Hales, Glossa III, d. 15 (n. 12), p. 155.
Bonaventure

Bonaventure adopts the same psychology that is presented in the *Summa Halensis* whereby the rational part of Christ’s soul is divided into higher and lower reason, and the *ut natura*/*ut ratio* distinction is applied to both portions of reason. Bonaventure also follows the teaching of the *Summa* as to where in the soul of Christ sorrow is to be located. Nevertheless, Bonaventure’s examination of the sorrow of Christ differs from that of the *Summa* in three main ways.

The first difference concerns the terminology Bonaventure uses for Christ’s sorrow. In *In Sent.* III, distinction 15, Bonaventure examines specific negative passions that are attributed to Christ, such as *tristitia*. When, however, Bonaventure turns in *In Sent.* III, distinction 16 to examine the passibility of Christ’s soul, he asks about Christ’s *dolor* rather than his *tristitia*. We have seen that Alexander’s *Glossa* distinguished *dolor* and *tristitia*, using *dolor* for sorrow arising from one’s own physical pain, and *tristitia* for sorrow over the suffering of others. This way of distinguishing *dolor* from *tristitia*, however, is not at work in Bonaventure’s switch to the term *dolor*. Instead of using *dolor* exclusively for sorrow arising from bodily suffering, Bonaventure tells us that he is using the term *dolor* in the way Augustine uses it. Bonaventure writes, ‘Just as Augustine says in *The City of God*, there is a twofold *dolor* in the soul: one, which is in the soul according to itself, and another which is in the soul from the flesh.’ Thus, for Bonaventure, *dolor* can refer to sorrow that one experiences because of the suffering of other people.

In practice Bonaventure treats *dolor* and *tristitia* as interchangeable. For example, the verbs *tristatur* and *contristetur* are used in *In Sent.* III, distinction 16, when speaking of *dolor* in Christ. Also, one of the arguments in *In Sent.* III, distinction 15 for ascribing *tristitia* to Christ is nearly the same as one of the arguments in *In Sent.* III, distinction 16 for locating *dolor* in the soul of Christ. In *In Sent.* III, distinction 15, Bonaventure argues that Christ loved and desired the salvation of the human race, but experienced *tristitia* over the refusal of some human beings to accept the offer of salvation. In *In Sent.* III, distinction 16, this idea is expressed in a similar way: ‘concerning that *dolor* that is in the soul of Christ according to itself, there is no doubt that Christ suffered according to reason. For he suffered with us and sorrowed over our sins; and this *dolor* was in his rational will proceeding from a consideration

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38 For more on Bonaventure’s use of the distinction between higher and lower reason, see R.W. Mul- ligan, SJ, ‘*Portio Superior* and *Portio Inferior Rationis* in the Writings of St. Bonaventure,’ *Franciscan Studies* 15 (1955), pp. 332–49.
39 Bonaventure, *Commentarius in quatuor libros Sententiarum (In Sent.)* (Quaracchi: Collegium Sancti Bonaventurae, 1887), III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, Respondeo, p. 354a.
40 Bonaventure, *In Sent.* III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, arg. 4 and ad 4, p. 353b and p. 354b.
of reason, namely from a recognition of our sins.Both passages claim that there was sorrow over the sins of the human race in the rational part of Christ’s soul.

Although Bonaventure investigates Christ’s sorrow in both In Sent. III, distinction 15 (ar. 2, q. 2), and distinction 16 (ar. 2, q. 1), these two parts of his commentary do have different emphases. In distinction 15, Bonaventure is concerned to ascribe sadness to Christ and show that such an emotion is compatible with Seneca’s view of the wise man, whereas in distinction 16, Bonaventure primarily seeks to locate more particularly where in Christ’s soul sorrow can be found and to identify the reasons for this sorrow. In distinction 16, Bonaventure argues that there is sorrow in Christ’s reason-as-nature over his own bodily suffering, and that the sorrow he experiences in this way is in both higher and lower reason. Yet his own bodily suffering does not lead to sorrow in his rational will or in his reason-as-reason.

