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Editor's Statement

In contrast to the first issue of 2022, this second issue is pure philosophy—although its articles are as diverse as are the parts of philosophy. Thus, John Nieto critiques a misunderstanding about the mind's first apprehension of being, whereas Bernard Guéry interprets a recent papal encyclical on the political order in light of the distinction between gradations of universal final causality. We also include two less well-known texts composed by Charles De Koninck, both works of the *sapiens*, whose office it is to contemplate the order among sciences: one on the significance of Aristotle's underappreciated tenth logical category, and another on the best way to define arts of imitation that are aimed at the sheer delight imitation evokes.

Our final two essays, while also philosophical in nature, respond to the growing scholarly interest in the work of Cardinal Cajetan,* the sixteenth-century theologian and defender of St. Thomas Aquinas who both argued on the frontlines against the heterodox theology of his contemporary, Martin Luther, and wrote the first complete commentary on the *Summa Theologiae*. In this issue we offer two works that demonstrate Cajetan's own sapiential insights: a translation of his treatise on how to articulate (and how *not* to articulate) the subject of natural philosophy, and a selection from his commentary on the *Summa* centering on the metaphysics of knowing, from the humble act of sensation to the self-knowledge of the Godhead.

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* As is indicated by recent scholarship and the publication of translations of his theological and philosophical writings. Examples include: Hieromonk Gregory Hrynkiw, *Cajetan on Sacred Doctrine* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2020); *On Exchange and Usury*, trans. Patrick Brannan (Acton Institute, 2014); *Cajetan Responds: A Reader in Reformation Controversy*, ed. and trans. Jared Wicks (Wipf and Stock, 2011); and recently reprinted, *The Analogy of Names, and the Concept of Being*, trans. Edward Bushinski and H. Koren (Wipf and Stock, 2009).

Christopher A. Decaen
Thomas Aquinas College,
November, 2022

Preface

At Thomas Aquinas College we often say that the education we provide is only a beginning. For the most part, our students are reading the important works in our program for the first time, and the class discussion, while certainly helping them to better understand the principal arguments and themes in the readings and to acquire the intellectual virtues, only introduces them to the profoundest truths and deepest questions that have engaged mankind for centuries.

Accordingly, it is fitting that the College publish *The Aquinas Review* to honor its patron and to provide a forum for deeper consideration of those matters which constitute its curriculum and are central to genuine Catholic liberal education. Consistent with the nature of the College itself, this review is marked by fidelity to the *Magisterium* of the Catholic Church and a respect for the great tradition of liberal learning which is our common heritage.

The essays in *The Aquinas Review* reflect positions taken by their authors and not necessarily by the College itself. The editor—in collaboration with the editorial board—determines the contents of each issue. Any interested person may submit an essay for consideration or letters or comments on articles already published.

It is our hope that *The Aquinas Review* will be a source of wisdom to its readers and contributors.

Paul O'Reilly
President, Thomas Aquinas College

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HAS GILSON OVERLOOKED *ESSE*?

John Francis Nieto

> The greatest mistake which a metaphysician can make about being is to overlook the very act whereby it is a being.
>
> —Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*

[Author's note: I wrote this essay over twenty years ago with the now long-forgotten intention of writing something more comprehensive about Etienne Gilson's *Being and Some Philosophers*.[1] The request to publish it in this review has led me to reread it with more satisfaction than I expected. I have made a few changes where I thought the diction inaccurate or the syntax unclear and I have added a few footnotes. But I determined not to "update" it. I have also thought it advisable here to point out that the intellectual acts I describe in these remarks fall under the knowledge Saint Thomas Aquinas describes when he says, in the first lesson of his commentary on Dionysius's *On the Divine Names*, "Multa cognoscimus virtute quae

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John Francis Nieto has taught thirty years at Thomas Aquinas College, where he also did his undergraduate work. He received a doctorate in 1998 from the University of Notre Dame. He is currently working on a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.

[1] Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952).

> non actu speculamur."[2] In fact these acts constitute the very first elements in such knowledge. The infant mind forms the acts I describe here while sensible beings and its desires for them absorb its attention. Still such intellectual acts constitute the foundation for the mind's hold upon these beings (in its distinction from and in dependence upon the senses) and for its steadily increasing efforts to satisfy these desires. Very few of us ever look directly at them, as Saint Thomas points out. This labor belongs to philosophers: a labor only possible because these acts underlie every other intellectual act, yet are more difficult to unearth in their proper integrity than the fossils of living bodies long extinct.]

In the final chapter of his influential book *Being and Some Philosophers*, Etienne Gilson offers an account of the first activity of the human intellect. He recognizes two simultaneous operations, an abstraction and a composition, corresponding to the two powers of the intellect as such.[3] While the text is riddled with confusions, a number of precise statements lead to the conclusion that Gilson has misunderstood the concept arising in the intellect's first abstraction. As a result, he explains the principle that *ens primo cadit in conceptione intellectus*[4] in an accidental manner. Further, Gilson's misunderstanding follows from a failure to see the role of existence in the intellect's first grasp of essence. In these matters Gilson has in fact neglected the principle that *esse [est] formalissimum inter omnia*.[5]

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[2] St. Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum de Divinis Nominibus*, ch. 1, lec. 1, n. 9: "We know many things virtually which we do not actually look at."

[3] St. Thomas, *Commentaria in Posteriorum Analyticorum*, I.1, 33–40, 41–43; *Expositio Libri Peryermenias* (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1989), I.1, 1–14.

[4] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 5, a. 2, c. (henceforth *STh*): "Being is what falls into the conception of the intellect first."

[5] St. Thomas, *Quaestio disputata de Anima*, a. 2, ad 17: "among all things, existence is the most formal." Cf. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 229.

Gilson's Account of Our First Conception of Being

Now, Gilson quite rightly claims that the first proposition of the intellect is "being is." He also sees, in some manner, that it is a *per se notum* or self-evident proposition, one in which the predicate is contained in the definition or account of the subject.[6] Thus he says, "In fact, being itself is neither existence nor essence; it is their unity,"[7] and again, "Not even the simple apprehension of being can be without a judgment. Since an *ens* is an *esse habens*, all that which is conceived as a being is also judged to be an *is*."[8]

Yet Gilson thinks the first concept formed by the intellect expresses essence insofar as it is distinct from existence. When giving an account of the manner in which being is what first falls into the intellect, Gilson betrays his intention and proposes the first apprehension of the intellect in a manner that does not satisfy this principle:

> Abstraction and judgment are never separated in the mind, because essence and existence are never separated in reality. I may well abstract the essence of a certain being and deal with it for a while as though it were unrelated to the being from which I abstracted it, but it is not, for *essentia* always belongs to an *esse*, and, even while I conceive it apart, essence never cuts loose from actual being. . . . Thomas Aquinas was fond of repeating, with Avicenna, that being is what first falls into the mind, and this is true; but it does not mean that our cognition is an abstract cognition. What comes first is a sensible perception whose object is immediately known by our intellect as "being," and this direct apprehension by a knowing subject immediately releases a twofold and

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[6] Cf. St. Thomas, *In libros Metaphysicorum*, Bk. 4, lec. 5, n. 595 (henceforth *In Metaph.*); see note 13 below.

[7] Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 209.

[8] Ibid., 209; cf. St. Thomas, *In Metaph.*, lec. 6, n. 605.

> complementary intellectual operation. First, the knowing subject apprehends *what* the given object is, next it judges *that* the object is, and this instantaneous recomposition of the existence of given objects with their essences merely acknowledges the actual structure of these objects. The only difference is that, instead of being simply experienced, such objects now are intellectually known.[9]

While the text includes a confusing reference to an intellectual apprehension of "being," this seems to be naturally posterior to an act in which "I may well abstract the essence of a certain being and deal with it for a while as though it were unrelated to the being from which I abstracted it." In such an act, "I conceive it apart." He goes on to state clearly that the first operation "apprehends *what* the given object is." This is explained as a grasp of the object's essence, which is only "recomposed" with its existence in the second act, the judgment that it is. Such a "recomposition" is necessary because the initial abstraction brings forth a concept of the object's essence *rather* than its existence.

As the concept of being involves both essence and existence—for being is "what is"—this is to say that the concept of being depends upon abstraction of the essence *and* the judgment that it exists. The concept of being, even if temporally simultaneous, is psychologically posterior to such abstraction and composition.

In the following paragraphs Gilson emphasizes this position, albeit with little clarity. At first one might understand him to say (rightly, I maintain) that the knowledge of being demands that of existence, and therefore the proposition "being is" immediately *follows* the concept of being, as the self-evident principle proper to that concept:

> To repeat, every *ens* is an *esse habens*, and unless its *esse*

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[9] Ibid., 203–204.

> be included in our cognition of it, it is not known as an *ens*, that is, as a *be-ing*. If what we have in mind is not this and that being, but being in general, then its cognition necessarily involves that of existence in general, and such a general cognition still entails the most fundamental of all judgments, namely that being is. In short, the very notion of a purely essential cognition of being is self-contradictory, and, because being imperiously demands the immediate recognition, through judgment, of the *esse* which it includes, its knowledge is both essential and existential in its own right.[10]

However, the distinction of "this and that being" from "being in general" suggests the consideration of a determinate essence: a man or a dog. The earlier text suggests that Gilson imagines one can, in the first instance of intellectual activity, conceive such essences with some distinction, so as to grasp *what* it is.

He makes this view clear when he explains how "being," *insofar* as it is that into which all the intellect's conceptions are resolved, depends upon a judgment:

> Being, then is not only the first and primary object of intellectual cognition, it is the cognition into which every other one ultimately resolves: "*Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum et in quod omnes conceptiones resolvit est ens.*"[11] And, since *ens* (being) includes its own *esse* (to be), each and every real knowledge ultimately is resolved into the composition of an essence with its own existence, which are posited as one by an act of judging.[12]

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[10] Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 204.

[11] Gilson's text reads "*in quo*" here, though he clearly understands it (correctly) as *in quod*: "however, that which the intellect conceives first as what is best known, and into which it resolves all conceptions, is being."

[12] Ibid., 205.

Clearly, on this account, the very notion of being as "what is" depends upon the intellect's composition of essence and existence in a proposition in which the subject signifies the essence in its distinction from existence, "this is" or "that is."

How Gilson Overlooked the Role of Esse *in Our First Conception of Being*

Now, such an account renders the principle that being is what first falls into the intellect accidental. For, were this so, being would not enter the intellect as such. Rather, it would enter the intellect through its intelligible parts, essence and existence. One act of the intellect would conceive essence, another would "assert" existence and so unite it to the essence simultaneously abstracted. Such a concept would be no more one than that of "white man."

Further, the proposition "being is," so understood, would lose its self-evident character. St. Thomas explains such propositions, in his *Metaphysics* commentary, as he approaches the discussion of the intellect's first and most fundamental proposition:

> Self-evident propositions are those that are known as soon as the terms are known, as is said the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*. Now, this happens in those propositions in which the predicate is put in the definition of the subject, or the predicate is the same with the subject.[13]

On Gilson's account the predicate is not drawn from the subject. Rather, we come upon a sort of "synthetic" judgment in which the predicate is joined to the subject by the intellect's power of composition. Being, taken as "that which is," is formed or constructed in and by this judgment.

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[13] St. Thomas, *In Metaph.*, Bk. 4, lec. 5, n. 595: "[P]ropositiones per se notae sunt, quae statim notis terminis cognoscuntur, ut dicitur primo *Posteriorum*. Hoc autem contingit in illis propositionibus, in quibus praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti, vel praedicatum est idem subiecto."

But this most fundamental proposition cannot depend upon a construct of the intellect, even if its operations were providentially suited to the nature of its object. Rather, the very nature and order in the intellect's operations follow from the nature of the object known.[14] The first concept, "being," demands some resolution, precisely because it is an adequate representation of that object, an essence that exists. Thus what the intellect conceives in common about many particular instances of its object in a concrete manner under the name of "being" it immediately conceives in a more distinct manner under the name "is." The verb arises from the same intelligible species as the subject, but with a different mode of signifying corresponding to a different mode of understanding. The intellect that conceives the existence of its objects in the concrete mode and calls them beings, immediately conceives the same existence as in some way distinct from, yet inhering in, these beings and says that they are.

Gilson is thus correct in thinking that the knowledge of being implies some relation of the essence known to its real existence. But this is not found first in the judgment of existence. Rather, this is present in the mind's first concept. The essence of the mind's object is first conceived under the formality of its existence.

Where Gilson Went Wrong

What seems principally to have motivated Gilson to give his account is his reading of a text from St. Thomas's commentary on Boethius's *De Trinitate,* "The first operation regards the very nature of the thing, . . . the second operation regards the very existence of the thing."[15] He understands the first operation to attend abstractedly to the object's nature or essence and therefore to conceive it in its distinction from the object's existence. Thus the concept of being or "what is" must receive its completion from the act of judgment. He develops an account of abstraction to correspond to this understanding.

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[14] Gilson seems to interpret St. Thomas's distinction of the three operations of the intellect as though the intellect were a machine, pre-programmed to work in these three ways. The distinction should be understood as expressing a dynamic interaction of the intellect with its object by which the intellect completes its knowledge of the object.

Gilson thus asserts that "Judgments always affirm that certain conceived essences are in a state of union with, or of separation from, existence."[16] He later elaborates on the relation of such judgment to the intellect's grasp of a thing's nature in its first operation:

> [W]hile abstraction can correctly conceive apart what is really one, judgment cannot separate what is one in reality. It cannot do it, at least in this sense that, when it does, it betrays its own function and defeats its own purpose. In other words, whereas abstraction is there provisorily to take parts out of their whole, judgment is there to integrate or to reintegrate those same parts into their wholes.[17]

This text is quite explicit. Judgments unite what the power of apprehension has separated by abstraction. The paradigm of such judgments would seem to be "Man is white," or "Man is not white," in which the predicate signifies a distinct nature from that signified by the subject. Each is known separately by abstraction, while they are joined into a whole in a judgment.

But this account of abstraction is seriously defective and even contradicts the very words of St. Thomas in the commentary from which it takes its principle. St. Thomas recognizes two abstractions of the intellect: formal abstraction, by which a form is abstracted from sensible matter (used in mathematics), and total abstraction, by which a nature is considered in distinction from all parts that do not belong to its "essential *ratio*." This latter produces the universal, standing as a whole to what we predicate it of. St. Thomas plainly asserts that there is no abstraction by which the part is abstracted from the whole:

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[15] St. Thomas, *Expositio Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 3, c. (Decker edition [Brill, 1955], 182); henceforth, *In De Trin.*: "Prima quidem operatio respicit ipsam naturam rei, . . . secunda operatio respicit ipsum esse rei."

[16] Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 203.

[17] Ibid.

> And so there are two abstractions of the intellect: one that responds to the union of form and matter or of accident and subject, and this is the abstraction of form from sensible matter; another that responds to the union of the whole and part, and to this the abstraction of the universal from the particular responds, which is the abstraction of a whole from all parts that are not parts of the species, but are accidental parts, in which [abstraction] some nature is considered absolutely according to its essential definition. However, there are found no abstractions opposed to these, whereby the part is abstracted from the whole, or matter from form. For either the part cannot be abstracted from a whole by the intellect, if it is among the parts of the matter in whose definition the whole is present, or it can also exist without the whole, if it is among the parts of the species, like a line without triangle, or a letter without syllable, or an element without the compund. In these things that can exist divided in being, however, a separation more than an abstraction has place.[18]

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[18] St. Thomas, *In De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3, c. (Decker edition [Brill, 1955], 185–86): "Et ita sunt duae abstractiones intellectus: una quae respondet unioni formae et materiae vel accidentis et subiecti, et haec est abstractio formae a materia sensibili; alia quae respondet unioni totius et partis, et huic respondet abstractio uniuersalis a particulari, quae est abstractio totius, in quo consideratur absolute natura aliqua secundum suam rationem essentialem, ab omnibus partibus, quae non sunt partes speciei, sed sunt partes accidentales. Non autem inueniuntur abstractiones eis oppositae, quibus pars abstrahatur a toto vel materia a

Other questions aside, here, in the consideration of essence and existence, division *secundum esse* is altogether out of place. The absurdity of an essence *existing* apart from existence seems to be *why* Gilson is so determined against what he calls "purely abstract cognition" of being.[19]

Yet, even if his account of abstraction were sound, Gilson is in fact inattentive. He says that "abstraction can correctly conceive apart what is really one,"[20] and he applies this to the consideration of essence and existence. But in the text to which he clearly refers, a distinction is made: "But according to the first operation [the intellect] can abstract those things that are not separate in reality, yet not all, but some."[21]

This consideration of how things can be understood apart from that with which they are really united shows that essence can never be understood apart from existence. For one thing can never be understood apart from what constitutes the account or definition of its nature:

> When therefore with respect to that through which the account of the nature is constituted and through which the nature is understood, that nature has an order to and dependence upon something else, then it stands that that nature cannot be understood without the other.... But if one does not depend upon another according to what constitutes the account of the nature, then one can

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forma; quia pars vel non potest abstrahi a toto per intellectum si sit de partibus materiae in quarum diffinitione ponitur totum, uel potest etiam sine toto esse, si sit de partibus speciei, sicut linea sine triangulo, vel littera sine sillaba, vel elementum sine mixto. In his autem quae secundum esse possunt esse divisa, magis habet locum separatio quam abstractio."

[19] Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 204

[20] Ibid., 203.

[21] St. Thomas, *In De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3, c. (182): "Sed secundum primam operationem potest abstrahere ea quae secundum rem separata non sunt, non tamen omnia, set aliqua."

> be abstracted from the other by the intellect so that it is understood without it, not only if they are separate in reality, but even if they are really conjoined.[22]

But essence has from its very nature and definition an order to existence and depends upon it for its intelligibility, as will be more evident later. So it cannot be understood apart from an understanding of existence.

Note here that what Gilson says about abstraction seems to be something other than what he means. This passage is instructive:

> Judgments unite in the mind what is united in reality, or they separate in the mind what is separated in reality.... This is why, while abstraction can correctly conceive apart what is really one, judgment cannot separate what is one in reality. . . . In other words, whereas abstraction is there provisorily to take parts out of their wholes, judgment is there to integrate or to reintegrate those same parts into their wholes.[23]

Gilson is clearly thinking here that we abstract many things that exist in one subject, and this is true, as when one says, "Man is brown." But the phrase he uses, "to take parts out of their whole," does not even describe such an operation. "Man" and "brown" are not taken from "brown man" as such. "Man" may be abstracted from something brown, and "brown" may be abstracted from a man. But each of these is precisely what St. Thomas considers total abstraction, the "abstraction of a whole from all parts which are not parts of the species but are accidental parts, in which [abstraction] some nature is considered absolutely according to is essential account."[24] In the intellect's second operation, we bring some individual or supposit under these two natures—under man in the subject position and under brown in the predicate position—in recognition of their union in that individual.

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[22] Ibid. (183): "Quando ergo secundum hoc per quod constituitur ratio naturae et per quod ipsa natura intelligitur, natura ipsa habet ordinem et dependentiam ad aliquid aliud, tunc constat quod natura illa sine illo alio intelligi non potest. . . . Si vero unum ab altero non dependeat secundum id quod constituit rationem naturae, tunc unum potest ab altero abstrahi per intellectum ut sine eo intelligatur non solum si sint separata secundum rem, . . . sed etiam si secundum rem coniuncta sint."

[23] Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, 203.

In fact, the phrase "to take parts out of their whole" more closely describes the consideration "in abstraction" and "by resolution" of some part of a whole known "in concretion," as, for example, humanity distinguished from man.[25] Even here, however, we can focus on and attend to the part "by itself," but it is known and defined by the whole from which it has been resolved. We can certainly think about the foot without distinct attention to the whole animal or even what kind of animal has such a foot. But we cannot conceive a foot except as an instrument animals use in their forward movement. Thus, existence and essence may be considered "in abstraction" from one another, but neither existence nor essence can be understood apart from an understanding of being, of which they are the intelligible parts.[26]

How We First Conceive Essence

This can be made clear by considering the starting point for Gilson's account of abstraction, the distinction made by St. Thomas regarding the operations of the intellect as such: "The first operation regards the very nature of the thing, . . . the second operation regards the very existence of the thing."[27] Gilson rightly understands the first operation to bear upon the essence or nature of the thing rather than its existence. In fact, existence can never be abstracted.[28] For the object known and the intelligible form or species differ only in their mode of existence. In the object this essence has real existence, in the mind it has intelligible existence. Were existence abstracted, it would differ from the existence in reality by its existence, which is, of course, absurd. Rather, some essence is abstracted.

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[24] St. Thomas, *In De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3, c.. (185): "abstractio totius, in quo consideratur absolute natura aliqua secundum suam rationem essentialem, ab omnibus partibus, quae non sunt partes speciei, sed sunt partes accidentales."

[25] Cf. St. Thomas, *STh* I, q. 12, a. 4, ad 3.

[26] This fact seems the principal motivation of St. Thomas's opusculum *De Ente et Essentia*. I might add here that the fact that existence and essence are real parts of the being that is the proper object of our intellect—however much it causes the order in the first operations of our intellect—remains matter for scientific consideration far beyond the understanding of reality spoken of here.

But, in considering the first use of this operation, Gilson neglects the principle that existence is most formal of all. For when St. Thomas points out that not all things that are really conjoined can be abstracted from one another, he introduces a psychological principle that is most appropriate here:

> For since anything is intelligible insofar as it is in act, as is said in *Metaphysics* 9, it is necessary that the nature or quiddity of a thing be understood either insofar as it is some act . . . or according to that which is its act . . . and this is that from which any nature is allotted its definition.[29]

Certainly the essence of anything is an act, but existence is yet more formal and actual. The essence is in potency to its existence. The intellect therefore first conceives essence *secundum id quod est actus eius*, with respect to its act. The intellect does not in its very first concept know what its object is except in relation to existence; it knows its object as a being.

This is evident from the name assigned by the intellect to the concept that immediately proceeds in this first abstraction, the name "being." For the name signifies what the intellect conceives about its object: "the notion signified by the name is what the intellect conceives about the reality, and it signifies this through the sound of voice."[30] But the name "being" only expresses the essence of the object indeterminately, as what is. It determinately expresses the object's existence: "'Being' expresses not the whatness, but only the act of existing."[31] What is formally signified by the name "being" is the existence belonging to any essence and making it intelligible. The essence is the thing named, for the existence is *its* actuality and perfection. But this name "being" is not taken from what distinguishes essence from existence or one essence from another. Rather, in the name "being" essence is denominated from the existence to which it is ordered.

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[27] St. Thomas, *In De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 3, c. (182); see note 15 for the Latin.

[28] I am following Gilson's use of "to abstract" here.

[29] Ibid. (182–83): "Cum enim unaquaeque res sit intelligibilis secundum quod est in actu, ut dicitur in IX *Metaphisice*, oportet quod ipsa natura sive quiditas rei intelligatur uel secundum quod est actus quidam . . . vel secundum id quod est actus eius . . . et hoc est illud ex quo unaquaequae natura suam rationem sortitur."

In fact, the intellect considers essence distinctly only in light of the concept and proposition under investigation, the concept of being and the self-evident proposition that a being is. The intellect knows the essence as a "being" in the first instance of its first operation. The essence of things is first received into the intellect under the concept of being. This is how being falls first into the intellect.

The intellect then conceives the existence that determines this concept in another, more distinct manner and so draws it out of the concept of "being" into the predicate "is."[32] Thus "is"

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[30] St. Thomas, *STh* I, q. 5, a. 2, c.: "Ratio enim significata per nomen, est id quod concipit intellectus de re, et significat illud per vocem."

[31] St. Thomas, *In libros Sententiarum*, Bk. I, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2: "Ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi."