A second place where Bonaventure differs from the Summa Halensis over Christ’s sadness is his attempt to relate the propassion of tristitia to the tristitia ascribed to Christ’s reason-as-nature. The Summa set out three ways Christ might experience sadness without explicitly examining what connections might exist between the propassion of sorrow and the sorrow that can exist in one’s reason. Bonaventure argues that the propassion of sorrow leads to sorrow in Christ’s reason-as-nature. Bonaventure recognizes, however, that the standard way of describing a propassion as something that does not disturb reason seems to conflict with the claim that sorrow is in some way in Christ’s reason. According to Bonaventure, when sorrow over one’s own bodily suffering reaches reason through the mode of nature it can remain a propassion so long as one’s rational will is rightly disposed towards that suffering. If Christ’s reason had become dominated by this sorrow, then he would have nilled his bodily suffering by his free human will. Yet this is precisely what Christ does not do. As Bonaventure writes,

To be stirred up [perturbari] is to become dominated, but one can experience passions, and overcome them. This is what happened in the soul of Christ, which according to reason-as-nature

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42 Bonaventure, In Sent. III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, p. 354a: ‘Et utrumque dolorem constans est in anima Christi fuisse; et de illo quidem dolore, qui inest animae secundum se, non est dubium, quin Christus fuerit passus secundum rationem. Compassus enim fuit et doluit pro peccatis nostris; et iste dolor in voluntate rationali erat procedens ex consideratione rationis, videlicet ex recognitione peccatorum nostrorum.’

43 Bonaventure, In Sent. III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1–2, pp. 353–57.

44 Bonaventure, In Sent. III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, Respondeo, p. 354a.

45 Bonaventure, In Sent. III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, arg. 5, p. 353b: ‘Item, cum passio attingit usque ad rationem, non tantum est propassio, immo est completa et perfecta passio, quae non potest cadere in sapientem, iuxta quod probat Seneca et Hieronymus dicit. Aut igitur Christus sapiens non fuit, aut si fuit, anima eius secundum rationem carni compassa non fuit.’

46 Bonaventure, In Sent. III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, ad 5, p. 355a: ‘Hoc enim est, quod facit hominem cadere a statu et perfectione sapientiae, videlicet quod eius ratio cedat et succumbat passionibus, non autem quod sentiat passiones; et ita pati per modum naturae non auffert rationem propassionis.’
was experiencing the passions of the body with a most acute dolor, but according to deliberative reason, he was overcoming these bodily passions with a virtuous joy.\footnote{Bonaventure, In Sent. III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, ad 5, p. 355b. Although this idea is not expressed in the SH, something similar to it is mentioned in Alexander’s QD, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 6 (n. 56), p. 249.}

A propassion arises in the sensitive appetite, but a human being will have some sort of response to a propassion in the rational part of his soul, and how one judges the propassion will determine whether or not one becomes dominated by it. Since Christ only has a natural wish not to suffer, but rationally willed his suffering, his propassion of sorrow did not develop into a full-fledged form of sorrow.

A third notable difference between Bonaventure and the Summa Halensis occurs when Bonaventure explains how there can be sadness in the higher part of Christ’s reason. Bonaventure notes that it is the common opinion of the masters that Christ suffered even in his higher reason.\footnote{Bonaventure, In Sent. III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 1, Respondeo, p. 354a.} He also sees that it is necessary to attribute suffering to the higher part of Christ’s reason, if Christ is going to cure the whole sinful soul of human persons.\footnote{Bonaventure, In Sent. III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 2, Respondeo, p. 356a.} Yet Bonaventure highlights the difficulty of doing this since it would require ascribing both sorrow and joy to the higher part of Christ’s reason: ‘it is difficult to understand how in the soul of Christ there was dolor and joy according to the same power and the same part of that power.’\footnote{Bonaventure, In Sent. III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 2, Respondeo, p. 356b.}