[32] One intelligible species can serve for many concepts of the object, so long as the relation of the species to the object is diverse and one concept depends upon another. Thus, from the first intelligible species proceed the concepts of being, non-being, divided, one, and many. Cf. *STh* I, q. 11, a. 2, ad 4. But in working out these concepts, the intellect does not receive a second (impressed) species, for example, of negation. Rather, through the very intelligible species

"signifies what first falls in the intellect through the mode of actuality absolutely, for 'is' simply speaking signifies to be in act, and therefore it signifies through the mode of a verb."[33] Now, the mode of the verb is that of action, "as proceeding from substance and inhering in it as in a subject."[34] Conceived as inhering, existence is distinct from the essence that is its subject—at least in thought—though the same in subject with that subject, and can therefore be predicated of that subject. This completes the first composition of the intellect, "being is."

Although essence and its conditions (material, for example, and sensible) are implicit even in the first abstraction from our intellect's proper object, none of these provides the formality under which it is first intelligible.[35] Rather, such notions

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by which it conceives its object as a being, it also conceives another as a being, and then considers them as divided from one another by attention to the sensible differences by which one is here and another is there, and so on. Comparison with the moral order may be helpful here: many moral acts proceed from a single habit of virtue, with these two conditions: the relation to the object is diverse and the posterior depends upon the prior. Cf. *STh* II–II, q. 28, a. 1, c.

[33] St. Thomas, *Expositio Libri Peryermenias* (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1989), lec. 5, lns. 394–96: "significat enim id quod primo cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute; nam 'est' simpliciter dictum significat esse actu, et ideo significat per modum verbi."

[34] Cf. Ibid., lns. 62–64: "alio modo per modum actionis, ut scilicet est egrediens a substantia et inhaerens ei ut subiecto, et sic significatur per uerba aliorum modorum. . . ." Beware here of the foolishness of taking the verb's mode of signifying as an indication that existence is action or activity in reality. It is certainly an actuality, but an actuality proper to category of being that includes the essence in question. The present consideration bears upon essence simply speaking, which is nothing other than the category of substance. So all existence belongs to it, insofar as includes first substances or supposits, yet existence belongs to it in order: substantial existence first and, as the "essences" of various accidents belong to it in order, so the existence proper to each of these accidents actualizes the individual or first substance. This is to attend to first substance as a supposit.

[35] This fact leads some to imagine that one can consider immaterial being sufficiently through this first concept of the intellect as we first grasp it—without extending the concept by demonstration. Their error arises because they

are made explicit by a process of resolution. After recognizing being and that it is, the intellect turns again to the subject of the proposition and conceives it under the notion of "what" or *quid*. After recognizing that "being is," the intellect asks "what is it?" This "what" is the concept to which the names "substance" and "essence" will later be assigned.

But this concept, even though it does not call for a second intelligible species, clearly depends upon a resolution of the concept of "being" in light of the concept of "is." We attend to the essence as the subject, at least in thought, to its existence distinguished from it, yet considered as inhering in it.[36] "Essence" names the object as that in which existence inheres, as *what* exists.

Consideration of the definitions of essence Saint Thomas employs in *De Ente et Essentia* also manifests the deficiency in Gilson's account. Whether he defines essence logically or

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fail to consider the fact that nothing is true unless the intellect can verify it in some first substance or supposit. So St. Thomas points out, "This is false, '[a] man is every man" because it cannot be verified for any supposit." *STh* I, q. 39, a. 6, ad 1. To verify that some being is immaterial, one must prove that such a being exists as a principle or cause to the substances or supposits immediately known to us.

[36] This is only the logical distinction of essence and existence. Cf. St. Thomas, *Expositio libri De Hebdomadibus*, lec. 2: "Dicit ergo primo, quod diversum est esse, et id quod est. Quae quidem diversitas non est hic referenda ad res, de quibus adhuc non loquitur, sed ad ipsas rationes seu intentiones. Aliud autem significamus per hoc quod dicimus esse, et aliud: per hoc quod dicimus id quod est; sicut et aliud significamus cum dicimus currere, et aliud per hoc quod dicitur currens. Nam currere et esse significantur in abstracto, sicut et albedo; sed quod est, idest ens et currens, significantur sicut in concreto, velut album....[E]a que supra dicta sunt de diuersitate ipsius esse et eius quod est, est secundum ipsas intentiones. Hic ostendit quomodo applicetur ad res." Note, however, that the name *ens* is taken here by St. Thomas not in its distinction from the name of essence, but insofar as they signify the same thing. Cf. St. Thomas, *In Metaph.*, Bk. 4, lec. 2, n. 557: "Et ideo hoc nomen ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia"; "And therefore this name 'being,' which is imposed from the very to-be, signifies the same thing as the name that is imposed from the very essence."

metaphysically, "being" and "existence" are present as more intelligible. The logical definition of essence, "that through which diverse beings are placed in diverse genera and species,"[37] explicitly mentions "being." "Existence" is implicit in the reference to diverse genera. For this implies the modes of predication that differ according to diverse meanings of "is." Again, the real definition of essence, "that through which and in which a being has existence,"[38] is yet more explicit. Essence therefore clearly depends for its distinct intelligibility on its conception as a being and the proposition "being is."

Finally, only with such an account of the intellect's first abstraction and concept can one understand the principle that being falls first in the conception of the intellect. St. Thomas proves this by stating, "because anything is knowable according to this, insofar as it is in act."[39] This reference to the actuality of the knowable must be appropriated to the first act of the intellect as speaking of the object as an essence intelligible in virtue of its substantial existence, even though this existence is not yet explicitly distinguished from the acts of existence that follow it. For this very reason "to be in act" first names substantial existence, though it passes over into other categories.

Conclusion

Thus, Gilson's insistence on the need always to understand essence, not as *being* sometimes with and sometimes without existence, but as informed by existence as by its proper perfection, was well-intentioned. He was right to see here the fundamental order of the intellect to something outside it, the object known precisely as informed by real existence. Yet he himself falls prey to such misapprehension when he considers essence as it first "exists" in the intellect. This led him to deny any "concept of existence" and to insist upon an "intuition of *esse*." In fact, existence does not need a distinct intuition. Existence informs the first concept of the intellect. Although the intellect cannot receive an intelligible species of existence by itself, it can attend to existence distinctly by resolution of, and therefore in dependence upon, this first concept. In this way, even for the finite mind, whose proper object has composition of potency and act, existence is most formal of all.

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[37] St. Thomas, *De Ente et Essentia*, ch. 1: "Et quia, ut dictum est, ens hoc modo dictum dividitur per decem genera, oportet quod essentia significet aliquid commune omnibus naturis, per quas diversa entia in diversis generibus et speciebus collocantur, sicut humanitas est essentia hominis, et sic de aliis."

[38] Cf. Ibid.: "essentia dicitur secundum quod per eam et in ea ens habet esse."

[39] St. Thomas, *STh* I, q. 5, a. 2, c.: "quia secundum hoc unumquodque cognoscibile est, inquantum est actu."

UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR: *FRATELLI TUTTI* IN THE LIGHT OF ST THOMAS'S CONCEPTION OF UNIVERSALITY

Bernard Guéry

> Perhaps the infatuation that makes one neglect intermediate causes comes from a certain anthropomorphism: one lends to God the ambition of a man who, in things worthy of praise, prefers to accomplish everything alone, lest the person whom he would have act in his stead or in association with, by magnanimity, should conceal from the eyes of the crowd his own merit; his solution is undoubtedly mediocre, but it appears to be safe, and at his level.
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> —Charles De Koninck, "Le scandale de la médiation (II)"[1]

Universal love sounds beautiful under the pen of Pope Francis. But genuine generosity towards other peoples seems quite utopic, heroic, or restricted to some holy men and women. At

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[1] "Peut-être l'infatuation qui fait négliger les causes intermédiaires vient-elle d'un certain anthropomorphisme: on prête à Dieu l'ambi¬tion d'un homme qui, dans les choses dignes de louange, aime mieux tout accomplir seul, crainte que la personne que par magnanimité il ferait agir à sa place ou s'associerait, ne

the same time the pope dedicates his 2020 encyclical, *Fratelli Tutti*, to "all people of good will."[2] How can we understand the pope's aspiration?

In this essay, I aim to show how St. Thomas Aquinas's thought is useful for understanding properly the pope's conception of the relationship between universal love and particular friendship. While doing this, I will work as a philosopher. As the philosopher seeks for reasons, I will look for the reason why the pope says that universal love is fostered by particular love.

There are many ways to articulate the distinction between the universal and the particular, and many levels of universality and particularity. In the text it is clear that Francis is cautioning against two mistakes in applying the distinction when comparing love of mankind and love of one's nation or local political community: the first would consist in reinforcing the particular against the universal; the second, in promoting the universal at the expense of the particular.

Of course in politics those two contradictory positions can lead to the following ideologies: first, an "aggressive nationalism,"[3] which assumes that fostering universal fraternity pulls down the identities of nations;[4] and second, what Francis calls

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masque aux yeux de la foule son mérite à lui; sa solution est sans doute médiocre mais elle apparaît sûre et à sa toise." Charles De Koninck, "Le scandale de la médiation (II)," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 15.1 (1959): 80–81.

[2] Pope Francis, *Fratelli Tutti (On Fraternity and Social Friendship)*, §6. The quotations of magisterial texts are from the website of the Holy See: www.vatican.va. This encyclical is not yet available in Latin; all quotations will be based on the official English translation. https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html

[3] Ibid., §11.

[4] "In some countries, a concept of popular and national unity influenced by various ideologies is creating new forms of selfishness and a loss of the social sense under the guise of defending national interests." Ibid., §11. This refers to the theme of the "culture of walls" (Ibid., §27) and to the xenophobic mentality (Ibid., §39).

"false universalism"[5] constitutes the opposite ideology, which argues that the existence of nations is an obstacle to universal fraternity, and this position endeavors to weaken the local political communities, which are said to obstruct the way towards universalism.

The pope's intention is to promote both poles, trying to show a way towards "building fraternity, be it local or universal."[6] He says more precisely:

> We need to pay attention to the global so as to avoid narrowness and banality. Yet we also need to look to the local, which keeps our feet on the ground. Together, the two prevent us from falling into one of two extremes.[7]

But he not only promotes them simultaneously. According to the pope, the particular is a path to the universal. Indeed, in this text, which promotes universal love, he complains against a phenomenon that "fosters low national self-esteem," and recalls that "there is no worse form of alienation than to feel uprooted, belonging to no one."[8] His advocacy for universal love does not lead him to despise local connections. Such remarks leave no doubt, when we carefully read the encyclical, that Francis is convinced that promoting the local groups is a way to foster universal fraternity.

How can we understand this claim? It is not easy to interpret this double love. One could say that all the love I give to the members of my family cannot be given to strangers, and all the love I give to strangers is not given to my family. We think we have to choose where to place the balance between the two poles, because our life and our love are not infinite. Although the pope's claim deserves an explanation, one is not given in the text itself; but such an explanation is given in the philosophical tradition shared by St. Thomas Aquinas.

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[5] Ibid., §99: "This is a far cry from the false universalism of those who constantly travel abroad because they cannot tolerate or love their own people."

[6] Ibid., §50.

[7] Ibid., §142.

[8] Ibid., §51 and §53, respectively.

It is useful to mobilize St. Thomas's thought to enlighten this paradoxical assertion, because St. Thomas elaborated the notion of the common good, which is the heart of the question. Indeed, the pope just mentions, without arguing for it, that: "The common good likewise requires that we protect and love our native land."[9] But which conception of the common good allows one to assert that?

The Relationship between Universal Fraternity and Social Friendship

We can start our reflection with the interpretation of the title of the encyclical, which gives a good idea of the link between local and universal in Francis's thought. Why "fraternity *and* social friendship" in the subtitle of the encyclical?[10] Why not only "fraternity"? The answer is that it would be a mistake to turn our back on local friendship in order to build global fraternity. We need both: "Universal fraternity and social friendship are thus two inseparable and equally vital poles in every society."[11] But further, they need each other:

> A love capable of transcending borders is the basis of what in every city and country can be called "social friendship." Genuine social friendship within a society makes true universal openness possible.[12]

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[9] Ibid., §143.

[10] "Sulla fraternità e l'amicizia sociale." (Emphasis added.)

[11] Ibid., §142.

[12] Ibid., §99. Cf. §154: "The development of a global community of fraternity based on the practice of social friendship on the part of peoples and nations calls for a better kind of politics."

Social friendship, in the sense of a more or less extended society, is the condition necessary for an openness to a more extended fraternity. True universalism is grounded on particular loves in particular places:

> The solution is not an openness that spurns its own richness. Just as there can be no dialogue with "others" without a sense of our own identity, so there can be no openness between peoples except on the basis of love for one's own land, one's own people, one's own cultural roots. I cannot truly encounter another unless I stand on firm foundations, for it is on the basis of these that I can accept the gift the other brings and in turn offer an authentic gift of my own.[13]

This is why "Families are the first place where the values of love and fraternity, togetherness and sharing, concern and care for others are lived."[14]

The sign of this articulation between the two poles is that the pope does not blame nationalism in itself, but only "violent nationalism," or "narrow forms of nationalism."[15] He does not condemn groups or couples, but only "closed groups" and "self-absorbed couples."[16] But how is this articulation possible? St. Thomas's thought enables us to understand the possibility of promoting universal love without condemning particular loves.

St. Thomas's Conception of Universal and Particular

In his commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, St. Thomas asserts that there are two ways to understand universal causes.[17] After lectio 5, where he presents the four species of causes, he dedicates the next lectio to the *modes* of causality, two of which are prior (or universal or common) and posterior (or proper or particular). Following Aristotle, St. Thomas gives the example of the doctor who treats a patient. Assuming that medicine is an art, we can say that the artisan is a prior or universal cause of health, and the doctor is the posterior or proper cause.

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[13] Ibid., §143.

[14] Ibid., §114.

[15] Ibid., §§86 and 141, respectively.

[16] Ibid. §89.

[17] St. Thomas, *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio*, Bk. 2, lec. 6, n. 3 (henceforth *In Phys.*). All quotations from St. Thomas are from https://www.

Those modes of causality can be found in each species.[18] The example of the man and the doctor is taken from the line of efficient causes, because here the man who cures is the efficient cause of health. Following Aristotle, St. Thomas also gives an example of universal formal cause, saying that the "diapason" (or musical interval now called the "octave") is the effect of a formal cause, which is "proportio dupla" (or the double ratio of the chord lengths). But "proportio dupla" is a particular cause compared to "proportio numeralis" (numerical relation), a more universal formal cause.[19] Thomas does not give further examples but asserts that it is the same in each species. Consequently, in final causes we will find universal causes as well. Considering that, for St. Thomas, "universal" and "common" are synonymous here,[20] and that the final cause is the good to which each being tends,[21] we can say that the common good is another name for the universal final cause.[22]

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corpusthomisticum.org/.

[18] Ibid., lec. 6, n. 2.

[19] Ibid.; Aristotle, *Physics* 2.3, 195a31.

[20] For example, in the case of the artisan and the doctor, artisan is "communior et prior." Ibid.

[21] See Ibid., lec. 5, n. 11. Also, "id autem ad quod tendit actio agentis, dicitur causa finalis." Ibid., lec. 10, n. 15; "bonum est quod omnia appetunt." St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q. 1, a. 1, c.

[22] Here it is necessary to understand the common good in a broad sense, which transcends the merely political application of the concept. For recent insights on the common good as final cause, see Aquinas Guilbeau, *Charles De Koninck's Defense of the Primacy of the Common Good*, Doctoral thesis

Because to love, in St. Thomas's thought, signifies to be attracted to a final cause, we can say that universal love is an effect provoked by the universal final cause, by the common good. Of course, while using this key interpretation, we leave open for the moment the question of whether this universal common good is a political common good. Now we are able to ask the question raised about Francis's text in a more precise way. To experience universal love without despising particular love means now to love the more universal common good without despising a less universal common good. But the main difficulty remains: how can the same effect be brought about by two causes, one universal, and one more particular?

Two Kinds of Universality

Here we have to distinguish between two possible interpretations of "universality," because the answer will not be the same in the two cases. In the text commented on above,[23] Thomas distinguishes two kinds of universality:

> it must be noted, however, that the universal cause and the particular cause, and the prior cause and the posterior cause, can be taken either according to a commonness in predication, as in the example given about the doctor and the artisan, or according to a commonness in causality, as if we say the sun is a universal cause of heating, whereas fire is a proper cause.[24]

Notice that the universal *in praedicando* is the result of an

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(Switzerland: University of Fribourg, 2016), 140.

[23] *In Phys.*, Bk. 2, lec. 5.

[24] "Advertendum est autem quod causa universalis et propria, vel prior et posterior, potest accipi aut secundum communitatem praedicationis, secundum exempla hic posita de medico et artifice; vel secundum communitatem causalitatis, ut si dicamus solem esse causam universalem calefactionis, ignem vero causam propriam." Ibid., lec. 6, n. 3.

abstraction, as in the example of the artisan and the doctor, who are numerically the same in reality, whereas a universal cause *in causando* is numerically different from the particular *in causando*. For example, the hand, which is able to produce many kinds of effects, is not the tool it holds, which is a particular cause of only one type of effect.

In the order of universality *in praedicando*, we do not deal with different causes, but with different formalities in the same cause. As Ronald McArthur says: "We do not infer, by the distinction of 'artist' and 'doctor,' that there are two causes, but that the same cause is known under two formalities."[25] We can easily recognize, in this type of universal, the whole abstracted from its part, which is the object of a confused knowledge. Because the genus, when compared to the specific difference and the species, says in a confused way the same thing, we can say with McArthur that "the more general is the universal *in praedicando*, the more superficially does it explain the objects of which it is said."[26] Consequently, "superiority, then, in the case of the universal *in praedicando* is synonymous with potentiality and confusion, because the universal is less intelligible than its inferiors."[27] We can say that the more universal such a cause, the less he has an action proper to the effect. The doctor merely insofar he is an artisan has a weaker impact on health than does the doctor as such.

We could put forward the idea that, in this conception of universality, the existence of lower causes weakens the power of the higher. To understand this, we have to keep in mind that universal is a relative concept. Something is universal in comparison to something else. And in the same way that artisan is more universal than doctor, but particular compared to man, we can say that the common good of the village is a more universal final cause than the common good of the family, but less universal than that of the nation. With this in mind, we can say that the causal power of the superior formality decreases as its universality increases. If one must operate as a physician, the power of the physician as a man to determine the effect is weak. Now, if one has to operate as a surgeon, and a surgeon specialized in dermatology, the relative power of determination of the man will be even weaker. In other words, one finds all the less trace of the cause in the effect if the cause is universal *in praedicando*. Consequently, the more particular causes—here specific formalities under which the agent acts—are interposed between the cause and the effect, the more the cause will be relatively universal with respect to its effect, and the more its power of determination on the effect will decrease.

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[25] Ronald McArthur, "Universal *in praedicando*, universal *in causando*," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 18.1 (1969), 60.

[26] Ibid., 64.

[27] Ibid., 65.

It works in the opposite way in the order of universality *in causando*. According to St. Thomas,

> the higher the cause, the greater its scope and efficacy; and the more efficacious the cause, the more deeply does it penetrate into its effect, and the more remote the potentiality from which it brings that effect into act.[28]

More universality means a greater diversity among the effects,[29] but more universality *in causando* leads also to a deeper impact in the effect. As McArthur says:

> The more universal cause, therefore, not only causes

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[28] "Quanto enim aliqua causa est altior, tanto est communior et efficacior, et quanto est efficacior, tanto profundius ingreditur in effectum, et de remotiori potentia ipsum reducit in actum." St. Thomas, *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia*, q. 3, a. 7, c.; henceforth, *De pot*.

[29] See also St. Thomas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, Bk. 6, lec. 3, n. 15.

> more effects by a single act, but in virtue of its power it also attains those effects more intimately and determinately than does the inferior cause. The more universal is the cause, the more is it the cause of its effects in all their determinations.[30]

This manifests the enormous difference between the two ways of conceiving the universal. As McArthur says:

> this order seems to be similar to the order within our universal predicates, but the difference is really immense, for the greater extension of causality, characteristic of the more universal cause, does not mean that it is more remote or potential. It is, in fact, because of its perfection and greater actuality, able to attain its effects more perfectly and intimately than does the inferior cause. If the universal causes were potential and indeterminate, as is characteristic of the universal *in praedicando*, the higher causes would be more remote than the inferior causes, with the result that they would attain their effects less determinately.[31]

Consequently, in the field of universal of causality, the lower cause is not an impediment for the universal one, because it is "subject to the higher cause, and takes its very determination in causing from it, so that both work *per modum unius* towards the production of their effect in all its determination."[32] And because the universal is relative to the particular, it is possible to say that, in the line of the universal *in causando*, a universal cause is in some sense more powerful thanks to particular lower causes, which proportion the universal cause to the effect, as the hand is more powerful with a hammer than without it.[33]

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[30] McArthur, "Universal *in praedicando*, universal *in causando*," 73–74.

[31] Ibid., 73.

[32] Ibid., 73–74.

[33] The hand is, practically speaking, more powerful with a hammer than

Applying this assertion to final causes, we have to say that a more universal common good, which is nothing else than a universal final cause, is in a sense more attractive to people thanks to the intermediate common goods that also attract them.[34] This answer assumes that the commonness of the good is understood as a universal *in causando*.

A Parallel in the Line of Efficient Causes

We can have an example of this relationship between universal and particular causes in the way God governs creatures. Of course, it is in the field of efficient causality, but it will be possible to draw an analogy with the field of final causality.[35]

In the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, St. Thomas asks how the same effect is from God and from a natural agent.[36] And we will ask a similar question: how can a universal love be provoked simultaneously by a universal common good and a particular common good? St. Thomas first says that "it seems difficult for some people to understand how natural effects are attributed both to God and to a natural agent."[37] We already raised the same difficulty for final causes when we asserted that it is difficult to

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without one, but the hammer itself is an artifact, something made by the hand, so the hammer's power comes from the hand (and the mind). Certainly we do not want to say that God is, without qualification, more powerful because of his instruments; but we do want to say his power is in some sense more determined or focused by his creation and use of those instruments, so in that sense he is more powerful.

[34] For the common good as universal *in causando*, see Gregory Froelich, "On the Common Goods," *The Aquinas Review* 15 (2008): 1–28.

[35] As St. Thomas writes: "sicut est ordo in causis agentibus, ita etiam in causis finalibus. Ut scilicet secundarius finis a principali dependeat, sicut secundarius agens a principali dependet." *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Bk. 3, ch. 109 (henceforth *ScG*).

[36] *ScG*, Bk. 3, ch. 70.

[37] "Quibus autem difficile videtur ad intelligendum quod effectus naturales et Deo attribuantur et naturali agenti." Ibid., n. 1.

understand how our love can be attracted by both the national common good and the universal common good.

St. Thomas says, in objection, "it does not seem possible for one action to proceed from two agents."[38] For our case, we can say that it does not seem possible that our love be oriented towards two objects simultaneously without there being a certain tension or competition between these loves. St. Thomas adds:

> Again, when a thing can be done adequately by one agent, it is superfluous for it to be done by many; in fact, we see that nature does not do with two instruments what it can do with one. So, since the divine power is sufficient to produce natural effects, it is superfluous to use natural powers too, for the production of the same effects. Or, if the natural power adequately produces the proper effect, it is superfluous for the divine power to act for the same effect.[39]

Applied to the line of final causes, this signifies that when a local common good is powerful enough to attract our love, it would not be necessary to assume attraction to a more universal common good. And when the universal common good is attractive, it is counterproductive for an attraction to a particular common good to intervene between individuals and this universal cause.

Here is the way Thomas answers these difficulties:

> In every agent, in fact, there are two things to consider: namely, the thing itself that acts, and the power by which it acts. Fire, for instance, heats by means of its heat. But

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[38] "Nam una actio a duobus agentibus non videtur progredi posse." Ibid., n. 2.

[39] "Item. Quod potest fieri sufficienter per unum, superfluum est si per multa fiat; videmus enim quod natura non facit per duo instrumenta quod potest facere per unum. Cum igitur virtus divina sufficiens sit ad producendos effectus naturales, superfluum est adhibere ad eosdem effectus producendos etiam naturales virtutes; vel, si virtus naturalis sufficienter proprium effectum producit, superfluum est quod divina ad eundem effectum agat." Ibid., n. 3.

> the power of a lower agent depends on the power of the superior agent, according as the superior agent gives this power to the lower agent whereby it may act; or preserves it; or even applies it to the action, as the artisan applies an instrument to its proper effect.[40]

If we follow the analogy from efficient causes to final causes, we find the following duality in the lower group of particular final causes: the lower final causes themselves, which cause the love of the participants, and the power by which they attract love. We can now understand better how the intermediate causes facilitate the causality of the highest cause. In the case of final causes, we can say that the local common good has a causal power, because it owes it to the more universal cause. The universal common good communicates its causal power to the particular.

In another place St. Thomas goes deeper into the explanation of the subordinate causes, and will give us the reason why the particular cause depends on the universal one:

> Nor can the second cause by its own power have any influence on the effect of the first cause, although it is the instrument of the first cause in regard to that effect; for an instrument is in a manner the cause of the principal cause's effect, not by its own form or power, but insofar as it participates somewhat in the power of the principal cause through being moved thereby. Thus the axe is the cause of the craftsman's handiwork not by its own form or power, but by the power of the craftsman who moves it so that it participates in his power.[41]

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[40] "In quolibert enim agente est duo considerare, scilicet rem ipsam quae agit, et virtutem qua agit: sicut ignis calefacit per calorem. Virtus autem inferioris agentis dependet a virtute superioris agentis, inquantum superius agens dat vitutem ipsam inferiori agenti per quam agit; vel conservat eam; aut etiam applicat eam ad agendum, sicut artifex applicat instrumentum ad proprium effectum." Ibid., n. 5.

[41] "Nec causa secunda potest in effectum causae primae per virtutem

The reason why the instrumental cause has a power over the effect is its participation in the power of the higher cause. For our concern, a particular common good has a causal attractive power for men insofar as it participates in the more universal common good.

Moreover, in the synthesis of his *respondeo*, Thomas gives the reason why the higher cause has a greater impact on the effect through the lower cause:

> If, then, we consider the subsistent agent, every particular agent is immediate to its effect; but if we consider the power whereby the action is done, then the power of the higher cause is more immediate to the effect than the power of the lower cause. For the power of the lower cause is not coupled with its effect save by the power of the higher cause; wherefore it is said in *De Causis* (prop. 1) that the power of the first cause takes the first place in the production of the effect and enters more deeply therein.[42]

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propriam, quamvis sit instrumentum causae primae respectu illius effectus. Instrumentum enim est causa quodammodo effectus principalis causae, non per formam vel virtutem propriam, sed in quantum participat aliquid de virtute principalis causae per motum eius, sicut dolabra non est causa rei artificiatae per formam vel virtutem propriam, sed per virtutem artificis a quo movetur et eam quoquomodo participat." *De pot.*, q. 3, a. 7, c. It is important to warn the reader against the reduction of every less universal cause to an instrumental cause. The universal/particular distinction is in every kind of cause (*In Phys.*, Bk. 2, lec. 6, n. 2), whereas the instrumental cause is only one kind, the efficient cause ("causa adjuvans," Ibid., lec. 5, n. 5). See De Koninck. "Le scandale de la médiation (II)," 79. But the instrumental cause is more known to us and therefore presents a good pedagogical analogy for understanding the relations between first and second causes.

[42] "Sic ergo si consideremus supposita agentia, quodlibet agens particulare est immediatum ad suum effectum. Si autem consideremus virtutem qua fit actio, sic virtus superioris causae erit immediatior effectui quam virtus inferioris; nam virtus inferior non coniungitur effectui nisi per virtutem superioris; unde dicitur in *Lib. de Caus.*, quod virtus causae primae prius agit in causatum, et vehementius ingreditur in ipsum." *De pot.*, q. 3, a. 7, c.

The power of the lower cause is so dependent on the power of the higher cause that we can say that when the lower cause acts, it is still the higher cause which acts through the lower. The effect remains the effect of the universal cause.[43]

From this analogy with universal efficient causes *in causando* we can conclude that to be attracted by a local common good means to be attracted by the more universal common good by means of the local one. There is no rivalry between the particular and the universal common goods, because they are two essentially subordinated causes that, as we said, "both work *per modum unius*." It would be inappropriate to think that the causal action of the tool hinders or is a rival with the causal action of the craftsman. To love humanity as a whole is heroic. But to love one's neighbor, who gives a concrete appearance to humanity, is easier. The love of humanity as universal common good is easier because of less universal common goods that proportion the causality of the universal final cause to the effect. Because we are made in such a way that our knowledge always begins with the senses, we need intermediate common goods, perceptible to our faculties, in order to proportion the causal power of the more universal common good to our capacities for knowledge and love. That is why it is easier to love humanity as a whole, because there is first in front of me a particular man to love. It is easier to love my country because I have a son and a daughter who are the visible face of my nation. It is the sense of the pope's claim: "No one can experience the true beauty of life without relating to others, without having real faces to love."[44]

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[43] The very reason for this doctrine has to be taken from the *communicatio* of God's goodness. Talking about the position of those who "said that fire does not heat, rather God creates the heat in the heated thing," St. Thomas says: "It is repugnant even to the divine goodness, which is communicative of itself" (Ibid.). In this light, the false universalism of which Pope Francis speaks can be understood as a political version of occasionalism.

[44] *Fratelli tutti*, §87.

The Common Good in Praedicando

At this point in our reasoning, we can raise a question: why does our contemporary culture have so much difficulty understanding that the love for a more particular common good is not an obstacle to the love of the more universal common good? Why do we so easily make the mistake of thinking that nationalism is an obstacle to universal fraternity?

Here we have to question our conception of common good. It is necessary to remember that the harmonic articulation between the universal and particular cause is such as long as we stay in the field of universal *in causando*. If we understand this articulation in the field of universal *in praedicando*, it will not be the same. The universal cause *in praedicando* is as remote to the effect as there are, as it were, many intermediate causal agents. The universally predicated cause is less powerful if there are many intermediate particular causes. In this case, the intermediate mitigates the impact of the universal. This is the case when we think of the common good on the pattern of a whole that would be like a mathematical sum. A sum is somewhat like an abstraction. It is a total constituted from his parts, and it abstracts from the specificity of the parts that constitute it. The common good, in this conception, is constituted *a posteriori* from the particular goods. It is in the field of the universal *in praedicando*. The common good considered to be a consequence of a mathematical addition is far from the common good *as a cause* of particular goods, just as a number is not a cause of its units. If it is difficult for us to understand how such a particular cause can facilitate the role of the universal, it is because our conception of a common good is affected by an inappropriate idea of commonness.

Indeed, Charles De Koninck remarks judiciously that if this kind of mathematically common good can be called "common," it loses the characteristic of a good insofar as it is distant from its effect. About an "abstracted and quantitative conception of the common good," he writes:

> One could believe, indeed, that the good of the highest number is also the most perfect and the most secured. Let us suppose that it is the most common, the most general: does it follows that it has more the nature of a good? Because, provided that we talk of the common good of a political society, it has to be a good "operable" by ourselves, a good to be realized by our own activity. . . . As soon as we are talking of a human good, it has to have the needed appeal, known practically, in order that it incline us to action in an efficient manner.[45]

The most universal, the least powerful to attract love: this is the characteristic of a good that would be in the line of universal *in praedicando*.

Political Consequences

Now we can see the political consequences of the fact that one's love for particular causes *in causando* facilitates one's love for the universal cause.

An adjusted nationalism is the first consequence of the proper relationship between the universal and particular.[46] As we have already said, the pope does not blame nationalism, but only "violent nationalism." What is a good nationalism? It is the love of one's nation that is open to a causally more universal good.[47] In this light we can see the nation as a particular expression of humanity.[48]

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[45] "La confédération rempart contre le grand Etat," in *Œuvres de Charles De Koninck*, Tome II, vol. 3 (Québec: Presses Universitaires de Laval, 2015) 85. The translation is ours: "On pourrait croire, en effet, que le bien du plus grand nombre est aussi le bien commun le plus parfait et le mieux assuré. Mettons qu'il soit le plus commun, plus général: s'ensuit-il qu'il ait davantage la nature de bien ? Car du moment que nous parlons du bien commun de la société politique, il doit être un bien 'opérable' par nous-mêmes, un bien à réaliser grâce à notre propre activité. . . . Dès lors qu'on parle d'un bien humain, il lui faut avoir l'attrait nécessaire, connu d'une manière pratique, afin qu'il nous incline à l'action de façon efficace. "

[46] About the roots of Francis's conception of the nation and people, see Juan

Here is a question about what we call the universal common good. The validity of St. Thomas's doctrine of the universal and particular does not excuse us from being aware of the specificity of the reality to which we apply this doctrine. We could assume, without examining it, that there is a continuity of nested communities from family to the global population. But the natures of those human groups are not the same. They differ not only according to their size, but according to their very "species." Families and nations are actual communities, insofar as they are linked by a common culture, a common history, and a common goal. In this respect, it is difficult to be certain that the global population is an *actual* community, because there is no common culture, nor living together. As Aristotle says for interpersonal relations:

> distance does not break off the friendship absolutely, but only the activity of it. But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually to make men forget their friendship; hence the saying "out of sight, out of mind."[49]

Carlos Scannone, "Pope Francis and the Theology of the People," *Theological Studies* 77.1 (2016): 118-35.

[47] This assertion follows the traditional positions of the Church. See for example Pope John Paul II, *Memory and Identity: Conversations at the Dawn of a Millennium* (New York: Rizzoli, 2005), 69.

[48] See Pierre Manent, *Metamorphoses of the City: On the Western Dynamic*, trans. Marc LePain (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

[49] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.6, 1157b10. See St. Thomas: "Multae amicitiae dissolvuntur per hoc, quod unus alium non appellat, id est non colloquitur et convivit alteri." ("Many friendships are dissolved through the fact of the one not addressing the other, that is, the one does not have conversation, and a shared life, with the other.") *Sententia Ethicorum*, Bk. 8, lec. 5, n. 2.

There is no community without friendship, and no friendship without living together. Consequently, there is no global community. Pope Francis speaks in accordance with this idea when he reserves the term "friendship" for local interactions and uses the word "fraternity" for love that transcends borders.

It remains true that sound nationalism is characterized by its openness to the more universal good. But does that imply that this universal good is the common good of a community? It would be possible to speak of a community, but in an analogous way. Indeed, the *brotherhood* that derives from a similarity of kind (in the initial sense of *family* deriving from the same father) is a certain community, even if the brothers have no other relations between them than their common birth, without knowing each other. In this case, the unity is made according to the anterior causes, which cannot take the place of final cause. To expect the antecedent causes (i.e., ancestors) to play the role of a common good is the error for which we reproach racist nationalism, and for which we can reproach just as much those who promote world citizenship in the name of an initial brotherhood of the sons of Adam. As De Koninck says about nationalism:

> the life of man does not consist in a return to the initial principles of his being, but in tending towards an end which is the good of his reasonable nature, and which one should not look for as rigorously pre-established in natural origins.[50]

The reason why the unity of origin cannot guarantee the existence of a harmonious political community is proposed by De Koninck:

> nature does not have of itself that unity which reason can

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[50] De Koninck, "La confédération rempart contre le grand Etat," 68; translated by us.

> achieve. As we see so clearly in animals, equilibrium in nature depends on the play of opposites. If fish could not swallow each other, and the beasts of the jungle could not devour each other, this animal life would soon be exterminated. A similar contrariety exists everywhere in nature. It is therefore not by turning back to nature alone that we can achieve harmony between nations.[51]

Here we have to be reminded that the common good is a broad notion, and is certainly applicable to political realities, but not only to such. The common good of humanity is not necessarily the common good of a political community.

A second consequence of the proper relationship between the universal and the particular is an understanding of the relationship between what Pope Francis calls the "universal destination of created goods"[52] and private property. In *Fratelli Tutti*, in continuity with the previous magisterial teaching of the social doctrine of the Church, the pope recalls "the social purpose of all forms of private property"[53] according to the principle of the universal destination of goods, formulated in *Gaudium et Spes*[54] in accordance with the Thomistic conception of private property.[55] The doctrine of the relationship between the universal and the particular as set out above sheds light on the relationship between private property and the universal destination of goods, because if the particular good would be an obstacle towards the universal, it would be inappropriate to promote private property.

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[51] Ibid.; translated by us. This argument presupposes the Aristotelian theme, recurrent in De Koninck, of reason as the power of opposites. See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 7.7, 1032b1–6; 9.2. See also Charles De Koninck, "Deux tentatives de contourner par l'art les difficultés de l'action," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 11.2 (1955): 188, and De Koninck, "Tout contingent opposé au nécessaire implique un rapport au bien," *Laval théologique et philosophique* 24.2 (1968): 207.

[52] *Fratelli tutti*, §120.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, § 171. Available on https://www.vatican.va/. "God intended the earth with everything contained in it for the use of all human beings and peoples. Thus, under the leadership of justice and in the company of charity, created goods should be in abundance for all in like manner. Whatever the forms of property may be, as adapted to the legitimate institutions of peoples, according to diverse and changeable circumstances, attention must always be paid to this universal destination of earthly goods. In using them, therefore,

In the light of St. Thomas's doctrine, we can assert that the universal destination of goods will not be hindered by the promotion of private property. Indeed, to possess something in particular does not signify that this material thing is only for me. We can say that "to be mine" is not the same as "to be for me." On the contrary, I make it mine in order that it can be for all.

The way the pope justifies the love of one's country from the theme of the universal destination of goods is original in the Magisterium:

> Everyone loves and cares for his or her native land and village, just as they love and care for their home and are personally responsible for its upkeep. The common good likewise requires that we protect and love our native land. Otherwise, the consequences of a disaster in one country will end up affecting the entire planet. All this brings out the positive meaning of the right to property: I care for and cultivate something that I possess, in such a way that it can contribute to the good of all.[56]

The universal common good requires that everyone takes care of a particular place. The love of a particular place is the concrete means to the love of all.

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man should regard the external things that he legitimately possesses not only as his own but also as common in the sense that they should be able to benefit not only him but also others." *Gaudium et Spes* §69, available on https://www.vatican.va/.

[55] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* II-II, q. 66, a. 2; henceforth *STh*.

[56] *Fratelli tutti*, §143.

Thirdly, the doctrine of the universal and particular explains also how the work towards universal fraternity should not eliminate the differences between local cultures and identities. For the pope, unity is not uniformity.[57] Indeed, we could easily think that local identities are hindrances to a universal fraternity. But in the light of the proper relationship between the universal and particular, it is possible to understand how a diversity of cultures is a precondition for an expanded fraternity. The universal common good needs particular cultures to proportion its power of attraction to each people.

In his commentary on the *Politics* of Aristotle, St. Thomas explains Aristotle's criticism of Plato's theory about the unity of the city. First, he presents Socrates's reasoning:

> Socrates supposed as a principle, as it were, that it was best that the political community should be as unified as possible. And so he wanted all things, even sons and wives, to be common, so that citizens were united with one another to the greatest extent.[58]

For St. Thomas commenting on Aristotle, there are two ways of understanding unity. It can be either unicity or similarity. In both cases, Aristotle gives objections, but those directed against a city's unity as similarity will interest us. St. Thomas reports three reasons Aristotle gives, but only the third interests us:

> the things out of which it is necessary to make something perfect differ in kind. And so we find that every perfect whole in things of nature is composed of parts different in kind (e.g., human beings of flesh, bones, and nerves).

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[57] Ibid., §144.

[58] "Socrates supponebat hoc quasi principium, quod optimum esset civitati quod esset una quantumcumque posset: propter hoc enim volebat omnia esse communia, etiam filios et uxores, ut cives essent maxime ad invicem uniti." St. Thomas, *Sententia Politicorum*, Bk. 2, lec. 1, n. 10.

> But every whole composed of parts of the same kind (e.g., air, water, and other purely material substances) is imperfect in the way of nature. And so it is clear that a political community, since it is a perfect whole, needs to consist of parts dissimilar in species.[59]

The perfection of a whole consists in the diversity of its parts. Likewise, then, the perfection of the human world consists in the diversity of cultures.[60]

If we consider that the perfection of the whole is the universal common good, we can say that its causal attractive power can be fostered better through the diversity of particular common goods. The variety of effects of the common good is a sign of its universality. The perfection of a common good is measured less by the *quantity* of effects produced than by their *specific diversity*. This conceptual context enlightens the Pope's blame of "One model of globalization" which

> in fact "consciously aims at a one-dimensional uniformity and seeks to eliminate all differences and traditions in a superficial quest for unity. . . . If a certain kind of globalization claims to make everyone uniform, to level everyone out, that globalization destroys the rich gifts and uniqueness of each person and each people." This

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[59] "Ea ex quibus oportet unum aliquid perfectum fieri, differunt specie unde omne totum perfectum in rebus naturalibus invenitur esse constitutum ex partibus diversis secundum speciem; ut homo ex carnibus, ossibus et nervis. Totum vero quod componitur ex partibus eiusdem speciei est imperfectum in genere naturae, sicut aer et aqua et alia inanimata corpora. Unde manifestum est quod, cum civitas sit quoddam totum perfectum, oportet quod consistat ex partibus dissimilibus secundum speciem." Ibid., n. 12.

[60] As well, the perfection of the world requires diversity of things. See *STh* I, q. 47, as. 1 & 2, and *ScG* Bk. 2, ch. 45 and Bk. 3, ch. 97. For an application to the question of the common good, see Charles De Koninck, "In Defence of St Thomas: A Reply to Father Eschmann's Attack on *The Primacy of the Common Good*," in Ralph McInerny (ed.), *The Writings of Charles De Koninck*, Vol. 2 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 239.

> false universalism ends up depriving the world of its various colors, its beauty and, ultimately, its humanity.[61]

The heterogeneity of local cultures is not a sign of the imperfection of the universal common good; on the contrary, it results from its perfection.

Conclusion

In some sentences the style of Pope Francis can sound disruptive and far from the Magisterium's traditional manner of expression. But we have shown that, on the main subject[62] of *Fratelli Tutti*, the pope's thought appears rooted in the Thomistic tradition. Sound nationalism, the universal destination of goods, and cultural diversities depend on a fair conception of the relationship between universal and particular causes in St. Thomas's writings. Those political conceptions can be understood to rest upon an adequate theory of intermediate causes that provide a structure to the natural order, and such theory is specific to the genuine Catholic natural philosophy. The text of the pope, despite the sometimes confusing wording, remains rooted in this tradition. It endorses the principles of this natural philosophy and uses it to apply the traditional principles to the *Res novae* of the twenty-first century.

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[61] *Fratelli tutti*, §100; Francis is quoting his "Address to the Meeting for Religious Liberty with the Hispanic Community and Immigrant Groups," Philadelphia, PA (26 September 2015): *AAS* 107 (2015): 1050–1051. See also §191.

[62] See Ibid., §6.

PROLEGOMENA TO THE TENTH CATEGORY

Charles De Koninck

Ladies, gentlemen,
Especially the young ladies, since it is to you that I am going to address myself!

We are going to speak a little about clothing, and that concerning the tenth of Aristotle's predicaments. You have heard talk of the tenth predicament, have you not? We call it the *habitus*, that is to say, what results from the fact of being clothed. Clothing is not the tenth predicament, but the tenth predicament is what results from the fact of being clothed. We are going to speak of the *habitus*, or more properly of clothing, since clothing is in a certain way the cause of this category.

We will abstract from the fact that we have need of being clothed to appear in public due to the consequences of original sin, and we will place ourselves simply at the point of view of the very nature of man. Does man naturally require being clothed,

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Charles De Koninck, who died in 1964, was for many years the Dean of the Faculté de Philosophie at l'Université Laval in Quebec. He was as well professeur auxiliare of the Faculté de Theologie of the same university and a visiting professor at the University of Notre Dame. *The Aquinas Review* here offers a translation of the written version of a talk presented at a conference in French under the title "Prolégomènes à la dixième catégorie"; the original French transcript, from which this translation was made by Ambrose Terneus and Pierre-Luc Boudreault, was published in *Philosophia Perennis* 3.1 (1996): 5–23.

even when we consider him absolutely? Do not ask yourself a useless question; do not look for necessity where there is none; clothing is not of the essence of man. Also the tenth predicament of Aristotle appears extremely unimportant—even having no importance whatsoever. It appears so superfluous, so artificial, that the authors who wanted to attack the division that Aristotle made of the categories as being a division altogether arbitrary always first and principally attacked this tenth predicate. It appears so tenuous, so accidental—at least, accidental in the sense of a predicable accident—that we ask ourselves why Aristotle took it into account. We ask ourselves at the same time: would there not be here a sign of the arbitrary character of all this classification of the categories? Moreover, the modern authors, the modern scholastics do not care much about this tenth predicate. Thus, Father Gredt—who has made a very widespread and very good manual of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy—makes the following remark concerning a problem: "After all, this predicate is not very—*non multo*—important." As for us, we believe that it is extremely important, but that we can only understand its importance if we search for the true and first root of it.

Before passing to a consideration of the true cause of this predicate, let us turn our attention to an extrinsic sign of its importance: the clothing industry. No one doubts the importance of this industry. We can even ask ourselves whether it is not much more important than it should be. Concerning this industry of clothing, it is necessary to remark that what constitutes its importance is not simply the clothing insofar as it is a protection for us against bad weather, against the cold, against the heat, or against the sun. It is not simply that! You know very well that people would not be content with being all dressed up in exactly the same fashion, with one same homogeneous sack, even if it was sufficient to protect one from a severe climate or bad weather. No, what costs the most in this industry, what people feel they have the greatest need of, or at least the need that costs the most to satisfy, is clothing as adornment.

What is the principle of all that, what is its reason? We ought to search for the principle through the infinite capacity of human reason. That can appear very strange. It is, furthermore, a general principle, and in order to show on what precise account the infinity of human reason is the principle of the necessity for clothing, let us consider two other cases where the infinity of reason is truly the principle.

Let us consider first the case of language, of language and of speech. When I say "tongue" [*langue*] I mean not simply language as in the expression "the French tongue," but "tongue," in the physiological and anatomical sense of the word—that is, the organ of locution. Not only the tongue, then, but the whole entire mouth: the tongue, the teeth, the lips, and even the throat as an organ of enunciation. We see the necessity easily enough of the human tongue—thus understood with its characteristics—in the infinity of human reason. Here is how: why is human speech not natural? Why are not the words we form natural such that there would exist a natural connection between the word *horse* and horse the animal? But there is no such natural connection. English says *horse*, French says *cheval*, Latin said *equus*. The word varies between languages and it varies even inside the same language. How is it that nature does not bestow words? How is it that we do not produce sounds that correspond naturally to the objects we wish to express? Why not? On the contrary, we define the word, that is, the oral expression: *vox significativa ad placitum*.[1] Why *ad placitum*? Why does the meaning of the word need to be by convention? Why is nature unable to bestow this meaning? It is that if our speech should be natural, it would be necessary to have an infinite number of organs for enunciation; it would not suffice to have only one mouth; it would take, so to speak, an infinite number of them. It would take an excessively complicated organ, where the parts lend their sound and their division of sound in such a way that they would correspond to our actual speech in a purely natural manner. No! That is not possible! It would be necessary for us to have an infinite [*incommensurable*] mouth, to have instruments and organs without end. Why would that be necessary? Precisely because the things of which we speak, that we express to one another, are infinite in number. The things that we are able to know and the aspects of the things we are able to know are infinite, without limit. On the other hand, nature is for its part very determinate *ad unum*, towards only one thing. For example, the nose, our nose, for what function does it exist? To discern certain differences of a very determinate order. Our eye serves to see, and in fact it can see many objects, but the eye is not like the mouth: the eye receives while the mouth expresses. The mouth, insofar as it is an organ of enunciation, has its principle immediately in human reason.