To understand their compatibility, Bonaventure begins by explaining how joy and sadness are not necessarily contrary affections.\footnote{For more on this aspect of Bonaventure’s Christology, see Cristina Motta, ‘Piacere e Dolore del Cristo in S. Bonaventura,’ Doctor Seraphicus LVI (2009), pp. 17–30.} According to Bonaventure, Christ’s joy and sorrow are not directed at the same object.\footnote{Bonaventure, In Sent. III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 2, Respondeo, p. 356a.} Christ experiences joy over the beatific vision, but sadness over his bodily suffering. Thus, they are not contrary affections. It is also important for Bonaventure that Christ’s joy and sorrow are not in the higher part of his reason in the same way. Joy from the beatific vision is in the higher portion insofar as his reason is taken as reason, while sadness is in the higher portion of reason as a nature. Thus far Bonaventure follows the approach of the Summa Halensis in ascribing sorrow and joy to the higher part of Christ’s reason, but Bonaventure introduces a further distinction to his own account of Christ’s higher reason. Corresponding to the ut ratio/ut natura distinction, Bonaventure describes the higher portion of reason as having a per se object and an object per accidens.

The per se object of higher reason is the divine essence, and its per accidens object is whatever is occurring in the body to which it is united. Taking the higher portion of reason ut ratio gives its per se object as the beatific vision, but this does not preclude it from having a different object accidentally. Higher reason has an object in
this other way because of its connection to the body, and thus sadness is attributed
to the higher portion *per accidens*, and not *per se*.³ Where this goes beyond the *SH*
is in Bonaventure’s description of the higher portion as not having a single eternal ob-
ject, but rather a proper and accidental object. Bonaventure seems driven to make
this distinction between a proper and accidental object of the higher portion because
of the difficulties involved in bringing together what had been independent psycho-
logical principles from the works of Augustine and John Damascene. Nevertheless, as
we shall see, Duns Scotus criticizes the idea that sorrow can properly be attributed to
the higher part of reason, if it is only attributed to it in virtue of something incidental.

Richard of Middleton

Richard of Middleton differs from his predecessors in his understanding of how there
is sadness in Christ’s reason-as-reason. Bonaventure, for instance, attributed sorrow
to Christ’s reason-as-reason only over the suffering or defects found in other people.
Richard, on the other hand, argues that in the lower part of Christ’s *reason-as-reason*
there was sorrow over his own suffering. According to Richard, lower reason consid-
ers good and evil in comparison to lower causes.⁵⁴ By lower reason Christ viewed his
own suffering in reference to his own innocence and in reference to the viciousness
of those inflicting that suffering. Richard writes that all of these considerations ‘were
displeasing to his will, and thus it is clear that in the lower portion of his intellective
part there was sorrow for his bodily sufferings, as that part is considered both *ut na-
tura* and *ut ratio.*⁵⁵

There was no sorrow in Christ’s higher reason-as-reason over his own suffering
because higher reason considers good and evil in relation to the will of God. As Ri-
chard observes, ‘in the [higher] intellective part of Christ’s soul there was no sorrow,
because inasmuch as his intellect apprehended the suffering of his body as pleasing
to the divine will for redeeming the human race, the will of Christ was rejoicing over
the suffering of his own body.’⁵⁶ God’s will that Christ’s passion serve as the means
of human redemption is known in the higher part of Christ’s intellect, and since Christ’s
human will conforms to the divine will, Christ experiences no sorrow over his own
suffering in the higher part. In the lower part of his intellect there is suffering, not
because of a lack of conformity between the human and divine wills of Christ, but