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[1] [For this definition of a name, see Aristotle, *De Interpretatione* 2, 16a20.]

Take, for example, the natural noise that the dog makes to express its passions. The dog barks. Evidently, there are all kinds of barks, and the same dog will have a certain variety of barks. But all that remains extremely limited, and thus it is for all the animals. Even the song of the birds, or at least of one particular species of bird. The range of this song is still extremely limited. Moreover, the animals produce sounds and communicate with one another by means of sounds in order to express something quite limited: to express their passions. The dog barks when he is upset or when he is happy. There will be a small difference between the two barks; nevertheless, the range, and even the expressed passions, will be very limited. In man, we encounter a similar phenomenon. Man also produces in his speech, in his enunciation, certain variations that are more or less natural, but in the end fundamentally natural. Indeed, we too express the state of our passions in certain intonations of our speaking, in the style of our speaking, and in the variety of sounds that we can introduce or that we introduce naturally enough in our speech. When one says, for instance, “This gentleman is insane!” there is a way of expressing it that means: “he is crazy!” But there is also a way of stating the thing in an absolutely neutral fashion. The doctor, a psychiatrist for example, could say the same thing in a tone, let us say, scientific, of diagnosis: “This gentleman is insane.” The ordinary man who says, “This gentleman is insane!!!” states without doubt the same proposition, but he does not do so in the same manner. In this case, very manifestly, an emotion gets involved. One can say of a man that he is insane in meaning to say something more objective, as the psychiatrist would do it, or . . . as he should do it. But one can also do it with emotion, in such a way as to manifest an aversion to this man: contempt, for example. All of that is expressed by the intonation of the voice, by its style [*allure*]. And it is natural that such intonations express such passions. This is very important, moreover, since all music is first founded on it. Yes, music is founded on the human voice—is it not the case? It is founded on the human voice insofar as it expresses the state of our passions—insofar as it expresses joy, for example, in the intonation itself, or sadness, or any other passion.

Reason itself cannot remain in these limits even as to the variety of tones, intonations, and inflexions of our voice insofar as it expresses the passions. Already this variety even joined to the natural expression of the passions is much grander for man than for the animals. It is because, for us, the passions are not totally foreign to the reason, and something of the reason is expressed in the passions. It is understood that there is already a very great variety, which will by the way be amplified by necessity. Nature, however, has not given man an organ that functions in a strictly natural manner so he can express himself; it has given him an organ proportioned to reason by what Aristotle calls "its absolute character," "its freedom":[2] the mouth itself (which from now on we are going to call "the tongue") is indeed free and absolute. It does not produce sounds that have nature for their principle. It can produce signs that answer to this infinite character of reason, as we see it in human speech, which does not have limits. In fact, human speech, such as it is today, has some limits; but its capacity for enrichment is infinite. It is because the intellect's capacity to learn and its capacity to conceive concerns infinitely varied objects, under a very great number of aspects, according to an infinity of relations amongst themselves. Now, this infinite capacity always remains more or less able to express itself, and its expression requires a proportioned infinity. Already, from the beginning, the organ we use to express this infinity ought to be itself infinitely malleable. It ought to be free, and free in a well determined sense. If our tongue were tied, for example, we would speak with more difficulty. It is that which Aristotle calls "the freedom of the tongue"—not the freedom of language, but that of the tongue, the physical freedom of movement of the organ itself.

There is another case where one observes a proportion of which reason is very manifestly the cause: it is the hand, the organ that is called "the hand," which is even "the organ of organs."[3] How can we see in the hand, in this organ by which we grasp things and fashion objects, how can we see something of the infinity? Here is what Aristotle says on this subject, which will by the way help us to prepare our consideration of clothing.

> In truth, it is not just to say as some do that man is the most deprived of the animals, from the fact that he has been created barefooted without clothing, without

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[2] [See Aristotle, *The Parts of Animals* 2.17, 660a18.]

[3] [See Aristotle, *On the Soul* 3.8, 432a1.]

> weapons to defend himself. On the contrary, we can say that all the other animals only have one sole method of defense and cannot change it out for another. They are, so to speak, obliged to sleep and do all their work shod.[4]

Is it not the case that the horse cannot remove his hooves [*sabots*][5] in order to sleep? Animals can never take off their more abundant clothing. If it is too hot and an animal should have thick fur, what would you have him do? He cannot even trim himself. No more are animals able to change the weapons that they have received once and for all.

> But for man, it is possible to employ many methods of defense and to vary them; he can choose the weapons that he wants when he wants. The hand, indeed, befits at will iron, claw, horn, spear, sword, or any other kind of weapon or instrument. It can handle and hold all of them.[6]

It is for this reason that nature has thus arranged the structure of the hand. St. Thomas, commenting on these passages, writes in the *Summa Theologiae*:

> The horns and claws, which constitute for certain animals their method of defense, the hardness of their skin, and the multitude of hair and feathers, which serve to cover them, bear evidence in these animals to an abundance of the earthly component, which is repugnant to the delicacy and harmony of man's complexity. And therefore these things were not suitable for man. But in place of all these things, he has reason and hands [in another place he adds: "tongue"], with which he can make for himself weapons, clothes, and everything necessary for life in an infinity of ways. It is for this reason also that in Book

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[4] *Parts of Animals* 4.10, 687a24–31.

[5] [*Sabots* can also mean "clogs," a type of shoes.]

[6] Ibid., 687a31–b5.

> III of *On the Soul* the hands are named by Aristotle as the “instrument of instruments” [*organum organorum*]. Besides, this was more suitable for the rational nature, which is capable of an infinity of concepts, that he might have the faculty of preparing an infinity of instruments for himself.[7]

The intellectual soul is in potency an infinity of acts by the fact that it can grasp universal natures. It was therefore not possible to endow it with fixed instinctive judgments of a certain kind or even with special methods of defense or protection, as is the case for animals, whose knowledge and affinity are determined to certain particular ends. In place of all these instruments, man possesses by nature reason and the hand—which is the organ of organs, since by the means of it man can make for himself tools of an infinity of models and for an infinity of uses. Thus, while man does not have natural clothing, he has hands. The infinity, the entirely practical infinity of the hand, and the necessity of this infinity, can also be seen in the need of defense, of defense not only against a harsh climate, against the weather, but of defense against the other animals, and even—and especially so—against other men.

Indeed, there is a certain natural contrariety among men. It suffices that a certain group of men agrees on an end, and that another group of men agree on another end, so that there be interference in the pursuit of their respective ends, and that it become necessary for each group to strive to exclude and estrange the other. That can take smaller or larger proportions, but it often ends by a fight. It becomes necessary, then, to protect oneself from other men and even to have ways of attacking them. Counting on reason, one can consequently invent, reinvent, and invent again methods of attacking or of defending. One begins with a stone; next, one makes a knife, then a spear, bows, guns, atomic bombs. . . . All this evolution of weapons responds in some way to a natural need. Evidently, when I say *a natural need*, and go so far as the atomic bomb, or even the gun, I go a little too far. Yet it is certain that man naturally has the capacity to produce this great variety of weapons, and that even the most normal circumstances should oblige him already to exploit this capacity in a very great measure. At any rate, it clearly appears from all this that the infinite character of reason acts as a cause of the infinite character and the freedom of the tongue, and of the universality of the hand to the extent that the hand is the organ of organs. Is it also clear that it is as immediately and properly the purpose [*motif*] of the diversity of human clothing?

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[7] *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 91, a. 3, ad2: “cornua et ungulae, quae sunt quorundam animalium arma, et spissitudo corii, et multitudo pilorum aut plumarum, quae sunt tegumenta animalium, attestantur abundantiae terrestris elementi; quae repugnat aequalitati et teneritudini complexionis humanae. Et ideo haec homini non competebant. Sed loco horum habet rationem et manus, quibus potest parare sibi arma et tegumenta et alia vitae necessaria, infinitis modis. Unde et manus, in III *De anima*, dicitur organum organorum. Et hoc etiam magis competebat rationali naturae, quae est infinitarum conceptionum, ut haberet facultatem infinita instrumenta sibi parandi.”

Firstly, why do we need clothing? Evidently, there is a primary, very manifest reason: as protection against a severe climate, against the variations of temperature. But one could ask: why does man not find the protection he needs already all made on earth, or on him, like the other animals? And why does man not have on earth, like the other animals, a place that is natural for him? Why cannot men quite simply migrate to adapt themselves to some natural environment? Precisely since man differs so profoundly from all the other animals! Man has—even as regards the place he occupies on earth—a certain universality. He can conceive of other places. He can find in other places the things that he needs; he can move and go there. The movement of man is directed by reason, and by a universal reason, which is such that if man is not naturally adapted to any given environment, he can of himself adapt to any environment. Thus, man's movement, by its liberty alone, is an expression of universality. Yes, man is able to go live in cold regions and make himself clothes and houses for living there. He is able to go into a region where there is much sun, and imagine wearing white clothing there. And so on. He can adapt to an infinite variety of environments. It is reason, once again, which is the principle of this universality. Perhaps you think of ducks or geese, which travel too, going north in the summer or spring and south in the fall? But the difference is that they are forced to do so; they are not able to remain where they are; they are forced to migrate, since they cannot adapt definitively to a given place. Man, however, is able to do so. And you know how useful it is! The best for man is not, as one may be tempted to think, that all live on one point of the earth where the climate is ideal, where one could walk free from all clothing—at least as far as harsh climate is concerned—all year long. Not only would this be extremely annoying, but also there would not be room and resources for everyone. Here again, nature is much too determined *ad unum*, supplying a thick skin, or fur, or feathers. Man could not achieve his good, if he was bound by these things.

Animals are naturally clothed. There are no *animal tailors*. Our substance, however, needs a *complementum artis*, a complement that we ought to produce by art. Why does man have need of such a complement? St. Thomas gives us the reason for it in his commentary on the *Physics*, in speaking of predicates.[8] He has been speaking of place and time, which are in some way extrinsic measures of the body. We can ask ourselves whether clothing is not also something altogether extrinsic to and a measure of the body. If so, we could reduce clothing to the category of place, could we not? Clothing will be a kind of place. There will be no need to invent a different predicate, a special category to account for clothing. St. Thomas's response to this difficulty is interesting.

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[8] [See St. Thomas, *In octo libros Physicorum expositio*, Bk. 3, lec. 5, n. 322 [15] (henceforth, *In Phys.)*.]

> There is, however, something special in the case of men. For with the other animals, nature has sufficiently provided the things that concern the preservation of life, such as horns to defend themselves, a thick hide or feathers to protect them, claws or similar devices for cutting without injuring itself. In this way, when one says of such animals that they are "armed," or "clothed," or "shod," such a denomination is not said of something extrinsic to them, but of certain of their parts. Indeed, concerning the animals, what we call their "clothing" is referred to the category of substance.[9]

The skin of an animal is something of the animal and intrinsic to the animal, as opposed to a man's hat. Also, for them, it refers to the predicate of substance. For animals, "jacket" is in the predicate of substance, or at least reduces to the predicate of substance. "It is as if one should say of man that he is *pedatus* or *manuatus*."[10] There is not really a way to translate those words. Likewise, we say that the horse is *naturally shod*, in comparing it to the shod man. But to speak strictly, it does not have shoes. We see simply that what we have by the shoemaker, the horse has directly by nature. Just as we naturally have our hands, so the animal naturally has its jacket, its ties, and what have you.

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[9] *In Phys., Bk.* 3, lec. 5, n. 322: "Est autem aliquid special in hominibus. In aliis enim animalibus natura dedit sufficienter ea quae ad conservationem vitae pertinent, ut cornua ad defendendum, corium grossum et pilosum ad tegendum, ungulas vela liquid huiusmodi ad incedendum sine laesione. Et sic cum talia animalia dicuntur armata vel vestita vel calceata, quodammodo non denominantur ab aliquo extrinseco, sed ab aliquibus suis partibus. Unde hoc refertur in his ad praedicamentum substantiae."

[10] Ibid.: "ut puta si diceretur quod homo est manuatus vel pedatus." [If one were to try to translate these words: "handed" and "footed."]

For there is indeed something that corresponds to the tie in animals. One finds in the rooster, for example, adornments that are quite useless.

> But nature, in the case of man, could not allocate such things, both because they did not suit the multiplicity of his constitution, and because of the multiformity of the works that suit man insofar as he possesses reason, and for which nature could not match specific instruments. Rather, in place of all that, man has reason, by which he prepares exterior things in place of the things that are intrinsic for the other animals. Whence when a man is called "armed," or "clothed," or "shod," these denominations pertain to extrinsic things.[11]

This is unlike in the case of the horse or rhinoceros where these denominations pertain to intrinsic things. What is more, in the case of man,

> they have the notion neither of cause nor of measure; they form a special predicate, that we name *habitus*. One must, however, note that we also attribute this predicate to the other animals, . . .[12]

For example, we might speak of a *saddled* horse, . . . and we even put little jackets on dogs! Certainly, it is not nature that gives the saddle to the horse, and the jacket to the dog! But this is no longer the nature of the horse or the dog, nor *their* utility, which motivates the invention of these accessories.

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[11] Ibid.: "Sed huiusmodi non poterant dari homini a natura, tum quia non conveniebant subtilitati complexionis eius, tum propter multiformitatem operum qua conveniunt homini inquantum habet rationem, quibus aliqua determinata instrumenta accommodari non poterant a natura; sed loco omnium inest homini ratio, qua exteriora sibi praeparat loco horum quae aliis animalibus intrinseca sunt. Unde cum homo dicitur armatus vel vestitus vel calceatus, denominatur ab aliquo extrinseco."

[12] Ibid.: "quod non habet rationem neque causae, neque mensurae; unde est speciale praedicamentum, et dicitur habitus. Sed attendendum est quod etiam in aliis animalibus hoc praedicamentum attribuitur, . . ."

> [We do this] not according to how the they are considered in their own nature, but according to how they come into man's own use, as when we say of the horse that it is "caparisoned," or "saddled," or "armed."[13]

. . . and of the dog that it is "jacketed." This distinction is already present in St. Thomas.

In man, then, clothes are in a certain manner the *ersatz* parts of his substance, substitutes of his substance. Thus, something that replaces, which makes up for, what the animals have naturally instead of clothing. For us, clothing is not part of our substance. If it were, it would be natural. Now, it is not natural but artificial; nevertheless, it serves a similar end.

Clothing, then, relates to our substance by that, and maintains with substance a very deep relation, as one sees it in a way through a sign. It is *phenomenological* (though I do not like this word): there are moments when, looking at a jacket or a coat hanging on a coat rack, this seems extremely strange to us, despite the fact that we are used to the sight of such an object. To take a better example, let us take the clothes left by an unknown dead man, or let us go look at used clothes displayed in the showcase of a store. It is curious, it looks . . . cadaveric. That is to say, we do not completely breathe at ease before these things. With this, we see how clothing replaces for us what is the natural fur or skin for an animal.

But there is a much more manifest reason, in my opinion, of the necessity of clothing for man—more manifest in itself, perhaps less manifest for us, although we immediately agree upon its necessity. Clothing is necessary for man, even in its aspect of varying indefinitely, insofar as man naturally needs adornment. Clothing as adornment, clothing in order to adorn man is necessary, and profoundly necessary. Even for animals, who have natural clothing, even for them, clothing is often adornment: the rooster's feathers, for example, are not purely utilitarian; it is not a pure utilitarian, a maker of overalls, who developed this plumage. Similarly, the lion's mane. For animals, especially for the males, adornment is extremely important, one can say. It is a fact that has its reason. It should be noted that natural clothing contributes to constituting the figure of the animal. The figure of an animal is determined not simply by the bone structure, not simply by the muscular formation. What we see first, and actually, the only thing that strikes sight is its skin, its fur, the exterior configuration of its head. Take off the skin and you will find a totally different configuration. It really is the configuration of the skin that appears first, and this figure is very important. Shave the lion, for example! What will it look like? You would then uncrown it! Or pluck the rooster! It will still have a figure, but it will no longer be the figure of what we call "rooster," and it will be a figure rather . . . humiliating for it.

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[13] Ibid.: "non secundum quod in sua natura considerantur, sed secundum quod in hominis usum veniunt, ut dicamus equum phaleraturm vel sellatum seu armatum."

This figure of animals is very important for the animals themselves, very important particularly for the animals of a social nature. When they are of different sexes, when they live together, when there are a certain number and there is a choice to make between them. This figure as appearance and as adornment is important especially for animals that already have a certain discernment, in which the instinct is quite elevated, that is, for the more perfect animals. Now, if the more perfect animals already need a certain adornment, will not man, who is the most perfect of animals, need similar trappings, though in the order properly named "clothing"?

In that regard, one ought to consider that the corporeal figure is the proximate sign of the nature of a natural being, of its species, and even of the perfection according to which he participates in this species in his individuality. It is the figure that is important for manifesting the nature of the natural being, as one sees it through these signs. Take other accidents, for instance, color. Is the color of an animal sufficient for recognizing the animal? If I make a light brown mark on the wall, will you say: "Here is a lion!"? Of course not! That will not suffice. And if I simply make some strokes on the wall, would you say: "There's a zebra!" Of course, that does not suffice. We need the figure—it is the figure that allows one to distinguish the species of animals, to recognize them, to distinguish them from each other. It is furthermore on account of its figure that we are going to say of this animal that it is nice or not, at least from the aesthetic point of view. Figure is very important, as a proximate sign of the nature of the thing, and a visible sign. Thus, for animals, natural clothing determines, at least from the viewpoint of visible appearances—which are extremely important—its species, its nature. Thus, for man, who hides his natural figure under clothing, it is his clothes (at least when he wears them) that will provide him a certain sign of what he is; *they* will be his figure. We have the figure that our clothing gives us—this is obvious! The man who chooses for himself an article of clothing consequently chooses in a way his own figure; he chooses the visible sign of what he is, or of what he wants to be.

Clothing can thus render manifest something hidden, but of which signification is very important. Man chooses himself, in choosing his clothing; he chooses his public figure. It is why clothing is so significant of the temperament of a man—not only of his position, but of his character. It is not about pretending that a man ought to have many choices in his clothing, or ought to neglect it, as a certain detachment from terrestrial beings. Not at all! Moreover, you recall this hypocritical philosopher who was wearing clothes with holes in them to signal to everyone his detachment from things. Someone said to him: "Your pride pierces through your shirt, through your jacket," "Your pride is visible through the holes in your clothing."[14]

Here is an example showing that the figure one gives himself changes in an important way in choosing such clothing rather than another, or in wearing a certain piece of clothing in such a way rather than in another: a gentleman slides his bowler hat from the ear where he usually wears it to the other. It is a change that *disrupts his substance*, at least with respect to the appearance of it. He may then look absolutely ridiculous, may he not? In sum: one chooses his exterior figure a bit.

When we consider clothing in its function of ornament, the infinity of which I was speaking is much clearer. If we had only to protect ourselves against a harsh climate or against changes in temperature, if the goal of clothing was restricted to this, we would not see this infinity very well. We would see a certain infinity, a large variety, necessary in relation to different environments where man can live or move to. But this is still not the most impressive infinity. One sees the infinity better in the case of clothing as an adornment. Here is how: the disposition of man's nature is very multiform—that is, on account of his reason, man is capable of conceiving an infinity of representations, of solutions and attitudes adapted to the infinity of situations that he may encounter. But on account of his social nature, man ought to be able to express exteriorly this infinite multiformity of intentions, attitudes, and states. It is in clothing, in the ornamental aspect of clothing, that this multiformity will express itself.

I will show you this through induction. It is agreed that we express an interior attitude through clothing and through a certain variety of clothing that is not at all necessary for protecting us from a harsh climate. For example, we wear different clothes on Sundays. There are people who dress the same way on Sundays as they do the rest of the week; but we will find that these people are also rather undifferentiated in their attitudes. If we dress differently on Sundays, it is not because it is colder or less cold on Sundays; that is not the reason. Rather, we express by this different attire the different interior attitude that we have on that day. In liturgical clothing, there are yet more manifest signs of the differences signified. There is a great variety of clothing, and this variety signifies different attitudes, whether for him who wears it, or expected from others towards him who wears it. There is a variety of clothing attached to different functions in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Why is all that necessary? Today, indeed, there is an outcry and reticence towards these things. Why would it be necessary? But we must recognize and take into account the nature of man. We see with our own eyes, and do not have the same impression as a man is diversely dressed. This is especially true for those who imitate him.

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[14] [Diogenes Laertius reports this story of something Socrates said to his friend Antisthenes; see *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, Bk. 6, ch. 1, par. 8.]

If we assume that all men in principle will wear the same pants and the same tie, it must be perceived and admitted, after a certain point, that in order for certain people to stay in power, they are obliged to add some golden bands around their caps and to wear medallions, etc. It becomes necessary again to diversify clothing; that is absolutely inevitable, there is no way of escaping it. This is because we have eyes and we judge ourselves a bit according to what we see. We must recognize this: it is an excellent reason; we are not separate substances capable of always seeing ourselves from the inside; clothing is very important. But when I say *variety*, you could say: “But then, the people who choose a completely uniform outfit for their whole life, such as religious men or women, are acting contrary to nature!?!” How to explain that phenomenon? But precisely there is the completely visible sign of an interior attitude of detachment from exterior things, and of a firm, interior decision subject to an immutable will. One has chosen an absolutely stable state, has he not? And this aligns with an interior intention different from that of others. But one should not exaggerate and forget that the religious communities in the Church are very numerous and have their own attire. Consequently, once we look at these together, we can again say that the Church is *circumdata varietate*: every congregation expresses by its different clothing the originality of its own spirituality. In parentheses, discretely, I will give you another example that, in my opinion, is extremely striking: I mean the wardrobe of the Holy Virgin! She opts for variety, since at Lourdes, she appears with such a dress, in Mexico with such a mantle, and then at Fatima with again another vestment. In all these cases, it seems that the clothing and the diversity of the clothing plays a rather important role. Our Lady of Lourdes is still the same Lady whom one finds on her seat in Mexico, but she is not dressed in the same way. This goes to show the importance of clothing, as officially recognized by the great patron.

There is a reason that would better please zoologists, one that prescinds from human reason, restricting itself to what is more immediate. But this is a very profound reason, in any case. It is the reason for the necessity of clothing for man, and for the necessity of the ability to detach oneself from it as part of one's substance. One sees it in the relation between human reason and the quality of the operations of the sense organs, and more particularly of the touch organs. The human skin is the touch organ. Touch, one must not forget, is the fundamental sense. It is the fundamental sense prerequisite to all the other senses. If by some impossibility one could remove touch, we would have neither taste, nor smell, nor hearing, nor sight. All that would be ended. Touch, it is true, is not the most delicate sense; it is not the most refined, not the most representative of the senses. I mean that, as a sense of representation, touch is rather poor. The variety of things that we can distinguish by touch is rather limited, whereas with the eyes, for example, one reaches an extraordinary richness. We can see a very great variety of objects, a very great multiplicity, a very great diversity of objects, of colors, of shades, of figures, etc. Evidently, we can also perceive a diversity of figures by touch, since figure is in itself a common sensible; but to sense figure, we prefer sight. This is because figure, of course, pertains first to quality, but includes a quantitative aspect.

Touch is the most fundamental sense. If it is not the most perfect sense from the point of view of representation, it remains the most perfect sense from the point of view of certitude. A sign that the sense of touch is very certain is that we are naturally driven to want to touch things to assure ourselves of them. We even have a testimony of it in the Gospel, where Thomas the Apostle said that he would not believe until he could place his hand in the side of our Lord (Jn 20:25). He wanted thus to assure himself with his fingers, that is, in placing his fingers in the side of the Lord. Touch is the sense of certitude, and it the sense of intelligence, because certitude is very important for intelligence. Even with a very great variety of representations, if these representations were not certain, what could we do? It would not be worth much; it would be a dream. To see is only to dream, insofar as sight leaves us in a kind of incertitude if we are deprived of the possibility of verifying by touch. In that respect, sight is inferior to touch for intelligence. Moreover, touch is the most concrete sense, and if we have some contact with reality, it is first by the sense that is itself the closest to the reality of what is reality for us—that is to say, of what is a thing, of what is an entitative thing. I will now tell you what I understand by "entitative thing."

When you place a hand in water, for example, in water you would call tepid, the sensation that you have will depend on the temperature of your hand. If you have a very hot hand, for instance, and place it in tepid water, you have a sensation of cold. But you understand that you are conditioned by the physical and concrete disposition in that moment of the corporeal organ itself of your sensation. Touch is itself the most sensitive in this regard. That is to say that it is the most subject to this subjectivity, that it is the least objective of the senses, whereas sight is much more detached. From the point of view of certitude, there is a certain detachment of things that, however, are first for us, and on which depend our whole knowledge. Our knowledge does not come from the interior, in going towards things, but it comes from *things*—inversely from the angels, yes! Thus, for man, this sense is extremely important for his intelligence.

Now, if we had a hard skin, like mules, a very shaggy skin, we would not have universal touch; we would not have true touch of objects at the location where such a skin would exist. We would not have it. Why do I say "universal touch"? I say it in a completely material sense. Actually, man's touch organ is widespread on all his body, though not in an equal measure. Touch is most delicate in the fingers. When one wants to touch things, it is there that one distinguishes best, whereas if I should touch an object with the cheek, for instance, there I distinguish less. I have more the impression of a thing that pushes me than of an exploration in order to know what an object is. One must distinguish a kind of sensation that reveals primarily the object, from another kind of sensation that primarily makes one aware of the subject of himself as knowing. Touch in the fingertips is the most delicate, the most objective. I want to know whether it is hot or cold; I want to see the figure; I apply the fingers. But if I should do the same thing with my cheek, it will not go so well. Thus, the sense of touch in the fingers is the most perfect in that regard. It is to know things. But look, I can give myself a sensation of touch differently. I move an object on the hairs of the back of my hand. What does this show me? It does not show me much about the object I touch. It is rather the object that tickles *me*, that renders me aware of *myself*, the subject: something affects me. What is the object that thus affects me? This will be without interest. This sensation makes me aware of myself; it does not make me aware of the object.

We are tickled because the hair serves as some sort of lever and overstimulates the touch. Here is the reason for this sensation of tickling or itching. But that is not a sensation of touch that serves knowledge as such. {Now, if man were naturally clothed, as the other animals, if he thus had a thick or furry skin on his whole body, it is the only type of tactile sensation that he could have, and his reason would be very badly served so as to being informed about the nature of exterior objects. The nakedness of man, the fact that he is "free from dead surface," serves his reason better; his need of "clothing makes him feel that he is not entirely at home in nature"; it allows for a "sensation of *separation*" from the rest of the world, that opens to being "however immaterially open to the sensible world." "We are aware of clothing as being *of another*." This relation *bare skin-clothing* gives us a "sense of being distinct and of being there with respect to our whole substance, a sense of being much oneself and apart." "All that would be impossible with a natural clothing. *Intus existens prohibet extraneum*. We are aware of being entirely where we are; the dog does not have this awareness. If we had a lot of hair, we would be subjectivists and inevitably inclined to idealism."}[15]

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[15] The part in curved brackets is absent from the conference recording. One finds simply the statements between the quotation marks on a written plan that accompanies it, under this form: "If hard skin,very hairy, would not have universal touch. That would affect the free and varied movements of the body (dance). Touch on the whole body (unequally). *Ideo*, sensation of *separation*: thanks to the organ of knowing: sense of being distinct and of being there with respect to our whole substance: of being very much oneself and separate. Nonetheless immaterially open to the sensible world. Free from dead space. Awareness of being entirely where we are. (Dog does not). We are aware of clothing as being of another. All that impossible with natural clothing. *Intus*

{These considerations show us with much force "the importance of this category, the only one typically human." "The reasons for this are profoundly rooted in the reasonable nature of man." It is "as reasonable" that man needs to be naturally nude, so as to be endowed with an organ of touch capable of informing reason truly and assuredly about a world that is outside it. Natural clothing would undoubtedly protect man from bad weather, but would also cut him off intellectually from the world and make a dreamer of him, a lost idealist. It is also "as reasonable," and as political, that man needs to clothe himself, and provide himself with an infinite diversity of clothing, the adornment of which manifests exteriorly the infinity of interior dispositions elicited by his reason in regard to the infinite variety of situations, problems, and objects of contemplation that life offers him. We see ourselves thus obliged to conclude about . . . "the necessity of a new hat for women!" Since how could they, without a new hat, without an infinite multiplicity of ornamentation, manifest exteriorly, as soon as we see them, their passionate, interior taste for living, their desire to love, please, be loved, and the thousand dispositions that inhabit them?}[16]

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existens prohibet extraneum. If we had a lot of hair, we would be subjectivists and inclined to idealism. Two kinds of sensation by touch: 1st object; 1st subject: tickling through hair." [This and the following note translate comments by the editor of the published French text.]

[16] Same remark for the conclusion between brackets, of which we again find the statements in between quotation marks on a plan under this form: "Clothing shows that man is not entirely at home in nature. Importance of this category—the only one typically human. Necessity of a new hat for women. The reasons profoundly rooted in the reasonable nature of man—as reasonable."

A SHORT NOTE
ON *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE* I, Q. 1, A. 9, AD 1
ON *ARS DELECTABILITER IMITANDI*

Charles De Koninck

> To the first it should be said, then, that the poet uses metaphors on account of the representation, for representation is naturally delightful to human beings. But sacred doctrine uses metaphors on account of their necessity and usefulness, as has been said.[1]

To make this response clearer, let it be noted that poetics is in

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Translator's Note: This second essay by De Koninck is a translation that was made from a type-written Latin text he appears to have composed for a course shortly before 1942. The title given there is "Notula in Iae Partis Q. I, a. ix, ad 1," which we have amplified so as to be more informative. As a matter of presentation, the only changes we have made are to insert or remove a handful of paragraph breaks, to insert section titles, and to relegate to footnotes comments that De Koninck surrounds with parentheses. In a few spots, where the Latin may be of some significance, we have included it in square brackets. The reader should be aware that the voice of the deponent Latin verb *imitor*, *imitari* (which occurs frequently in this text) is ambiguous; it is usually translated actively ("I imitate"), but can also be translated passively ("I am imitated"), so we have had to make some interpretative judgments based on context. — Christopher A. Decaen

[1] "Ad primum erogo dicendum quod poeta utitur metaphoris propter representationem, representatio enim naturaliter homini delectabilis est. Sed sacra doctrina utitur metaphoris propter necessitate et utilitatem, ut dictum est." *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 1, a. 9, ad 1 (henceforth *STh*).

the genus of arts of imitating, the different species of which are painting, music, sculpture, etc. The definition of the whole genus, however, is "art of imitating in a delightful way" [*ars delectabiliter imitandi*], whereas the difference proper to poetics [*differentia poetica*] is speech, that of music rhythmic sound, etc.

Preliminary Clarifications About the Definition Proposed

Now, let the terms of this definition be clarified as follows: an art is the correct notion of things that can be made; what "of imitating" indicates should be seen based on *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 35, a. 1, and *In I Sententiarum*, d. 28, q. 2, a. 1, where one should note three elements that belong to the notion of an image: 1) being a likeness, 2) in the species [or appearance] of a thing, or in some sign of that species, and 3) origination. Whence "for something to be truly an image, it is required that it proceed from another as like it in species, or at least in the sign of its species."[2] An origination and procession [of something] expressive of the original, therefore, is that wherein the notion of an image is completed.

And in the passage in the *Sentences* St. Thomas distinguishes a triple gradation of imitation, insofar as each attains the notion of an image to some degree, inasmuch as it attains the notion of non-difference; for insofar as it differs [from the original] it is not its image. The first grade is that in which is found something like in quality to the other thing, something that designates and expresses the nature of the other, even though that nature is not found in it; for example, a stone is said to be the image of a man insofar as it has a like shape, but it does not have the nature of the thing of which it is the image. (And in this way the image of God is found in a creature, just as the image of the king is in the coin.) And this is the imperfect mode of being an image. But the more perfect notion of image is found when specifically the same nature is under that quality that designates the like nature; for example, the image of the father, a man, is in his son, since he has a likeness both in the figure and in the nature that the figure signifies. But the most perfect notion of an image is found when we find numerically the same form and nature in the one imitating and the one who is imitated. And so it is that the Son is the most perfect image of the Father, since all the divine attributes that are signified through the mode of quality are together with the divine nature itself in the Son, being there not only according to species, but even according to a unity in number.

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[2] *STh* I, q. 35, a. 1. [The full body of the article, to which De Koninck occasionally alludes below, but without quoting, reads as follows: "I respond that it should be said that likeness belongs to the notion of an image. Yet not just any sort of likeness is enough for the notion of an image, but only one that is a likeness in the species of the reality, or at least in some sign of that species. Now, the sign of a species among bodily realities seems most to be the shape, for we see that for animals diverse in species there are diverse shapes, but not diverse colors. Whence, if some reality's color is painted on a wall, this is not said to be its image, unless it is painted in its shape. But neither is the very likeness of the species or shape enough; rather, origination is required for the notion of an image. For as Augustine says, 'one egg is not the image of another, since it was not laid by it.' Therefore, for something to be truly an image, it is required that it proceed from another as like it in species, or at least in the sign of its species. Therefore things that indicate procession or origination in the divine are personal. This is why this name 'image' is a personal name."

"In a delightful way": Aristotle has shown that there are certain imitations that are naturally delightful to man as follows:

> It is reasonable to think that the art of poetry in general was brought into being by two kinds of causes, both of them natural: for (1) imitating is innate in men from childhood, and in this respect men differ from the other animals by being the most imitative of animals and learning first by imitating, and (2) all men enjoy works of imitation. A sign of the second cause is what happens when we observe works [of art]; for, although we are pained while observing certain objects, we nevertheless

> enjoy beholding their likenesses if these have been carefully worked out with special accuracy, e.g., likenesses of the forms of the lowest animals and of corpses. And the reason for this enjoyment is that learning is pleasant—indeed most pleasant—not only for philosophers, but similarly for other men also, although the latter partake of such pleasure only to some extent. That is why men enjoy observing likenesses: as they behold them, they learn and infer what each likeness portrays, e.g., that this is a likeness of that [man]; and if one happens not to have observed earlier the object imitated, pleasure will still come, not because the work is an imitation, but because of the workmanship or the coloring or some other such reason.[3]

Therefore the art of imitating in a delightful way is the art of producing works or images or representations the very consideration or contemplation of which is delightful. In fact, this delight is on account of the imitation or representation, but not thereby on account of the reality imitated, the original, since (as Aristotle notes) even a base reality can be imitated in a delightful way. Whence in a tragedy murder can be delightful—not as murder, for that would be perverse, but as an imitation of murder. Therefore, although it would be necessary that we ourselves know the original of the imitation so that we might attain the imitation as an imitation, the original itself is nevertheless outside the notion of that on account of which one delights. Nor is it a problem that the recognition of an imitation sometimes supposes the recognition of some wicked or ugly original. For

> the action of the intellect is perfected insofar as intelligible realities are in the intellect through the mode of the

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[3] Aristotle, *Poetics* 4, 1448b4–19. [De Koninck gives a French translation of the text; we have taken the English from *Aristotle's Poetics*, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (Grinell, IA: Peripatetic Press, 1990), 3–4.]

> intellect itself; and therefore the intellect is not infected by these realities, but rather is perfected by them. But the act of the will consists in a motion to a reality, such that the love affixes the soul to the reality loved.[4]

Whence too

> although the beauty of the visible brings about the perfection of sight, yet the ugliness of the visible can be [in sight] without [bringing about] any imperfection of sight. For the species of realities in the soul, through which contrary things are known, are not themselves contrary. Whence God also, who has the most perfect cognition, sees all things, the beautiful and the ugly.[5]

This delight, then, is formally on account of the imitation insofar as this stands in the line of pure objectivity and intelligibility. And this implies three things.

The first is that such imitation will be imperfect in the notion of delightful imitation to the degree that it fails in pure objectivity, that is, to the degree that it holds something of the subject insofar as it is opposed to the object. And this happens when the original is not imitatively expressed, such that the imitation itself is not sufficient of itself, but it must be completed by some subject, whether the original or the matter, as is manifest in a comedy that is imperfect by reason of the poet or an actor [*histrionis*]. For it sometimes happens that a representation effected by a mediocre actor cannot be delightful unless the person of the actor is loved first; and the same thing happens as regards the poem itself:[6] [it is not delightful] unless the original itself or the poet himself be loved beforehand.[7]

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[4] *STh* I-II, q. 86, a. 1, ad 2: "actio intellectus perficitur secundum quod res intelligibiles sunt in intellectu per modum ipsius intellectus; et ideo intellectus ex eis non inficitur, sed magis perficitur. Sed actus voluntatis consistit in motu ad res, ita quod amor rei amatae animam conglutinat."

[5] *In Sententiarum,* Bk. 4, d. 50, q. 2, a. 4, qla. 1, ad 2 (henceforth *In Sent.*): "quamvis pulchritudo visibilis ad perfectionem faciat visionis; visibilis tamen turpitudo sine visionis imperfectione esse potest; species enim rerum in anima, per quas contraria cognoscuntur, non sunt contrariae. Unde etiam Deus, qui perfectissimam cognitionem habet, omnia, pulchra et turpia, videt." [De Koninck cites the supplement to the tertia pars, q. 94, a. 1, ad 2.]

The second is that, so that the intellect could linger in the representation itself as in the object on account of which it delights, it is necessary that that object as object be more perfect than the original, having a greater intelligibility in this respect, and even a certain universality.[8] Whence if a painter makes a picture of some individual, a picture that is a material likeness conferring the illusion of reality, it is not a work of the art of imitating in a delightful way, nor does it have the notion of origination, properly speaking, but rather is more like a second egg.[9] And this is how many of grosser mind have understood Aristotle.

The third implication is that insofar as the imitation is more intelligible than the original, and because "imitation" signifies a relation to what is being imitated, i.e., to the original, the very art of imitating in a delightful way has the notion of instrumentality, to the degree that the original becomes more intelligible by virtue of the imitation. Whence the goodness of the work is judged from the greater intelligibility [it causes] of what it imitates. And this is why St. Thomas says,

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[6] Reading "de ipso poemate," rather than "de ipse poemate."

[7] And this is why works of the art of imitating can be morally evil to the degree that they fail in the notion of the art of imitating, or to the degree that in themselves within the line of pure objective imitation they are insufficient, but require as a precondition for delight the love of what is being imitated, or of the one who makes the imitation, or the matter in which it occurs. And such a failure occurs often [*ut in pluribus*]. And when about some work of the art of imitating we are delighted, but without ourselves knowing, frequently it occurs that one is delighted on account of some subject, and not on account of the object absolutely speaking. And in this stands the entire danger of the art.

[8] And on account of this Aristotle says that poetry is more philosophical than is history. [See *Poetics* 9, 1451b1–11.]

[9] [See the Augustine quotation in note 2.]

> the poetic science is about those things that cannot be grasped by [our] reason, on account of their deficiency in truth. Whence it is necessary that reason be, as it were, seduced by certain likenesses.[10]

And in this respect the art of imitating in a delightful way has the notion of a doctrine, to the degree that it leads one from one thing into another—that is, the original itself is elevated and made more manifest by the imitation. And in this respect, this art has a likeness with the agent intellect. However, that to which the imitation or representation guides one is in itself deficient in comparison to the clarity of the representation.

Let one note the difference between the scientific universal and this quasi-universal of the arts of imitating. For singular realities are more powerful images of that [universal]. And in this respect the universal of the art of imitating, or the imitation, stands in a middle way between the singular and the proper universal; whence it has the notion of a mean as regard both the universal and the singular. Therefore to have poetic cognition of realities is a great distance from the perfection of science, but also from the imperfection of the singular, or that of ignorance. But this intermediacy and instrumentality is in a certain way hidden, to the degree that imitation seduces reason. Reason is said to be "seduced" by imitations, however, because imitation is naturally delightful to man. Therefore the delight has the aspect of a mover. Therefore reason is inclined by something extrinsic to the notion of the cognitive in itself—namely, by the delight of the imitation. Whence in this respect poetic cognition does not altogether exceed the power of sensation, according to which, in the animals, the activities are sought on account of their delight. But neither intellect nor will, in and of themselves, seek knowledge or the good on account of the delight, but on account of the activities. For delight in and of itself does not have the notion of the end, but of something concomitant [with the end]. "And this is why the divine intellect, which is the institutor of nature, united delights [to activities], for the sake of the activities."[11]

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[10] *In Sent.,* Bk. 1, prol., q. 1, a. 5, ad 3: "quod poetica scientia est de his quae propter defectum veritatis non possunt a ratione capi; unde oportet quod quasi quibusdam similitudinibus ratio seducatur. Theologia autem est de his quae sunt supra rationem; et ideo modus symbolicus utrique communis est, cum neutra rationi proportionatur."

Therefore poetic cognition according to itself is path-like [*vialis*] and imperfect, although it is better than certain other things. And this is why St. Thomas asserts that it is the "lowest doctrine,"[12] as is clear from the first lecture of the first book of the *Posterior Analytics* [commentary] where, after he has spoken about scientific demonstration, he first enumerates dialectic, then rhetoric, then last poetics:

> sometimes one's judgment leans only toward one side of a contradiction, on account of some representation, in the way in which a man comes to abhor a certain food if it is represented to him under the likeness of something abhorrent. And the poetic art is ordered to this, for it belongs to the poet to lead one to something virtuous through a comely representation. But all these things pertain to rational philosophy [i.e., logic], for to lead one from one thing to something else belongs to reason.[13]

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[11] *STh* I-II, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2: "Et inde est quod divinus intellectus, qui est institutor naturae, delectationes apposuit propter operationes."

[12] [See *STh* I, q. 1, a. 9, obj. 1: "infima inter omnes doctrinas."]

[13] *In Aristotelis libros Posteriorum Analyticorum expositio*, Bk. 1, prooemium, n. 6: "Quandoque vero sola existimatio declinat in aliquam partem contradictionis propter aliquam representationem, ad modum quo fit homini abominatio alicuius cibi si repraesentetur ei sub similitudine alicuius abominabilis. Et ad hoc ordinatur poetica; nam poetae est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per aliquam decentem repraesentationem. Omnia autem haec ad rationalem philosophiam pertinent; inducere enim ex uno in aliud rationis est."

This is, however, displeasing to many people on account of the charm of poetic cognition and on account of the impetus of its brilliance [*eius impetum ardoris*]. And therefore many assert that poetic cognition is, as it were, at the edge of total cognition [*quasi in acie totius cognitionis*]. But this is accidental, that is, it is on account of the great imbecility of our intellect, such that poetic knowledge is easier, possessing a certain intermediacy between the singular and the universal, one for the most part proportionate to human beings. For there are few who reach the first principles as the principles of science, and who reach true science. And thus many, not having but a certain appearance of science, do not understand the excellence of true science, although it is true that we cannot ourselves have anything but poetic knowledge of many things, and that the genius of the poet holds its excellence based on what it teaches us about those things. And thus it is true that, among natural cognitions, for the most part the poetic offers a certain improvement [*melioritatem*] to men.

Commentary on St. Thomas's Reply to the Objection

Having presented these things, we can now clarify St. Thomas's response that "the poet uses metaphors on account of the representation, for representation is naturally delightful to human beings. But sacred doctrine uses metaphors on account of their necessity and usefulness, as has been said."[14]

One should note, therefore, that Sacred Scripture or theology intends not the representations delightful in themselves to man, but the realities that exceed the grasp of our intellect, things that cannot be signified without metaphors, or at least less fittingly (for the reasons given in the body of this article). Poetics uses metaphors for the sake of the representations on account of which we are delighted, as when a lion is called the king of the animals—from which follows a representation in which more of intelligibility is being attributed to the lion than it itself possesses, and what is being considered is the imitation of the lion, that is, the lion-king, not the lion itself, except materially. This is why we linger more over that to which the lion is being compared, yet insofar as it is that relative to which the imitation exists. Now, Sacred Scripture does indeed use metaphors, but not for the sake of delightful representations, but for the sake of the realities themselves; for example, when Christ is said to be a lion, what is being signified is his courage, based on the sensibly evident courage of a lion. But in this example we do not linger over that to which he is being compared, nor even in what is constituted from the two [i.e., Christ the lion], but rather in the courage of Christ. Whence St. Thomas says,

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[14] *STh* I, q. 1, a. 9, ad 1. [See note 1 for Latin.]

> the poetic science is about things that cannot be grasped by [our] reason, on account of their deficiency in truth. Whence it is necessary that reason be, as it were, seduced by certain likenesses. Theology, however, is about things that are above reason. And therefore the symbolic mode is common to both of them because neither is proportioned to reason.[15]

Therefore reason, properly speaking, is wholly opposed to each of them. Therefore it would be ridiculous to say that Scripture or sacred doctrine proceeds poetically. For to the degree that poetic knowledge attends to the representations per se, we are turned away from what [sacred doctrine] intends—that is, from [the reality] that exceeds the representations. And while it does have a poetic appearance, this is so accidentally and not precisely as Scripture or theology.

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[15] *In Sent.,* Bk. 1, prol., q. 1, a. 5, ad 3. [See note 10 for Latin.]

Objections to the Definition Itself

However, all these things follow from the proper definition of the art of imitating concerning which St. Thomas is speaking in this text. But on this interpretation do follow several incongruities. First of all, we will consider objections about the very definition of the genus of the arts that are here being called "arts of imitating in a delightful way."

The first incongruity is that the entire [definition] is asserted as being for the sake of representation and imitation as that on account of which one is delighted. But these arts are quite opposed to knowledge in the universal, insofar as they are based on experience, and we are delighted about an imitation to the degree that it makes us experience.

A second incongruity lies in the fact that, as objective, an imitation is opposed to the subject. But on the contrary, there is one species of poems, that is, lyric poetry, wherein the poet speaks in the first-person, and a certain species of paintings, that is, self-portraiture, wherein the very person of the artist expresses his very self. Whence it is said that an art is "expressive of itself" [*sui expressiva*].

A third is that in all the arts there is some imitation—an original and its image—as is clear in the art of making a hammer or a saw. Besides, [every] art is said to be "imitative of nature."[16]

The fourth is that the poetic art is about those things that, on account of their deficiency in truth, cannot be grasped by reason, or that the imitation is better than the original. For in comedy, as opposed to tragedy, a man is represented as worse than he is.[17]

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[16] [See Aristotle, *Physics* 2.8, 199a16: "And, generally, art carries to an end some things which nature cannot work out, and imitates others." *Physics, or Natural Hearing*, trans. Glen Coughlin (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2005), 38.]