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⁴ Richard of Middleton, *Super quattor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi questiones subtilissimae (In Sent.)* (Brescia: Vincentium Sabbium, 1591; repr. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1963), III, d. 15, ar. 4, q. 2, Re-
spondeo, p. 169a.
⁵ Richard of Middleton, *In Sent. III*, d. 15, ar. 4, q. 2, Respondeo, p. 169a: ‘(...) voluntati displicebat,
et ita patet quod in inferiori portione partis intellective fuit tristitia pro corporis passione: et inqua-
tum consideratur, ut natura et inquantum consideratur, ut ratio.’
because that suffering is looked at from a different perspective. Instead of being considered as the means of human redemption, the lower portion views it as a result of the sinful choices of his persecutors. In this way, his suffering was even displeasing to his will *ut ratio*.

### Matthew of Aquasparta

In one of his quodlibetal questions, Matthew of Aquasparta asks whether there was sorrow in Christ over his own suffering in the higher part of reason. Matthew’s resolution of this question involves extensive citation from different works of Augustine that leads to a striking departure from how his Franciscan predecessors understood the place of sorrow in the higher portion of Christ’s reason.

Matthew cites Augustine’s claim that there can be a twofold *dolor* in the soul. He describes the first form of *dolor* as arising in the soul from the suffering of the body. In this way, there was sorrow in the higher part of Christ’s reason as it is a nature. The other form of *dolor* is called *tristitia*. Matthew claims that *tristitia* arises in the soul when something happens that is contrary to one’s will. Matthew cites Augustine in support of this understanding of *tristitia*: ‘Another *dolor* was in the higher part (...) and this *dolor* is called *tristitia*, which Augustine defines in the same place [City of God XIV.15], when he says that “*tristitia* is the refusal of something that befalls us unwillingly.”

According to Matthew, Augustine’s understanding of sorrow should lead one to hold that Christ did experience sorrow over his own bodily suffering in the higher part reason, and this sorrow, moreover, is present not only *ut natura*, but also *ut ratio*. While this conclusion is a departure from the teaching of his predecessors, Matthew’s defense of it is similar to the explanation that Richard of Middleton gives for attributing sorrow to the *lower* portion of Christ’s reason. Both Richard and Matthew note that Christ viewed his suffering as unjustly inflicted upon him and as something that dishonored God, and for these reasons freely willed it not to occur. To support his position that this should lead to sorrow in higher reason-as-reason, Matthew points out that Augustine claims in *De Trinitate* that it does not only pertain to higher reason to contemplate an eternal object, but also to consider lower things in light of the eternal reasons and to judge lower things in their light. According to Matthew, when Christ consults the eternal light in the

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57 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Questiones disputate de incarnatione et de lapsu aliaeque selectae* (*Questions selectae*) (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1957), q. 5, p. 211.

58 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Questiones selectae*, q. 5, p. 211.

59 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Questiones selectae*, q. 5, p. 211: ‘Et iste utique dolor fuit in parte superiori, non solum ut natura, sed ut ratio.’

60 Matthew of Aquasparta, *Questiones selectae*, q. 5, p. 211.
higher portion of reason, he sees that his suffering is displeasing to God, and thus it also comes to be displeasing to Christ in his human nature. ⁶¹ Yet Matthew nonetheless agrees with Richard of Middleton that Christ also rejoices over his own bodily suffering insofar as it is chosen in conformity with the divine will. Matthew argues that there is no contradiction in Christ simultaneously rejoicing and grieving over his suffering in the higher part of reason because Christ looks at his suffering under two different rationes. ⁶² Christ was saddened over his suffering insofar as he saw it as the result of vicious and unjust actions that are displeasing to God, but he rejoiced over it insofar as it was pleasing to God as a means of redeeming the human race. ⁶³ Matthew, then, differs from Richard not in positing that there are two different rationes under which Christ’s reason can bring his suffering, but in positing that both of these are in the higher portion of Christ’s reason, and that they lead him in different ways to both nil and will his suffering.

Matthew recognizes that it seems contradictory to posit joy and sorrow in Christ’s higher reason even under two different rationes. To address this concern, he argues that there is an order between Christ’s joy and sorrow insofar as his sorrow is a cause for his joy. ⁶⁴ Matthew likens the relation between joy and suffering in Christ to the way that a penitent person rejoices over being forgiven and yet simultaneously feels sorrow for his sins. The joy experienced by such a person depends on experiencing sorrow for one’s sins, and in this way the sorrow of a penitent is material with respect to his joy. ⁶⁵ Similarly, Christ can experience sorrow over the sins of others, including sorrow over how those sins lead to his own suffering, and at the same time rejoice because he is making satisfaction for those sins.

The ideas that Matthew is drawing on here about sorrow being matter for joy and the penitent person being a model of the compatibility of joy and sorrow are similar to ideas found in Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, and Richard of Middleton. ⁶⁶ Yet

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⁶¹ Matthew of Aquasparta, Questiones selectae, q. 5, p. 212: ‘Aeterna autem lex, quae est voluntas Dei, consulta utrum debeat sibi displicere Dei inhonoratio, respondet quod sic; consulta utrum commatiendum sit peccatis hominum, pro quibus perpetuo damnantur, respondet quod sic; consulta utrum debeat de iniquitate Iudaeorum tristari, pariter respondet quod sic. Ergo manifestum est istum dolorem sive tristitiam esse in partes uperiori, ut, ad istum est contemplari vel inspicere, sed etiam illas consulere rationes.’

⁶² Matthew of Aquasparta, Questiones selectae, q. 6, p. 215: ‘Ulterius, etiam de eodem gaudere et dolore, consolare et tristaturi non est inconveniens, secundum aliam et aliam rationem et considerationem.’

⁶³ Matthew of Aquasparta, Questiones selectae, q. 6, p. 215: ‘Unde simul de passione dolebat ut iniqua ex parte Iudaeorum infligentium, et gaudebat quia Deo accepta et placita; simul dolebat aspirando ad causam quia pro culpa, et gaudebat aspirando ad finem quia culpae reparativa.’

⁶⁴ Matthew of Aquasparta, Questiones selectae, q. 6, p. 216: ‘Etsi enim corpore patiente compatriebatur et condolebat humanae infelicitati, tamen de isto dolore gaudebat, dum per hoc pro peccatis nostris satisfaciebat et voluntatem Patris impiebat.’

⁶⁵ Matthew of Aquasparta, Questiones selectae, q. 6, p. 216.

⁶⁶ Alexander of Hales, QD, q. 16, disp. 2, m. 5 (n. 54), p. 249; Bonaventure, In Sent. III, d. 16, ar. 2, q. 2, Respondeo, p. 356b; Richard of Middleton, In Sent. III, d. 15, ar. 4, q. 2, ad 2, p. 169b.
Matthew employs this line of thinking in a new way, when he invokes it to support his claim that Christ’s higher reason-as-reason simultaneously experiences joy and sorrow.

**Duns Scotus**

Unlike the Franciscans discussed above, Duns Scotus does not attribute sorrow to the higher portion of Christ’s reason insofar as that part is taken *ut natura*. According to Scotus, this would be to attribute sorrow to the higher part in virtue of something that is incidental to it. Of course, one of the attractions that this way of attributing sorrow to Christ held for the *Summa Halensis*, Bonaventure, and Richard of Middleton was its ability to account for sorrow in Christ’s higher reason without in any way implying that Christ did not freely will his passion. As we have seen, Matthew of Aquasparta begins to depart from this approach insofar as he allows that in a certain way Christ does freely will his own passion in higher reason. While Scotus follows in the direction of Matthew, he develops a more nuanced account of how sorrow can be attributed to the higher part of Christ’s soul.