[17] [See Aristotle, *Poetics* 2, 1448a18, and 5, 1449a34, although Aristotle says only that comedy imitates men "who are worse than average"; see Apostle, 2 and 5.]

Response to the Objections

Let us respond to these things. To the first, we say that, as regards these arts, two sorts of experience can be considered. The first experience is in reference to the work itself to the degree that it possesses singularity, like this painting or that poem. But the work of an art of imitating in a delightful way is not brought to completion in this singular as such, which would then be like [the kind of imitation possessed by] a second egg, or [an imitation that is] only numerical, one adding nothing in the line of intelligibility. Rather, together with that singularity, it stands in a certain universality in which the imitation that we are now speaking about is properly brought to completion. Yet it could be added that in the works of the arts of imitating in a delightful way there is a likeness with a spiritual reality that is a universal containing under itself only one individual. But this likeness on the side of the work is possible on account of its imperfection, insofar as [it imitates] "perfect things imperfectly, and imperfect things perfectly."[18]

The second relevant experience stands on the side of what is being imitated, insofar as many things that are being imitated should be known by experience beforehand, as is clear especially in music, wherein the motions of the passions are being imitated. But in what is known by experience in this way is not preserved what is proper to the art; rather, this is preserved in that whereby such experience is being imitated in an intelligible and delightful way. This is why what is attained obscurely by experience is expressed more perfectly by its imitation. And this imitation has the notion of a liberation and purification. In fact, the delight about which we are now speaking is not on account of what is known by experience as such, but on account of the imitation; this is clear in an imitation of pain or sorrow, except insofar as one understands the delightful thing itself as the beholding or hearing of the imitation.

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[18] [It is not clear what De Koninck is quoting here. Perhaps a common figure of speech.]

To the second, we answer that even lyric poetry is simply speaking objective. The first-person is not the individual person of the poet, but rather this is already an imitation of the first-person, where the individual person is relevant only materially. And it is likewise for the image of the painter himself, which does not hold the notion of an art of imitating in a delightful way except insofar as it holds something of universality. And when due to the image the individual person of the painter himself is known better, this is accidental, and if it makes us know nothing else, or does so only imperfectly, it is inept. To the expression "art is expressive of itself" we will respond below.

To the third, we answer that in every art there is indeed some imitation, just as there is both an exemplar and something based on it; this is why the exemplar is sometimes called the "original" and what is based on it is called the "image." But the [specific] difference that belongs to the arts that we are discussing now is preserved in the word "delightfully." One should consider, therefore, that in these arts there are two sorts of exemplar or original. The first—that is, the productive idea in the mind of the artist—is common to all arts, and it immediately expresses the "whatness" of the thing to be made. But in an art of imitating in a delightful way one should be aware that that exemplar is already based on an exemplar, it is already an image, as is clear with a painting conceived by a painter before its execution, or in a poem conceived but not yet written. In fact, this concept or image has a more radical original whose the concept or image is its likeness in species with origination, like a lion, or anger, or clouds, or a king, and all other things that can be so imitated.

> Now, the reason that art imitates nature is that cognition is the principle of action according to art, whereas our

> every cognition occurs through sensations received from sensible and natural realities. Whence we work on artificial things according to a likeness with natural realities. But natural realities are imitable by art because the whole of nature is ordered by some intellectual principle to its own end, to such an extent that the work of nature seems to be a work of intelligence, as long as it approaches certain ends through determinate means—which art also imitates in its activities.[19]

But an art of imitating in a delightful way as such and insofar as it is of this sort is not said to imitate in this way, as is clear from the fact that it can equally imitate artificial things.

And when it is said that "art is expressive of itself," this too can be understood in several ways. But art is understood by modern men to be expressive of the subject who is the artist as a subject. But this occurs either because the term "subject" is being misused (as was said above about "first-person"), or because while the work fails in the notion of delightful imitation, it more signifies a certain passion or thought that is in itself pleasing to the reader, viewer, or listener, as is clear in artwork that is said to be "daring" ["*audacia*"]. Whence one delights not on account of the imitation, but on account of what is being imitated, like a spectator might love the imitation of a base thing because he loves base things.

Nevertheless one should concede that the delightful imitation brings in something of the subject qua subject, as we implied above. For delightfulness belongs to the notion of this imitation, and not merely as something concomitant [with it], just as happens in happiness [*sicut in beatitudine contingit*]. Whence one who adheres to the objects exclusively insofar as they have the notion of the delightful, desiring the knowledge on account of the delight [it brings], clings to them in a disordered way. However, this happens naturally to the young, who do not yet seek knowledge except under the species of the delightful, and on account of this they are instructed by poetics in a more connatural way. It also happens in many people on account of an excessive orientation to sensation [*sensibilitatem*], such that they do not reach for purely intelligible things—or on account of a disordered desire for delight, as happens even in those who seek dialectical knowledge for its own sake, insofar as they are too content with a mere likeness of the truth [*verisimilitudine*]. But in these things, as was already said, one does not go beyond the instrumental cognition. Whence pragmatism proceeds logically when it exalts the eminence of the arts of imitating in a delightful way. And to the degree that it reaches these imitations, John Dewey correctly speaks about "enjoyed meanings" or delightful significations, and the highest experience of the arts he asserts is happiness.[20] And as regards the danger of the arts of imitating, let one look upon the altogether divine Plato.[21]

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[19] *In octo libros Physicorum expositio*, Bk. 2, lec. 4, n. 6: "Eius autem quod ars imitatur naturam, ratio est, quia principium operationis artificialis cognitio est; omnis autem nostra cognitio est per sensus a rebus sensibilibus et naturalibus accepta; unde ad similitudinem rerum naturalium in artificialibus operamur. Ideo autem res naturales imitabiles sunt per artem, quia ab aliquo principio intellectivo tota natura ordinatur ad finem suum, ut sic opus naturae videatur esse opus intelligentiae, dum per determinata media ad certos fines procedit; quod etiam in operando ars imitatur."

To these things it can further be added that, because within any work of an art of imitating in a delightful way two things can be considered, one being the very imitation and the other its execution, there are also two sorts of wonder: one at the imitation itself, and the other at the genius of the artist.

> When even the best of us hear Homer or any other of the tragic poets imitating one of the heroes in mourning and

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[20] *Experience and Nature*, chapter 9 (1925); and *Art as Experience* (1932), respectively.

[21] See Plato, *Republic*, books 2, 3, and 10.

> making quite an extended speech with lamentation, or, if you like, singing and beating his breast, you know that we enjoy it and that we give ourselves over to following the imitation; suffering along with the hero in all seriousness, we praise as a good poet the man who most puts us in this state.[22]

Moreover, "genius" [*ingenium*] can be understood in two ways: either for what is had from birth [*a generatione*] or by nature, as in the expression "a born poet," *or* for what is unbegotten [*ingenitum*], or what is not from any source, but is itself, as it were, the primary root and simple origin, and this is why he is called "someone original." But the good poet has both of these. He has the first insofar as by nature he is well disposed for conceiving and executing imitations, which he has partly from an innate sensitivity for objects under the species of the delightful (on account of which artists are often desirous of disordered living). And he has the second because imitations of this sort ought to be simultaneously both like the truth and unexpected. Aristotle presents an example of this latter from tragedy:

> Now, a tragic imitation is not only of a complete action, but also of events which arouse fear and pity, and these events come about best—and do so more when they occur unexpectedly—if they occur because of each other. For they are more wonderful if they occur in this manner rather than if they occur by chance or by luck. And even those which occur by luck are thought to be the most wonderful if they appear to occur as though by design, as in the case of the statue of Mitys at Argos: while the man who caused the death of Mitys was looking at the statue, it fell and killed him. Events such as these seem to occur

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[22] Plato, *Republic* 10, 605d. [De Koninck gives a French translation; ours is taken from *The Republic of Plato*, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 289.]

> not without plan, and so plots [with such events] are of necessity finer [than plots with events which occur just by chance].[23]

This power of conceiving and reaching the resolution in a good way, therefore, causes wonder. And through this path one goes to the subject of the artist, and sometimes his very person comes to be, as it were, an exemplar of a whole life of wonder, and this is an impure thing [*immundum*].

To the fourth we answer that in comedies a man is indeed represented as worse and more ridiculous than he is in reality. However, it does not follow from this that the imitation of him is not better [than he is in reality]. For it is more intelligible in the degree that it has more of the very notion of the ridiculous than do the realities themselves. But when, in fact, the imitation falls short of the original, then this does not belong to the art of imitating in a delightful way precisely as such. And this deficiency can happen from manifold causes, an example of which is given by the ancient writers and sculptors making imitations of the gods.

For such an imitation may have the notion of a terminus as that on account of which one delights, so the original stands only as material; in this case, the imitation arises from the art imitating in a delightful way precisely as such. And this is why the very gods being imitated—the originals—are considered by the poet to be imperfect in themselves; whence in comparison to them, his imitations are more perfect. And this can happen on account of one's ignorance, and in this consists the humanism of the ancients, such that man would be considered, as it were, the liberator of gods, and both creative [of them] and [their] exemplar.

Or else this imitation may not have the notion of a terminus, but rather of a middle by which realities higher in themselves become more proportioned to our mode of receiving them. And in this last case, the imitation does not arise from the art of imitating in a delightful way precisely as such, as will become clear from the things to be said below about the religious art. Nevertheless in fact we cannot draw the ancient poets wholly either to one side of this or the other, insofar as there are also ones who are said to be theologizing,[24] because their works are a certain blend of poetry and dialectic.

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[23] Aristotle, *Poetics* 9, 1452a2–11 [Apostle trans., 11–12; bracketed additions are Apostle's].

Objections Pertaining to the Above Definition in Connection to the Religious Art

Secondly, many incongruities follow [from our account] particularly as regards the religious art.[25] First, it is indeed manifest that many works of art, whether poetic or musical, sculpted or painted, that have been produced by Catholic artists are exceedingly beautiful, and therefore delightful. Therefore they have been produced by an art of imitating in a delightful way. Therefore the things that have been cited and inferred above from St. Thomas are too narrow and should be corrected.

Second, it would follow that the images of Christ and the saints should not be venerated [*colendas*],

> except improperly and in an abusive sense, whereas one should venerate only the exemplar, when before its image, such that the image is never the terminus of one's veneration [*cultus*], but only a sign or condition whereby we are excited to honoring the original.[26]

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[24] [Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.6, 107b27; 14.4, 1091a30, where Aristotle refers to some of the ancient poets as "theologians."]

[25] [As one reads this section it seems to be the case that De Koninck is using *ars religiosa* to mean not the artwork (as we normally use the phrase "religious art") but rather the craft in the soul of one who makes such artwork. To try to capture this meaning better, we translate this as "the/a religious art."]

[26] Charles-René Billuart, *Summa Sancti Thomae*, vol. 5, dissert. 23, a. 3, sect.

And this judgment is commonly rejected by theologians, as can be seen in Billuart.

Third, Sacred Scripture itself urges us toward giving praise to God with song, drum, choruses, on the harp and with the organ, in clashing cymbals. But things of this sort are beautiful works of art.

Fourth, it would follow that even the images of holy things [*sanctorum*] the very sight of which is not delightful would be more perfect than less polished images.

Response to these Objections

Let us respond to these things. To the first, I say that what is proper to an art of imitating in a delightful way is not preserved in the beautiful work of art as such, but in the delightful imitation. And therefore the arts of imitating in a delightful way are abusively equated with those that are called "fine arts" [*beaux arts*]. One should, therefore, consider that the beautiful is defined as that which when seen pleases,[27] and therefore through complacency according to vision, but not through delight. And although delight would follow on this complacency, this is not of the intrinsic notion of the beautiful. Whence if beauty were defined by the rest of the appetite or by the delight in the very look of what is called beautiful, the definition would be common and logical.

Therefore the works referred to in the objection can proceed from the most perfect art and be exceedingly beautiful, and yet not proceed from the art of imitating in a delightful way as such. For it is necessary that a religious work of art has the original as its principle and as its end, so the notion of delight comes principally from the original, and secondarily from the

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5 (Paris, apud Victorem Palmé, 1900, 641).

[27] "id quod visum placet"; see St. Thomas, *STh* I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1.]

imitation. And in this way the art of imitating in a delightful way and the religious art bear themselves in opposite ways.

Nevertheless it is very much worth noting that the religious art according to itself is more perfect in the very notion of an art of imitation to the degree that it expresses better things, guiding one to those better things, by which it is both primarily and ultimately measured. But the very perfection of its work is a participated perfection. For the religious artist is wholly subject to the original, and his work carries one to the original. And his work is perfect to the degree that it tends to something other than itself. Therefore although he has dominion over the form of the work and its matter, both the matter and the form stand materially in relation to the thing he is imitating. But in an art that is defined by delightful imitation, the artist is himself wholly the master [*dominus*]—whereas the original, even though it is a principle, stands only as material for the imitation, and the artist himself is the first measure simply speaking. Therefore the humanism in these realities is nothing other than an extension of this dominion over the originals, which are in themselves better things, especially [in the case of] the divine originals.[28]

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[28] Encyclopedia Britannica: "Humanism: in general any system of thought or action which assigns a predominant interest to the affairs of men as compared with the supernatural or the abstract. The term is specially applied to that movement of thought which in western Europe in the 15th century broke through the mediaeval traditions of scholastic theology and philosophy, and devoted itself to the rediscovery and direct study of the ancient classics. This is movement was essentially a revolt against intellectual, and especially ecclesiastical authority, and is the parent of all modern developments whether intellectual, scientific or social." On the Renaissance: "Humanism, a word which will often recur in the ensuing paragraphs, denotes a specific bias which the forces liberated in the Renaissance took from contact with the ancient world—the particular form assumed by human self-esteem at that epoch—the ideal of life and civilization evolved by the modern nations. It indicates the endeavor of man to reconstitute himself as a free being, not as the thrall of theological despotism, and the peculiar assistance he derived in this effort from Greek and Roman literature, the '*litterae humaniores*,' letters leaning rather to the side

To the second, let us respond based on the same author [quoted in the objection]:

> the same veneration is owed to an image and to its exemplar, yet in diverse ways: to the exemplar on account of itself, and to the image on account of the exemplar—that is, an absolute veneration is owed to the exemplar, but a relative veneration to the image, in such a way that from the image and the exemplar are integrated one whole object of adoration: the exemplar as principal and primary, and the image as secondary and by reason of the exemplar. Whence according to this judgment, the images of God and Christ are adored with *latria*, and the image of the Blessed Virgin with *hyperdulia*, and the images of the saints with *dulia*.[29]

If, in fact, one were to rest in the image itself in an absolute way as in that-on-account-of-which, then it would not have the notion of a holy image.

> Clement of Alexandria condemned as thieves the painters and sculptors who glorified themselves as being the inventors and first authors of the animals and plants in their paintings, as if God were not working in all things in a hidden way—this being a certain species of theft with respect to the divine omnipotence. For he adds, "he who therefore would say that he himself has thought out something or made anything among things that pertain to creation, he will pay the penalty of an impious and

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of man than of divinity. In this article the Renaissance will be considered as implying a comprehensive movement of the European intellect and will toward self-emancipation, toward reassertion of the natural rights of the reason and the senses, toward the conquest of this planet as a place of human occupation, and toward the formation of regulative theories both for states and individuals differing from those of mediaeval times." [De Koninck gives these two quotations in English without complete bibliographical information.]

[29] Billuart, *Summa Sancti Thomae*, vol. 5, dissert. 23, a. 3, sect. 5 (642).

> abominable undertaking. For by the general and universal providence of God, working through things that are moved more immediately, an efficacious operation is transmitted to individual things by way of intermediaries."[30]

Whence even more so, artists imitating sacred things but not, in the way it was said, subjecting themselves to the original should be held as thieves.

To the third we respond, besides the things that have been said above, that praise [of God] does not have the notion of delightful imitation except in performances [*scoenis*], but not in itself. For praise extols something as good and virtuous. And even if its form is well proportioned and luminous, as happens in hymns, nevertheless the speech with which it is spoken is itself wholly ordered to another. Therefore it does not have its terminus within itself, so one's very beholding of or listening to it is not delightful per se and on account of itself. Perversely would one praising remain focused on his very praise.[31]

Nevertheless in praise there is present a special difficulty, because from one side it is the most perfect speech of a creature, and from the other side it has many things in common with the art of imitating in a delightful way, such as wonder, delight, and purification. For praise proceeds from the wonder that follows on the apprehension of something exceeding a faculty, the sort that is sublime (as Gregory says about the angels who speak to God, since through the very fact that they look above their very selves, they burst forth into the motion of wonder). The delight that arises from wonder, however, is not a delight that bears itself in a merely concomitant way, since it is not perfectly of vision; rather, it arises on account of a contemplation that is completed in an affect. And praise is said to be purgative of the one praising to the degree that, because of the praise, the soul is liberated from the weight of the superior object [*a pondere excedentis*] insofar as the soul is pressed down by it. Therefore beyond the things that have been said, there remains the greatest difference between praise and delightful imitation, because praise itself, as a work, is not a cause of these things, but rather their effect.

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[30] Ibid., sect. 3 (635), quoting Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata*, Bk. 6, on the Eighth Commandment.

[31] On music and organs in the church, see Billuart, *Summa Sancti Thomae*, vol. 4, dissert. 5, a. 11.

To the fourth, one should consider that these images [of holy things] are not all ordered toward expressing the same formality of the original. However, what they do have in common is their efficacy of representation and expression. Whence it happens that a metaphor for something less noble more effectively expresses what it intends than a metaphor for something more noble—for example, when the courage of Christ is expressed by the sensible figure of a lion, and does so better, with respect to us, than would its expression under the shape of an exceedingly powerful man, or of Michael the heavenly soldier.[32] In fact, it happens otherwise when the beauty and appeal of the original should be expressed, where the efficacy of the expression is judged based on the very elegance of the image.

And one might insist that the works of the religious art defect from the perfection of the art of imitating in a delightful way insofar as it is not enough for it just to proceed from the original, but rather it is necessary that it go back to the original, to be completed by it. Whence what is a defect in the art of imitating in a delightful way would be a perfection in the religious art.

To this let us respond that the perfection of each should be judged based on its end. However, the end of the art of imitating in a delightful way is a delightful imitation, of the sort that was determined above, whereas the end of the religious art is to make one more efficaciously know the original as it is in itself, being more perfect than the mediating representation. Whence if the imitation produced by the religious art were not to make one know the original as the measure of the imitation simply speaking, then also to the degree that the imitation would not be subordinate to the prototype as to the more noble and superior, it would not be coming from the religious art as such—rather, with respect to this art it would simply speaking be imperfect. But the same work could accidentally hold great perfection in the notion of the art of imitating in a delightful way, insofar as it would be compared to the original as to something inferior. This often happens in some images of holy things made by painters of great genius, such that if the image be compared to the original the artist intended, it would be a great abomination, whereas if the image be compared to something more common, it would accidentally be a delightful imitation. And this can happen either because of the inability of the artist under the notion of the religious art, due to his ignorance, or from a disordered appetite. Nevertheless for some things it can be added that a good work of the religious art holds the perfection of the art of imitating in a delightful way, and does so even more fully, such that in it the faculty of the artist is elevated to eminence, and in his very work there is the perfection of delightful imitation, not formally but eminently.

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[32] This is for the reasons mentioned in the body of the article and in the reply to the third objection of this article [*STh* I, q. 1, a. 9, and ad 3].

ON THE SUBJECT OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

Thomas de Vio Cardinal Cajetan

Question: Whether mobile being is the subject in natural philosophy

Initial Objections to the Thesis

It seems that it is not.

First, because "mobile being" [*ens mobile*] signifies either the mobile substance, or the mobile accident, or a third thing common to both. If it signifies the first, then, since mobile substance and mobile body are convertibly the same, it follows that, according to the reality, mobile *body* would also be asserted as the subject of [natural] philosophy—which is contrary to the opinion of those who hold that it is mobile being. But if it signifies the second option, this is manifestly contrary to all opinions, and against the truth itself. And if it signifies the third, then it would follow that "being" would indicate some third concept that can be abstracted from substance and accident—which is

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Translator's Note: Cajetan's Latin can be both formal and terse; this translation aims to balance preserving his overall manner of speaking with rendering it more fluidly in English than a very literal translation might. However, when the sense of the Latin is ambiguous, or debatable liberties are taken in our translation, the relevant Latin phrase is given in square brackets or a footnote. Likewise to assist the reader in keeping track of the manifold divisions in the text, in several places we have added section titles and paragraph breaks that are not in the Latin text; similarly we frequently use changes in font to support these divisions in the argument. — Christopher A. Decaen contrary to the opinion of Thomists.

Second, the subject of a science ought to have one formal notion, otherwise it would not have a what-it-is, and consequently neither would it be a principle of the science. For, as is said in *On the Soul* 1 [1, 402b26], the principle of every demonstration is the what-it-is. Nor would the subject have any per se passion primarily; for whatever per se one [passion] might belong to what is not in itself one nature would belong to it by reason of its parts, and consequently no passion would belong to the subject primarily. Now, "mobile being" indicates an aggregate of two formal notions, so it is not the subject. ***And if one replies***, "those two words are stated as a circumlocution for one formal notion, in the same way that it is customary to use passions in place of [specific] differences," ***then against this*** it is said that the subject's notion in a science ought to be the thing first and best known in that science, for scientific cognition depends entirely on it. But if the notion of the subject requires a circumlocution, it could not be such [i.e., first and best known]. Indeed, this is the implication of the adjective ["mobile"]: to say that it is the formal notion in the science, and that we name it with a circumlocution based on the name of a passion, insofar as the formal notion is hidden from us. Therefore, etc.

Third, if mobile being were the subject of natural philosophy, then *either* natural philosophy would be a part of metaphysics, *or* it would be subalternate to it. But each option is false. Therefore etc. The consequent follows because either "mobile being" adds to "being" a condition per se dividing being, or it is accidental to "being." ***If the first***, it follows that mobile being should be considered by the metaphysician; for *Posterior Analytics* 1.22 [84a11–25] says that it belongs to the same science to consider a subject and its per se subjective parts, and so natural philosophy, to which mobile being is ascribed, would be a part of metaphysics. But ***if the second***, it follows that natural philosophy would be subalternate to metaphysics; for *Posterior Analytics* 1.8 [75b7–12] says that to descend from a genus to a qualified sort of genus—i.e., according to an accidental condition (as it is commonly interpreted)—is the condition of the only subalternate science of which Aristotle treats.

Fourth, a science's subject should be that relative to whose formal notion all the passions and conclusions of that science are resolved (as is evident of itself). But in natural philosophy, the physical passions, and consequently also the conclusions, are resolved ultimately in relation to the what-it-is of substance, that is, of natural body, insofar as all physical accidents are caused by natural substance. Therefore natural substance, or natural body, should be asserted as the subject.

Thesis:
Mobile being—but not mobile body, or mobile substance, or natural substance—is the proportionate subject of natural philosophy.

In this puzzle, we will ***first*** distinguish the opinions. ***Second***, we will make clear St. Thomas's opinion. ***Third***, that opinion will be strengthened and at the same time set against the others. ***Fourth***, the opposing arguments will be answered.

I – Distinguishing the Opinions

With regard to the first, one must note that some have spoken about the proportionate subject of natural philosophy—which this treatise is about—*naturally*, whereas others have spoken about it *non-naturally.*[1]

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[1] "Innaturaliter"; based on how Cajetan continues in discussing the angelic intelligences as instances of "non-natural" objects, the intended opposition appears to refer to the difference between proceeding according to the mode of natural philosophy and not doing so, but instead taking the more inclusive perspective of metaphysics—or as Cajetan calls it here, "theology." (The italics is added in place of the wide character spacing in the *Selecta Lavallensia* edition.)

a) On account of this, the latter approach should be treated only briefly in a disputation that we are carrying on among philosophers. For those treating the subject non-naturally lay it down that the intelligences are mobile and, while not binding natural philosophy within the sensible, they say the subject of [natural] philosophy is something common to both sensible things and things separate from matter, insofar as they are mobile. And they cover over their error with the name "theological piety."