Scotus points out that determining whether there could be sorrow in the higher part depends on how one characterizes that part. Scotus distinguishes two ways of considering the higher portion of the soul. According to the first way, Christ’s higher reason and will solely regard an eternal object. In a broader sense, the higher part of the soul considers temporal things in relation to the eternal. In this broader sense, higher reason judges things according to the eternal rules, and the will wills whatever it wills in reference to eternal things. Like Matthew of Aquasparta, Scotus refers to what Augustine says about higher reason in *De Trinitate* XII as support for taking the higher portion in this broader sense.

There could be no sorrow in Christ’s higher part taken in the narrow sense, but when taken broadly, it is possible to ascribe sorrow to Christ’s higher portion. According to Scotus, the sins of others cause sorrow in the higher part of Christ’s will. Scotus also states that sorrow could arise in Christ’s will over evils that are

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69 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 73) (Vat., 9:511).

70 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 75) (Vat., 9:511).
‘disagreeable to his own supposit or to other persons loved by him.’ It is in this area where Scotus will broach the question of Christ’s sorrow over his own bodily suffering. It is important to notice that Scotus more sharply distinguishes than Matthew of Aquasparta sorrow over the sins of others from sorrow over one’s own bodily suffering. As we have seen, Matthew holds that Christ experiences sorrow over his own bodily suffering because he sees it as unjustly inflicted upon himself. For Scotus, this way of describing Christ’s sorrow would fall under sorrow over the sins of others, rather than sorrow over his own bodily suffering.

To determine whether Christ experiences sorrow over his own bodily suffering, Scotus asks whether Christ nilled his bodily suffering according to any of the four ways that sorrow can arise in the will. According to Scotus, there can be sorrow in the will: 1. when something that is simply unwanted occurs; 2. from a naturally disagreeable object; 3. from an object disagreeable to the sense appetite; and 4. from an object that is conditionally nilled. Of these four ways, all but the third are possible for the higher part of the will. The higher will can absolutely or conditionally not want something. The higher will is also naturally inclined to want certain things whose opposites will cause sadness in it. Yet the higher will is not conjoined to the sense appetite, and so the third way that sadness could arise in the will does not apply to it.

Scotus argues that Christ experiences sorrow over his bodily suffering according to the second way that sorrow can arise in the will since such suffering is a naturally disagreeable object. To explain how this is possible Scotus distinguishes between the will as having a natural inclination and the will as a free power. Scotus writes, ‘it is clear concerning his will as a nature that he willed the good for his person and did so with respect to what is eternal – and what he did not wish for happened, and what was not wished for was contrary to his affectio commodi, and this is sufficient for sorrow.’ Christ’s natural will wished for bodily integrity and wished for this in a way that was consonant with his orientation to the eternal. Since this wishing was ordered to the eternal, it is an act of the higher portion of his will.

Christ’s will as a free power, however, did will his passion. Thus, he did not experience sorrow over it to the extent that he freely chose to suffer in accord with the affectio iustitiae. His wish to suffer was an absolute wish, and thus there was no sorrow in Christ’s will with respect to the first way that there can be sorrow in the will.

Yet Scotus argues that Christ conditionally wished not to suffer. According to Scotus, suffering is not choice-worthy in itself, and so he wills it on the condition that certain goods can only be achieved by undergoing suffering. In this way,

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71 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 75) (Vat., 9:511).
73 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 95) (Vat., 9:518).
75 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 104) (Vat., 9:522).
then, there is even sorrow in Christ’s higher will as it is a free power.⁷⁶ Thus, Scotus like some of his predecessors holds that Christ simultaneously experiences sorrow and joy because of what he freely wills, but he explains this in a new way by invoking the distinction between absolutely and conditionally nilling something. This perhaps expresses with greater precision the distinction that Matthew of Aquasparta was making between willing and nilling suffering under two different rationes.

When Scotus considers whether there was sorrow in Christ’s lower will, he attributes sorrow to it for many of the same reasons that he attributes it to his higher will. Thus, Christ’s lower will experiences sorrow over the sins of others and sorrow over his own bodily suffering insofar as he conditionally nilled them.⁷⁷ Scotus also attributes sorrow to Christ’s lower will as a natural power, but he does so in a way that is different from how he describes the sorrow in Christ’s natural will as it is in the higher part of his soul. In the lower part of his soul, Christ’s natural will is conjoined to his sense appetite, and suffers when it suffers. As Scotus writes, ‘it is clear that [the lower will] as a nature or as conjoined to his sensitive appetite did suffer by being saddened.’⁷⁸ In this way Scotus preserves something of the idea common to his predecessors that Christ experiences sorrow over his own bodily suffering in ratio ut natura.

Conclusion

Jerome’s idea of a propassion proved an attractive, but inadequate, account of Christ’s sorrow for the Summa Halensis and subsequent Franciscan theologians. The strength of Jerome’s theory was its ability to explain how Christ could have genuine human emotions and yet still conform to the Stoic model of a wise man. While this remained an important aspect of 13th-century accounts of Christ’s sorrow, the authors considered above also showed interest in examining Christ’s sorrow in response to the idea that making satisfaction for sin requires suffering in each part of his soul, and that this suffering would lead to sorrow.

The Summa Halensis offered a well-developed account of the sorrow of Christ and subsequent Franciscans followed its lead and freely made use of the tools the Summa provided to explore this topic. Augustine’s idea of higher and lower reason loomed large in this way of considering Christ’s sorrow. Also, the idea of sorrow as arising when something occurs contrary to one’s will is very much in accord

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⁷⁶ Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 101) (Vat., 9:520–21): ‘Tertio, videndum est de portione superiore ut libera est, et de nolitione condicionali vel habituali (et dico “habitualem” in cuius actum voluntas prona est ex se exire nisi alium obstet). Sic videtur dicendum esse quod illa portio noluit passionem, id est noluisse quantum in se fuisse si omnia prospera et iusta secundum se appetibilia aequo fuissent sine ea.’


⁷⁸ Duns Scotus, Ordinatio III, d. 15, q. 1 (n. 106) (Vat., 9:522).
with Augustine’s thoughts on the emotions. As Peter King observed, ‘[for Augustine] emotions are intimately bound up with the will.’\textsuperscript{79} Moreover, in some ways there is an increasing Augustinianism beginning with Matthew of Aquasparta and continuing with Scotus. Both of them highlight Augustine’s notion that the higher portion of reason can be taken in a strict or broad sense, and both of them emphasize how taking it in a broader sense allows one to attribute sorrow over his own suffering to the higher portion of Christ’s will.

While 13th-century Franciscan theologians looked to Augustine for an understanding of the soul and the emotions to help them address questions about Christ’s sorrow, their use of Augustine provides additional verification for Lydia Schumacher’s claim that the early Franciscan school represents much more than an unoriginal repetition of Augustine’s ideas.\textsuperscript{80} As we have seen, the Summa and subsequent Franciscans united parts of Augustine’s understanding of the soul with that of John Damascene’s. Also, Augustinian psychology and the Augustinian account of the passions adopted by these Franciscans was used to answer a question that Augustine himself never posed, namely, whether there was sorrow in every part of Christ’s soul. That question arose from an interpretation of Anselm’s soteriology found in the early Franciscan school that connects making satisfaction with undergoing suffering. Finally, the originality of how Augustine’s ideas were used by these Franciscans is also evident in those places where they offer different accounts of where and why sorrow is to be located in Christ’s soul. As we saw, for example, there was disagreement among the Franciscans over how to attribute sorrow to the higher part of Christ’s reason and will. Thus, the Summa Halensis inaugurated a new way of thinking about Christ’s sorrow, but it did not initiate a static tradition.


\textsuperscript{80} Lydia Schumacher, ‘New Directions in Franciscan Studies,’ Theology 120:4 (2017), pp. 253–61; and idem, Early Franciscan Theology, ch. 1, pp. 1–29.