For the student of nature need not dispute with them; for him it is an indubitable principle that abstracted substances are immobile. And the terminus of his philosophical consideration is the human soul—which is partly abstracted, partly not (as is said in *Physics* 2 [2, 194b11–14]); and among intelligences, this latter is the limit of what the student of nature can reach, and the existence of which he can show clearly (as Averroes says in his final commentary on *Physics* I).

Yet so great is the temerity of some of these thinkers that it should not be wrapped up in silence. For they presume to assert that their own opinion is the dictate of theology. And thus, they present an occasion for deriding theology to those experienced in theological study who are nonetheless nourished on philosophy. For it is not taken from Sacred Scripture, nor from the holy theologians approved by the Church, that angels move in such a way that they are subject to continuous motion. Rather the opposite [seems to be the case], insofar as it has been discussed by the saints in theology. Whence, if they believe they must argue against the Peripatetics, let them glorify themselves based on these errors that they have gathered from a Scotist workshop, not from theology.[2]

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[2] "Unde si Peripateticos arguendos censent, glorientur ex scotica officina hos se errores deprehendere, non ex theologia." The sentence seems to be ironic, although it is unclear whether he thinks they have detected genuine Peripatetic errors, or these are merely alleged "errors."

b) Therefore, having set aside these things, we go to the students of nature. Their opinion is not unified: Some think one should cut "mobile" away from the subject of physics, some think "being," others think both. And those who accepted neither word have been moved by the second and the fourth arguments made in the objections above, and they suppose *sensible* or *natural substance* is the subject. But those who rejected only "being" assert that *mobile body* is the subject of [natural] philosophy. And these thinkers are further divided: some grant that the word "mobile" signifies a passion, but some contend it supposes the formal notion of physical body. However, those rejecting only "mobile" are the ones who say *natural being* is the subject.

There are, then, five opinions of those speaking naturally: [1] that of the Thomists, who hold to *mobile being* as the subject; [2] that of the Albertians, saying it is *mobile body*;[3] [3] that of many moderns who say it is *natural or sensible substance*; and even [4] that of certain moderns who assert it is *physical or natural body*; and [5] that of those who believe the subject is *natural being*.

II – Explanation of St. Thomas's Opinion

With regard to the second, since "mobile being" contains a certain complex of names, the individual parts should be distinguished.

A. Distinctions as Regards "Mobile"

And first a threefold distinction about the word "mobile" is needed.

1. Distinguishing ways of taking "motion"

The first distinction is due to the fact that the mobile is relative to motion. Therefore just as "motion" is taken in two ways—*properly*, insofar as it is distinguished from change in *Physics* 5 [1, 225a1–b8] and it is said to be in only three genera, and

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[3] See St. Albert, *Physica*, Bk. 1, ch. 3.

commonly, insofar as it contains in itself both motion properly said and change (namely, generation and corruption)—so too "mobile" can be taken in two ways. Yet in this question it is being taken commonly, insofar as it is the same as what is changeable by a physical change.

2. Distinguishing ways of taking "mobile"

The second distinction is that something can be called "mobile" in two ways: namely, *subjectively*—that is, it is the subject of a motion—and *terminatively*—that is, it is the terminus of some change. And although on the face of it "mobile" sounds like the subject of a motion, yet if it should be taken in a restricted sense in what is being proposed, it should be taken more in a terminative sense than in a subjective sense; this will become apparent from things that will be said shortly. Nevertheless, in my judgment it should be taken *indistinctly*—but not for the reason that it might be common to all things that are in whatever way mobile, and so that it then would contain as subjective parts matter and form, etc. For this is against St. Thomas in his commentary on *Physics* 1, where he expressly says, in the division of the text,[4] that in the first book of the *Physics* Aristotle is treating of the intrinsic principles of mobile being, namely, matter and form—from this obviously implying that mobile being, which is the subject of [natural] philosophy, is not a universal whole, relative to matter and form, but an integral or essential whole. Rather, "mobile" should be taken indistinctly here so that that better known way of taking it would be supposed, which way one must suppose based on sensation. For the senses show us that there are mobile things; but whether those things that we see moving change subjectively or terminatively is discerned more by one's reason than held as the case based on sensation.

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[4] "In the first [book] he makes determinate the principles of the subject of this science, that is, the principles of mobile being as such." *In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio*, Bk. 1, lec. 2, n. 12 (henceforth, *In Phys.*); all translations will be my own. See also Bk. 1, lec. 1, n. 4: "The subject of this book is mobile being simply. I do not, however, say 'mobile body,' since it is proved in this book that everything mobile is a body, but no science proves its own subject; and this is why right away at the beginning of *De Caelo*, which follows this book, he begins by making body known."

3. Distinguishing the aptitude for motion and its foundation

The third distinction is that the name "mobile" is equivocal both for the aptitude for motion, and for the foundation of that aptitude, just as "risible" might signify both the aptitude for laughing, and the rationality that is its foundation. What "mobile" signifies in what is being proposed, however, is difficult to elucidate by this question alone. For it is impossible that a subject and a passion be taken at once for the subject in any science, in such a way that the whole subject is an aggregate, since of one subject there must be one formal notion, and one formal notion cannot be constituted from the subject's what-it-is and the passion's what-it-is. but nevertheless, nothing prevents what is aggregated from the subject and the passion from being so constituted as a [science's] subject, such that the passion's what-it-is is the formal notion of the subject in that science.

And in this latter way "mobile" can be understood to signify the passion in what is proposed, such that mobility, which is a passion, is the formal notion for the being or body that is the subject of natural philosophy. Whence it is customary for there to be a redundant addition to word "mobile," by saying "mobile being" or "mobile body," insofar as the mobile is the subject of physics. One is also persuaded that "mobile" is being taken in this way, in what is proposed, because of the subject of mathematics; for just as physics is about beings insofar as they are mobile, so mathematics is about beings insofar as they are quantified. However, it is given that the subject of mathematics is "quantified being" [*ens quantum*] in the following sense: that quantity itself, which is the passion or proper accident of material substance, is the formal notion of the subject of mathematics. Therefore the subject of physics will be "being apt to move,"[5] such that aptitude for motion is the formal notion of the subject. And this is strengthened by the authority of Albert the Great, who, in his commentary on *Physics* 1, when he distinguishes body this way into metaphysical, mathematical, and physical, says that mobility (which he calls the formal notion of the subject [of natural philosophy]) is naturally posterior to quantified body.[6] Nor is it an obstacle that it belongs to the same science to consider a passion and its subject, since this is understood to be the case when a passion is being treated as a passion, but not when the passion holds the place of the first subject. This is clearly the case with quantity in mathematics, which does not bother itself about the substantial principles of quantity's subject, that from which that passion flows. Likewise, it is not an obstacle that one cannot have perfect cognition of a thing without knowing the what-it-is of the subject; for this should not be taken in such a way that all cognition without it is so imperfect that it would not be evident and scientific, but rather such that without the what-it-is of the subject one cannot have a knowledge of the thing that is complete in every way.

And it is not unfitting that this be the case in physics, for it is certain that this is the case with mathematics. For the mathematician ignores whether the quantified is a substance or an accident, and the subject of quantity, and so on, and yet he is the most certain of all [scientists], as is said in *Metaphysics* 2 [3, 995a16], in the last text and commentary.[7]

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[5] "ens aptum moveri"; following *Selecta Lavallensia*'s suggestion of *aptum* rather than *actum*, which is found in the Lugdunum edition.

[6] See St. Albert, *Physica*, Bk. 1, ch. 3. The relevant passage seems to be: "because of a form perfecting sensible matter that is existing in an aptitude for three dimensions, a body has it that it is natural as natural." Albert there also distinguishes body "taken simply and absolutely" as being "prior to being mathematical or natural"; the first he says "the student of theology [*divus*] considers, according to its reduction to being."

But lying in opposition to this approach is the fact that (according to it) it would not pertain to the natural philosopher to consider any quidditative predicate of any substance unless perhaps there is some substance of whom the aptitude for motion might be predicated quidditatively. And consequently natural philosophy would not be about a substance, but about an accident, just as mathematics is. For if mobility (i.e., the aptitude for motion), which is being posited as a passion of natural beings, were to be accepted as the formal notion of the subject of physics, the physicist will not be allowed to speak about his subject's proportionate notion [*de ratione adaequati subjiecti*]. For that notion is prior [to the accidental passion], and through it, by descending from mobility in common to this or that mobility in the specific parts of natural philosophy, he will not be allowed to descend to the what-it-is of this or that subject. Rather, in whatever way the what-it-is of the proportionate subject of mobility has been omitted, for the same reason the specific and manifold what-it-was-to-be's subject to such sorts of mobility should be omitted. For no part of any science treats anything prior to its proper formal notion. Nor do I see how one could give a satisfactory response to this argument, except by holding that considering the what-it-is in the particular belongs to metaphysics.

However, because I do not believe that is true, in regards to this I think it is better to hold that "mobile," in what is being proposed, does not signify the very aptitude for motion, if it is a passion, but rather the foundation of it. For because the aptitude that the name "mobility" signifies is repugnant to certain beings (namely, those separate from matter) and not to others

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[7] See *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, Bk. 2, lec. 5, ns. 334–37.

(namely, material things), and because it might not be thought to be predicated substantially of material beings (such as man and ox), consequently something in them would come before this aptitude, something from which they themselves derive this aptitude. And this is the foundation of mobility. However, I have intentionally said "it might not be thought" because I have thoroughly treated this distinction about "mobility" while wishing to be satisfactory to the common expression. Indeed, in *Metaphysics* 10, at the end [10, 1059a6], it is left under doubt whether the corruptible is a substance or is in a substance, i.e., whether it is something belonging to a thing's substance or it follows upon its substance, as Averroes explains. A certain corruptibility, however, is a species of mobility, or is mobility itself insofar as in every motion there is a corruption, as is said in *Physics* 8 [3, 254a12]. St. Thomas also, in the same place, appears to place "corruptible" among the substantial predicates.[8]

Aristotle also, in *Physics* 1 [2, 185a1], appears to have the same thought when he says that one does not look to natural science to prove mobility [of the subject]. For this would not be true if mobility were a passion preceded by the formal notion of natural philosophy's subject; for the natural philosopher could prove it through that notion. Unless perhaps someone says Aristotle's claim is not true per se but per accidens, since [mobility] is a well known passion.[9] But this has no merit, both because it is not customary for Aristotle to speak per accidens, and because at least *defending* [the presence of] mobility pertains to the natural philosopher, and not to the metaphysician, just as also every artisan should defend every passion of his own subject. Nor is it an obstacle that it is a passion that is known through itself [*per se nota*] belonging to a proportionate subject; for what is known through itself and what is not known through itself together make the difference as regards anything being provable or not provable, as is clear in *Physics* 2 [1, 193a6], and yet they do not make a difference as regards defending or not defending them. For if hidden things should be given support, it is manifest that they should be given more support in the manner in which they are not principles but rather are based on principles. Mobility is that sort of thing, if it is posited as a passion.

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[8] "In every motion there is a certain generation and corruption, whether simply or in a qualified sense. For what moves to something as to a terminus comes to be *this*, as regards a motion of alteration and growth, or it comes to be *in this*, as regards a local motion. For example, what moves from black to white, or from small to large, becomes white or large, whereas what moves to some place comes to be existing in that place." *In Phys.*, Bk. 8, lec. 6, n. 2.

[9] "quia scilicet et passio notissima"; alternatively, "since [mobility] is [the subject's] best known passion."

Whatever might be the case about this, however, mobility, which is the formal notion of the subject of physics, is not a passion, but the what-it-was-to-be of natural beings, and it precedes naturalness and mobility—their passion, if that be granted—since it is a relative property; indeed, since passion is said to be such.

B. Distinctions as Regards "Being"

The only distinction one must make regarding the word "being" [*ens*] is that we are accustomed to using the name "being" in two ways: first, for everything that has existence [*esse*] in whatever way—and this is not how it is being taken here—and second, for what is properly said to exist; moreover, among the things that come to be, this is what properly speaking comes to be; indeed, to exist [*esse*], properly speaking, belongs to what comes to exist [*fieri*]. Now, that which properly comes to be, as is clear in *Metaphysics* 7 [8, 1033b18], is composed, whether a substantial composite, like a man, or an accidental one, like a physician-man [*homo medicus*]. And this is how it is being taken in the proposal.

Whence, in gathering together the things that have been said as regards this, that anything might be a subjective part of mobile being (which we are calling the subject of physics), it is required both that it be a being, properly speaking, and that it be changeable with a physical change. And on account of this, neither prime matter, nor substantial form, nor accidental form is a mobile being; rather, all of these are principles of mobile being. Therefore mobile being is more universal than mobile body, and even than natural or sensible substance. For it contains under itself all material composites, which alone are changeable, whether they be substantial or accidental, whether according to an absolute form or according to location. And mobile being is a more abstract "what" [*quid*] than any of the others mentioned, inasmuch as being that is concomitant with any grade is prior to that [grade], even granted that it does not extend to accidental composites. Nor does the contraction[10] [of being] signified by the word "mobile" present an impediment, since just as rational substance is a more abstract "what" than is rational animal, so too is mobile *being* a more abstract and prior "what" than mobile *substance*. For although on the side of the word "mobile" the abstraction is equal, still on the side of the word "being" and the word "substance," mobile being is more abstract. Whence, granting that there is rational substance in some way, still there is place here for disputing whether that rational substance would be a body, or an animal, etc.; and the question would continue from the more abstract to the less abstract. As long as one might go from rational substance to rational body, and from body to animate body, etc., so the question would remain under mobile being—whether that be substance, or body, etc.

Therefore, since one can consider in a changeable reality that it is both a changeable body, and that it is a changeable substance, and that it is a changeable being, the thought of the divine Thomas is primarily to take the notion of the subject of natural philosophy to be natural things, not insofar as they are changeable bodies or changeable substances, but insofar as they are changeable beings—such that mobile being, even though it contains a composition of names, nevertheless signifies an uncomposed and per se one what-it-is, as a being per se. For in whatever way being is divided into the per se and the in-another, if we were to lack simple words, we would name substance "being through itself," and accident "being in another," and yet we would be signifying one formal notion, not an aggregate of many. And so too with being divided into the changeable and the unchangeable, lacking a simple word, we call "changeable" or "mobile being" the one member that is of one whatness [*quidditatis*], and we say that is the proportionate subject of natural philosophy. So much for the second part of the treatise.

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[10] Reading *contractio* for *contradictio*, as the more likely interpretation (based on context) of the shorthand of the 1542 Venetian edition, but contrary to the Laval and Lugdunum texts.

III – Comparison to the Other Views

As regards the third heading, since "mobile being" is built from two names and signifies one thing, one must first show that what it signifies is the proportionate subject of natural philosophy; then, one must show that it is most fittingly signified by these names. The first item is proved in three ways.

A. First Proof, via the Relation between a Subject and its Proper Passion

The first proof is as follows:

- The proportionate subject of the first passions of natural things is the proportionate subject of natural philosophy.
- But mobile being—and not substance, or natural body, or mobile body—is the proportionate subject of the first passions of natural things.

Therefore etc.

The major premise is known through itself, whereas the minor is proved by taking transmutability or (what is the same thing) changeability as the first physical passion, or at least one of the first, or as equivalent with them (as everyone agrees). Then [the proof of the minor is] as follows: The proportionate subject of changeability has matter, form, and privation for its adequate principles; but only mobile being has these for its proportionate principles; therefore nothing other than mobile being is the proportionate subject of changeability, and consequently, of the first passions of natural things—this being what was to be proved.

The major premise of this preliminary syllogism is evident from the fact that these three in every matter must be proportionate to each other: the passion and the subject and the passion's proper principles; this is clear for risibility, man, and rational animal. Now, it is certain, based on the long process of *Physics* 1, that the first principles of changeability are matter, form, and privation. Therefore the proportionate principles of that on which, as on its proportionate subject, changeability first follows must be matter, form, and privation.

The minor premise is clear from things that are said in *Metaphysics* 12 [4, 1070a32 to 5, 1071b3], namely, that matter, form, and privation are not restricted to the genus of substance. Rather, the matter, form, and privation of the genus of substance are principles proper to changeable substance; and the matter, form, and privation in the genus of quantity are the principles proper to a changeable quantity; and the matter, form, and privation in the genus of quality are principles proper to a changeable quality.

B. Objections to the First Proof, and Their Rebuttal

However, if one says that, just as the proper principles of substance contain the proper principles of the other genera, since the former are the causes of the latter (as Aristotle teaches in the same passage), so too changeable substance contains all mobile quantity and quality, and the transmutability of substance [contains] everything else. And on account of these things, although matter, form, and privation formally exceed mobile substance, still they do not do so virtually.

Although this objection is expressed subtly, it does not evade the force of the argument, for two reasons, the first of which is as follows. It is false that the proper principles of changeable substance are the principles of the principles of the other genera of changeable things. For it is true, and expressed in the chapter of *Metaphysics* 12 mentioned, that the per se principles of existing within the genus of substance are principles of the principles of existing within the other genera—that is, that the matter and form of substance are the causes of the matter and form in quantity and quality, and so on. But nevertheless it is contrary to the truth to say that the per se principles of substantial transmutability are the principles of the principles of the transmutability of the other genera. For the privation in the genus of substance—which is a per se principle, not of substance, but of substantial transmutation—is not [a principle] universally, and consequently neither is it a per se principle of the privation that is a principle of accidental privation. This is clear in the heavenly bodies, where being mobile with respect to place has all its own proper principles (namely, its matter, form, and privation), but the heavens, speaking substantially, have only the two principles that are the per se principles of existing—whether matter be there, which is pure potency, or simply corporeity in place of matter, and the intelligence, and the form. For in no way is it a substantially mobile being.

The second reason is as follows. Even granted that this would be a virtual inclusion, still the proportionate subject of transmutability, and likewise the proportionate effect of matter, form, and privation, is not mobile substance, but mobile being. For when any property that is universal in predication has a subject that is proportionate in predication—in which is found the cause according to which that property is present in anything whatsoever—such a thing is its subject according to its very self. Nor should one require as its first subject that toward which, by a path of resolution [*per viam resolutionis*], that property and its principles are traced back. Otherwise the teaching in the *Posterior Analytics*, in the chapter on the universal [1.4, 73a22 to 5, 74b3], would be lost. For we are taught there to rest when we have found the subject proportionate in predication and the cause in it whereby that passion is present in everything else. Nor also could one posit a property common analogically to substances and accidents, for accidents and their properties and principles are included in substances virtually. Therefore, unless we wished to abuse words and their notions, what in itself is the proportionate subject of transmutability contains in its very self proportionately the proper principles of transmutability. But neither mobile substance nor mobile body contains these things in itself, since the proper principles of universal transmutability—that is, in general [*in communi*]—are matter, form, and privation in general, and these transcend the genus of substance. However, it is proportionate to mobile being, for whatever is constituted from matter, form, and privation is a changeable being, and conversely, inasmuch as privation devises toward evil.[11] Therefore mobile being is the proper and first subject of mobility.

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[11] "et e converso, eo quod privatio machinatur ad malum." This may be an allusion to a line from Aristotle, where he speaks of privation's "evil-doing [*kakopoion*]" (*Physics* 1.9, 192a15); as St. Thomas takes it, "one will imagine it not to pertain to a thing's constitution, but more to a certain evil of the thing, . . . But privation is opposed to form, since it is nothing other than its removal; whence, since what is opposed to the good, and removes it, is evil, it is manifest that privation pertains to evil." *In Phys.*, Bk. 1, lec. 15, n. 7. Alternatively, Cajetan's unusual phrasing might also be translated as "privation is the mechanism for evil," as if to say that the fact that "everything changeable is constituted from matter, form, and privation" implies that even the possibility of evil

C. Second Proof, via the Proof in *Physics* 6 that All Mobiles are Bodily

Second, the proposal is proved and argued directly against those who assert that the subject is mobile body as follows:

- The joining of everything mobile with the notion of corporeity is not being supposed in natural philosophy.
- Rather, in *Physics* 6 [4, 234b10–21] it is proved.

  Therefore not mobile *body*, but mobile *being* is the proportionate subject of natural philosophy.

The antecedent is clear from the passage in *Physics* 6 where it is proved that everything mobile is a body. And the consequent is clear, both from the fact that if mobile body were asserted as the proportionate subject, it would be necessary to suppose already that mobility is joined to body, either as its formal notion or as its passion—and from the fact that it would be necessary to suppose body is coextensive with the mobile itself, otherwise it would not be supposed as the proportionate subject of the science. But each of these things is impossible to suppose when one does not know the universal conjunction of the mobile itself with body, as is clear of itself. Therefore etc.

And this is St. Thomas's reasoning in *Physics* 1.[12] For he himself never said that the natural philosopher proves that body is mobile, such that it might be imposed on body generally, because this is not understood; for those who doubt that body is mobile need not a middle [term], but sensation, whereby they might perceive even their very selves moving. Rather, he said that the natural philosopher proves that everything mobile is a body.

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in the will is based on some kind of privation.

[12] Perhaps referring to the criticism of Parmenides and Melissus; see *In Phys.*, Bk. 1, lec. 2, esp. nn. 4–7.

And to perceive more fully the force of this argument, first take careful note of the fact that the proportionate subject of a science resolving its conclusions back to principles known through themselves—and natural philosophy is of this sort—must be: the subject of the first passions; and thereby the principle of their being [*principium essendi*]; and consequently, the principle of knowing them according to nature, and the principle of cognition in us, whether one proceeds a posteriori toward latent properties and hidden principles, or one proceeds a priori. For the knowledge of the subject is presupposed to all such things. And Averroes says in his commentary on *Physics* 2 that, within a science, the proportionate subject can be proved neither a priori nor a posteriori.[13] And it is innate to us that one must always proceed from things more known to us, as is said in the commentary on *Physics* 1.[14] Therefore, just as the first argument, presented above, proceeds from the order of nature, this one proceeds from our order of knowing. And on account of this, St. Thomas said that everything mobile is a body is proved to those who are attentive [*ad audientes*],[15] implying through this [that the proof is] more according to the order of cognition than according to the order of reality.

Secondly, one must be careful to note that, although it is one thing for all mobility to *be* joined to body and another to *know* that all mobility is joined to body, still for mobile body to be asserted as the proportionate subject of natural philosophy, it does not matter that it might fall short of these things. For just as by that conjunction failing in reality, mobile body would be prohibited from being the subject on the side of the reality, so too by that conjunction failing to be known, it is impeded from being the proper subject on the side of the knowledge that should be had in advance. However, it is not enough that it be presupposed that *something* mobile is a body (which is evident to sensation); rather, one must presuppose that *everything* mobile is a body.

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[13] Averroes, *Physics II*, comm. 26.

[14] See *In Phys.*, Bk. 1, lec. 1, n. 6.

[15] "This book is also called 'Of the Physical (that is, natural) that is Heard,' since it was handed on in the mode of teaching to those who are listening [*ad audientes*]." *In I Phys.*, Bk. 1, lec. 1, n. 4.

This is, first, because for something complex (or something signified in a complex way) to have a claim on the notion of a proportionate subject in a science, that which is as formal must also in this way be supposed as joined to the other through itself as its passion or formal notion; otherwise the question about the material part of this complex would become pointless, since things that are accidental are variable and outside knowable questions. However, just as it is impossible that it *be* the subject unless every such thing [i.e., the mobile] exists in that [i.e., a body], so too it is impossible that one *suppose* it to be the subject unless every such thing is supposed to exist in that; for just as all these things in the order of nature require universality [*de omni*], so too in the order of cognition. Whence if the subject of natural science is mobile body, it is necessary that, in this science that treats of the mobile as mobile, it supposes the mobile (which stands as formal) be joined to body through itself, whether as its passion or as its formal notion. But neither of these things can be the case unless one supposes that everything mobile is bound to body; for one cannot imagine that the proper passion or formal notion is [merely] *believed* to belong to something when it is more commonly a matter of doubt.

Second, one must do this because for something complex (or signified in a complex way) to have the notion of the proportionate subject of any science, that which is asserted to be formally proportional to that science is no less necessary than that which is taken materially as coextensive with that formal element. Otherwise if the formal [notion] were to contract the material notion, the science that proportionately[16] looks to the formal notion would be broader than its own subject; moreover, it makes no difference (as has been said) whether such coextension does not exist or is not supposed. Therefore if mobile body as mobile is asserted to be the proportionate subject of natural philosophy, it is necessary that philosophy that is about the mobile as mobile suppose that body exhausts the mobile; otherwise even though it would *have* a subject proportionate to itself, it would nonetheless not be able to *suppose* it [at the outset]. Moreover, it is impossible to suppose this while it is not known whether everything mobile is a body; this is clear from itself.

Moreover, you can form this argument according to St. Thomas by gathering it in the following way:

- No science that possesses a complex subject (or one signified in a complex way) proves the conjunction of the subject's parts, without which conjunction that complex cannot take on the notion of its subject.
- Otherwise the science would construct a subject for its very self—which no specific science is allowed to do.

For this major premise is equivalent to the major St. Thomas assumes (with greater brevity), that no science proves (that is, constructs or composes) its subject to itself. For when speaking of a complex subject, to say "No science composes something that would be its own subject" is equivalent to saying "No science proves its own subject," if one is among those contemplating the terms formally [*apud formaliter terminos speculantes*]. But if mobile body be asserted as natural philosophy's subject, it would construct its own subject. Therefore etc. – The minor premise is clear from things said, since it proves the universal conjunction of mobility with body, without which mobile body cannot have the notion of a subject.

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[16] Following *adaequate* in the Laval edition. The Lugdunum edition has *adaequatae*.

However, setting aside solicitude about the words, it would be directly syllogized as follows:

- Nothing composite, the universal conjunction of which is proved in some science, is the proportionate subject of that science;
- Mobile body is a composite whose universal conjunction is proved in natural philosophy;

Therefore mobile body is not the subject in natural philosophy.

The major premise is already clear from the fact that every composite that is asserted to be the proportionate subject of the science is supposed both composite through itself (at least on the side of what is formal) and coextensive with the formal notion adequate to the science; but where the universality of the conjunction is doubted, the composition cannot be supposed as [known] through itself, nor is it coextensive with the formal notion; therefore etc. The minor of this is clear from *Physics* 6, where the universal conjunction between mobile and body is proved, and by the progression of natural philosophy, especially in *Physics* 2 and the second tractate of *De Caelo* 1,[17] where the universal conjunction of body and the mobile is held.

D. Objections to the Second Proof, and their Rebuttal

But two objections against this argument remain to be ruled out. The ***first*** is that it is does not seem to be true that in *Physics* 6 it is proved that every mobile is a body, insofar as text 32 [234b10–21] proves only that every mobile is *divisible*. However, it is certain that if something's passion is proved of the mobile, the formal notion of that passion's *subject* is not thereby proved. Now, this is how divisibility and corporeity stand, as is obvious. The ***second*** is that it seems that this second proof is opposed to the first one; for in the second, every mobile is said to be a body, whereas in the first, mobile being is said to be more common than both mobile body and mobile substance.

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[17] "et processu philosophiae naturalis, maxime in II *Phys*., et II tractatu I *De Caelo*, unde habetur universalis conjunctio corporis cum mobili." (It is unclear where in the second book of the *Physics* Cajetan has in mind, or what he is calling the second treatise of the first book of *De Caelo*.)

To the first of these it is said that it does not fall within human understanding that anything is supposed as being a body whose divisibility is in doubt (except among the errors attributed to ancient thinkers who posited indivisible bodies), since divisibility itself is the companion of corporeity, both in being and in being known, in such a way that the prior is never known without the posterior. For we do not experience ourselves ever knowing or supposing body otherwise than as being of a certain size by quantity of bulk; therefore if in philosophy not every mobile is supposed as being divisible, so much more so it cannot be supposed as being a body. For the conjunction of the mobile with corporeity, as long as it is in doubt, cannot be known [to be conjoined] with divisibility, except by argument or sensation. Now, it is certain that it is not held based on sensation, and no argument is found for that conjunction. And if it is not taken as proved based on that demonstration in *Physics* 6, at least as by a necessary consequence of the conclusion formally concluded to, a great incongruity remains—namely, that [knowing] every mobile being a body is a long way away from the beginning of philosophy, as in *De Caelo* 3 and *De Generatione et Corruptione* 1. Yet the Peripatetics understand both propositions to be concluded to, indistinctly, in that same place. Whence Averroes, in his commentary on *De Caelo* 1, comm. 5, says that it was proved in *Physics* 6 that everything mobile is a body, etc.

To the second it is said that, although *being* is more common than *body*—since it is quidditatively predicated of many things of which "body" is not quidditatively predicated—nonetheless it is not more common in such a way that it exists in something to which corporeity is not conjoined. For every mobile being is a body or contains body within itself. It can also be said (although it amounts to the same thing) that in *Physics* 6 every mobile is proved to "be a body"—meaning "something corporeal." For in proving that the mobile is divisible, nothing else is proved than that the mobile is a corporeal being, whether a body or something corporeal. But the "corporeal" is convertible with mobile being, granted that "body" is not convertible with it.

And in the same way one can argue against those asserting that natural or mobile substance [is the subject of natural philosophy]. For everything natural or mobile is a substance—although it would be necessary to suppose that this is held to be the case based on either the senses, natural philosophy, or metaphysics. But it is not held based on sensation. Moreover, if it were held based on natural philosophy, then one would conclude that this could not be *supposed* in natural philosophy. Moreover, if it were treated by the metaphysician (as Averroes says in his commentary on *Physics* 2, comm. 4), this also entails that it cannot be the subject in natural philosophy, which science is evident of itself, without metaphysics. For it has a subject and proper principles known through themselves based on the senses, and it does not receive them in a hypothetical way [*positione*], even though they should be defended by the metaphysician, if they be attacked, as is said in *Physics* 1, comm. 12.[18]

E. Third Proof, via Authorities

Third, the same thing is proved by authority—and first by that of Aristotle in *Physics* 3 [1, 201a11], where in the definition of motion he made no mention of body or substance, but being in potency, etc. From which one can argue as follows:

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[18] See Aristotle, *Physics* 1.2, 185a19; St. Thomas, *In Phys.*, Bk. 1, lec. 2, n. 8.

- The subject of [natural] philosophy is what is placed in the definition of the first accidents of natural things; for such is their proper subject (as is clear from *Metaphysics* 7 [3, 1029a8–26]);
- Yet one finds in the definition of the first accidents of natural things—that is, of motion, etc.—not body, nor substance, but rather being in potency insofar as it is in potency, which is the same thing as mobile being (as is clear in *Physics* 3 [2, 202a7]).

Therefore mobile being is the subject of natural philosophy.

And the same thing is confirmed by *Physics* 1 [2, 185a14], where it is said to be necessary to suppose in [natural] philosophy that all things move (or at least some things), and not all things (or some) are bodies, etc.

Second, this is proved based on the authority of Averroes, who (not being solicitous about word choice) has named the subject of [natural] philosophy "mobile being," "mobile body," and "sensible reality" (in his commentaries on *Metaphysics* 3, comm. 1, *Metaphysics* 12, comm. 5, and his prologue to the *Physics*, respectively); on account of this, he has not wanted the reader to weigh his words in this matter, but their sense. Nonetheless, in his commentary on *Physics* 2 he expressly teaches that something prior to body is the subject of natural philosophy when he says, "It should be known that the subject of this book is nature and the natural principles, since they are common to all natural realities." And therefore in this book he has defined neither body nor other things that the natural philosopher considers, as he *has* done in *De Caelo* 1 [1, 268a9]. From this it is held that, according to him, the consideration of mobile body is deferred all the way till *De Caelo*, which begins from its definition (as is clear in comm. 2). Furthermore, the subject of physics is held to be common to body and the other things that the natural philosopher considers (as we have assumed in the first argument). Therefore not mobile body, but something prior to it, something common to all natural things, is the subject of the [natural] philosophy; and that this is mobile being is quite clear, based on the first argument. Therefore the notion signified by "mobile being" is the subject of natural philosophy, and not that signified by "substance," or "natural body," or "mobile body," or "sensible body."

F. The Suitability of These Words

Next, that it is signified most fittingly by these particular words becomes clear as follows. Among first things, the word "mobile" is taken more fittingly than is "sensible," since if sensible being is admitted, the natural philosopher is not yet free from the invective of Parmenides and Melissus. For while granting sensible being, they denied [the existence of] mobile being. However, having assumed mobile being, the principles of [natural] philosophy remain unshakable.

It is likewise more fitting than the name "natural," ***first***, because the latter presents the same incongruity. For having supposed natural being, the natural philosopher is still not free to advance—unless he adds the word "mobile"; Aristotle himself testifies to this in *Physics* 1 [2, 185a13], responding to Parmenides and Melissus, who grant "natural being," for he adds, "it is granted by us, however, that all natural things, or at least some, move." ***Second***, one ought to suppose as subject what is best known, and it is certain that things that define something should be better known than the thing being defined by them. Whence, because motion is part of what defines nature, what is being signified clearly by "mobile being" is already being indicated in an obscure way by "natural being"; for if the latter should be clarified, one must come to motion. ***Third***, one should use names as most people do, as it says in *Topics* 2 [1, 109a31]; but the name "nature" is used most commonly for the what-it-is of any reality whatsoever, and "natural" for everything that is not artificial, whether they are of the genus of mobile things or not. And on account of that, if natural being were supposed as the subject in natural philosophy, non-artificial being would be understood as the subject as well—which is false. And thus an equivocation on the word would give someone an opportunity to reject it; and if one should make the distinction by supposing "and also a natural being," that is, one having within itself a principle of motion, then why not, without gloss or distinction, from the beginning use the words "mobile being," expressing it more clearly?—especially since it would anticipate the beginning of *Physics* 2, insofar as that gloss would be understood.

That the name "being," however, is clearer than the others proposed is evident from things said. So much for the third part.

IV – Answers to the Initial Objections to the Thesis

Now it remains to satisfy the arguments given in opposition. And **to the first** it is said that "being" signifying a third "what" analogically common to substance and accident is not contrary to Saint Thomas, unless one is ignorant of the nature of analogy. Whence it is not incongruous that mobile being be common according to the formal notion, but it is not one notion simply speaking, but rather one analogically for all mobile beings, that is, for substances, quantities, qualities, etc. However, even the opposed argument does not reach any conclusion against those holding that mobile being is not found beyond substance, for man himself insofar as he is a mobile being is other than his very self insofar as he is a mobile substance. And on account of that, it would not follow that therefore, when asserting mobile being is the subject, mobile substance or mobile body is also being asserted; for they differ by formal notion.

To the second, two things can be said. *First*, "mobility" taken commonly—about which we are speaking in this question—is not a passion, but a substantial predicate, like "material," and "able-to-be" [*possibile*], according to the things adduced earlier. This can also be confirmed by argument based on the fact that "able-to-be" is a substantial predicate of beings, one drawn from matter. For man is not a being able-to-be because of some property, one consequent upon him, but because of things intrinsic to him. Now, "mobility" for the natural philosopher means the same thing as "ability-to-be" for the physicist, insofar for those occupied in these sciences it is not known by authorities.[19] But because this has not been discussed by our predecessors, and insofar as it is novel it will not be readily accepted, having now been established so weakly, therefore it is said, *secondly*, that if mobility *is* a passion, still the subject of philosophy is conceded to have one formal notion that is expressed by the circumlocution "mobile being."

And ***to the objection against this response*** there are three ways of responding. The *first* is that although in sciences proceeding a priori the subject should be primarily and maximally known as regards the reality's what-it-is, nonetheless this is not necessary in sciences teaching a posteriori, and natural philosophy is this latter sort of science (as the Commentator says in his prologue, and in his commentary on *Physics* 1, comm. 2). For it is enough that it is primarily and maximally known as regards whether-it-is, and as regards the what-of-its-name; this is clear from *Posterior Analytics* 1 [1, 71a12–16].

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[19] "mobilitas autem apud naturalem idem sonat quod possibilitas apud physicum; ut exercitatis in istis scientiis, non auctoritatibus notum est." Cajetan's meaning here is unclear, in part because it is not obvious what distinction he is assuming between the *naturalis* from the *physicus*. Perhaps the latter refers to the specialized student of nature, the former to the generalist, but these terms are usually treated as synonymous.

Second, it is said that the claim that the knowledge [*notitiam*] of the subject should be maximal can be understood in two ways. (a) The first is with respect to the possible knowledge to be had of that subject; for the same thing can be known probably or demonstratively, through common [principles] and through proper ones, etc. And in this way it is not necessary to suppose that we have that maximal knowledge; this is clear inductively even in mathematics. (b) In another way, with respect to other cognitions that are acquired within that science. And in this way it is true, and it is granted that the cognition that we have of that formal notion in this circumlocution is greater than all cognition that we acquire within natural philosophy. And *one might object against this* that we acquire knowledge of many things in natural philosophy that we know and name through their intimate [principles]; but cognition through intimate [principles] is more perfect than what is known through a passion, like that notion. *But to this we respond* that the perfection of cognition—which is what *Posterior Analytics* 1 discusses, and from which it is taken that the cognition of the subject should be maximal—is not viewed according to anything other than its evidence. Whence one should also view the more and less in cognition, in the proposed matter, according to the breadth of its evidence. On account of that, it is one thing to know a thing more intimately, and another to know it more evidently. For because all cognition acquired in a science—whether or not it reaches to the intimate [principles] of the thing sought—has its evidence from the cognition of the subject as from its principle, therefore it is necessary that the cognition of the subject be more evident, and consequently greater, than the cognition of the rest. And this is indeed so in the proposed matter, since the cognition of mobile being, which we are supposing by circumlocution, is evident based on the senses. However, whatever else is acquired by syllogistic discourse is certain because of its evidence, and that on account of which something is a certain way is this way even more so, as is said in *Posterior Analytics* 1 [2, 72a29].

Third, it is said that if we were to have [natural] philosophy under the perfect notion of science, whereby [mobile being] is in itself without a doubt the subject, it would be altogether necessary that it be primarily and maximally known, just as it is said [to be so] by the argument. However, it is not such, because as much imperfection is blended with our science as is compatible with our cognition of the subject. For due to this incomplete cognition of the subject, our cognition of subsequent things is less full, and the difficulties in resolving questions about it are not few.

To the third, it is said that, regardless which path is followed, the consequence is denied. For it does not belong to the same science to consider some subject and its per se subjective parts, or whatever are its per se modes, but only those that do not leave the genus, that is, of that subject. Now, the mobile is outside the knowable genus of metaphysics, since it does not abstract from sensible matter. However, it is in no way possible that mobility be an accidental condition of being, as subalternation [of a science] requires; this is clear from the things we have written on *Posterior Analytics* 1.13. For that accidentality [*accidentalitas*] requires both perseity [*perseitas*] and extraneousness at the same time with respect to that subject, and this is not possible with respect to being, for nothing is extraneous to being, as is said in *Metaphysics* 3 [3, 998b24]. And let no one object to me that St. Thomas, in the treatise *On the Nature of Genus*, says that natural philosophy is subalternate to metaphysics because of this sort of accidentality; for St. Thomas probably never laid eyes on that treatise, as its style is not his, and many things there are not consonant with his teaching.[20]

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[20] Contemporary scholars agree with Cajetan that *De natura generis* is not an authentic work of St. Thomas.

To the fourth, it is said that more is required for something to be a subject than that the resolution is completed at it [*ad ipsum fiat resolutio*]; otherwise the principles of the subject, at which the resolution is ultimately completed, would be the subject. Therefore it is necessary that the resolution be completed at the subject's formal notion, as the proportionate subject of its first passions. Now, the resolution of mobile things is not completed at mobile substance as at the proportionate subject of mobility, but as at the first thing contained [*primum clausum*] in the proportionate subject of mobility (which is mobile being). After the resolution of the common passions into the analogous subject, the analogous thing itself can be resolved into itself, by tracing the posterior back to the prior. We have explained this at length in our treatise *On the Analogy of Names*.

And this is the end of this inquiry, written in the convent of Saint Mary of the Graces in the suburbs of Milan, on November 6th, in the year of our salvation 1499. Therefore, my beloved brother Vincent, take this fruit of your solicitude and hospitality, and examine it with the acumen of mind you display, giving your pardon to the less fitting parts, recalling that nothing in any genus is ever both cultivated and hasty. Farewell.

ON GOD AS A KNOWER
AND THE NATURE OF KNOWING:
COMMENTARIES ON
SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I, Q. 14, A. 1 & Q. 55, A. 3

Thomas de Vio Cardinal Cajetan

On Question 14, article 1: Whether there is Science in God

Overview of the Article

I. Notice *science* in the title; by the word "science" we understand *certain and evident intellectual knowledge* [*cognitionem*]. In the body there is one conclusion, and it answers the question in the affirmative: in God there is science most perfectly. It is

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Translator's Note: The following two articles were translated based on the Latin text of Cajetan's commentary as published in the Leonine volumes: *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Ordinis Praedicatorum Opera Omnia*, vol. 4: *Pars Prima Summa Theologiae, cum commentariis Thomae de Vio Caietani* (Roma, 1888), 167–68; vol. 5, 59–61. As with the translation of *De Subiecto Naturalis Philosophiae*, given above, we have tried to render Cajetan's terse Latin in an English more suited to the contemporary reader, and have interspersed the relevant passages from St. Thomas on which he is commenting. The Roman numerical divisions and italicized phrases are in the Leonine text, but a handful of phrases have been italicized for emphasis, and a few additional section and paragraph divisions have been introduced. Ambiguous or noteworthy Latin expressions we have given in square brackets, and when Cajetan cites a text, we have suggested the probable source, sometimes with the help of the annotations in the Leonine edition. — Christopher A. Decaen.

proved as follows:

- Immateriality is the reason that a thing is a knower [*cognoscitivum*], and the mode of the knowledge is according to the mode of the immateriality.
- But God exists at the summit of immateriality.

  Therefore God exists at the summit of knowledge, which is to have science most perfectly.

The major premise has two parts, and it is proved with respect to each. *With respect to the first part, the proof is made in two ways.*

First, it is proved based on reason, as follows: a) To be a knower [*esse cognoscens*] arises from having one's own form and that of another; b) therefore it arises from the amplitude of the nature; and c) therefore from its immateriality. The antecedent is proved by the fact that this is how a knower differs from a non-knower. The first consequent is evident from itself, since what is both its very self and something else is more full [*magis amplum*] than that which is only itself:

> To make this evident one must note that knowers are distinguished from non-knowers in this: that the non-knowers possess only their own form, whereas the knower is naturally adapted to possess also the form of some other reality, for the species of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-knowing reality is more confined and limited, whereas the nature of knowing realities has a greater amplitude and extension.[1]

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[1] St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 1, c. (henceforth *STh*): "Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius, nam species cogniti est in cognoscente. Unde manifestum est quod natura rei non cognoscentis est magis coarctata et limitata; natura autem rerum cognoscentium habet maiorem amplitudinem et extension."

And this is confirmed by the authority of *De Anima* 3 [6, 431b21]: "the soul is in a certain way all things." The second consequent is proved based on things said in question 7 [as. 1 & 2], that the restriction of a form comes from matter, and the infinity of forms arises through a receding from matter:

> The confinement of form, however, comes through matter. Hence, as we also said above, insofar as forms are more immaterial, so far do they approach more nearly to a certain infinity. It is clear, then, that the immateriality of a reality is the reason why it is capable of knowing, and the mode of the knowledge is according to the mode of the immateriality.[2]

Second, the major premise is also proved based on the authority of Aristotle, in *De Anima* 2 [12, 424a32–34], when [St. Thomas] says that "it is because of their materiality that plants do not know."[3]

With respect to the second part, the major is proved based on the gradations of knowing in sensation and in understanding. For the former is able to know because it is receptive of species without matter, and the latter is such more so because it is separated and unmixed, as is said in *De Anima* 3 [4, 429a20, b4; 5, 430a17].

> But sensation is able to know because it is receptive of species without matter, and intellect is still more able to know because it is more separated from matter and

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[2] Ibid.: "Coarctatio autem formae est per materiam. Unde et supra diximus quod formae, secundum quod sunt magis immateriales, secundum hoc magis accedunt ad quondam infinitatem. Patet igitur quod immaterialitas alicuius rei est ratio quod sit cognoscitive; et secundum modum immaterialitatis est modus cognitionis."

[3] Ibid.: "plantae non cognoscunt, propter suam materialitem"; St. Thomas is paraphrasing, or rather drawing a conclusion from, what Aristotle says in the passage cited.

unmixed with it.[4]

The minor premise, however, is already known, based on things said above in previous questions: "Whence, because God is at the summit of immateriality, as is clear from earlier, it follows that he is at the summit of knowledge."[5]

Doubts about the Difference between Knowers and Non-Knowers

II. There is a doubt about the difference being assigned between knowers and non-knowers. When it is said that *a knower is naturally apt to be even things other than itself*,[6] you might intend the word *to be* to be understood as meaning to be the other thing *by way of an identification with it* [*per identitatem*]—and in this sense, it is false; for the intellectual soul is not naturally apt to be the same thing as a stone, as a cow, etc. Or you might understand it to mean to be another *through an informing*, and then it is either *through an intentional informing*—and then we have a false difference, since air is not a knower and yet it does receive colors intentionally—or *through a natural informing*—and then it is extremely false, both because a stone is not in the soul and because non-knowers become other things in this way.

Likewise, the word *other things* [*alia*] either stands for *all* other things—and then it is false, since the sense power is not naturally apt to be all things but only certain things—or it stands for *certain* other things—and then there is no difference, since it is common to all things around us to be not only themselves but certain other things in some way (namely, though an informing); for all things are not only in themselves substances, but have at least their own accidents conformed to their proper natures. For fire is not only fire but also light, rare, luminous, and hot. And in whatever way these things have their own accidents, so too the knower has his own proper accidents, the intentional species. Whence no difference between knowers and non-knowers is apparent here.

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[4] Ibid.: "Sensus autem cognoscitivus est, quia receptivus est specierum sine materia; et intellectus adhuc magis cognoscitivus, quia magis separatus est a materia et immixtus."

[5] Ibid.: "Unde, cum Deus sit in summo immaterialitatis, ut ex superioribus patet, sequitur quod ipse sit in summo cognitionis."

[6] "Cognoscens natum est esse etiam alia." This phrase is not precisely a quotation from St. Thomas, but Cajetan's summary of the sense; however, compare the end of note 1.

A Reply to the Doubts

III. To render clear the resolution of this difficult and arduous foundation of a great part of metaphysics and natural philosophy, two things ought to be done: first, these objections should be formally addressed, and second, the root of all [of them] ought to be brought into the light.

To the objections it is easily said that the word *to be* abstracts from the modes of being either through identification or informing, and likewise the word *other things* abstracts from *all* or *some*, just as *able to know* abstracts from this or that cognitive [power]. For there is a knower that is all things [it can know] by way of identification (namely, God),[7] another that is some things by way of identification and some things by way of informing (namely, the angels), another that is all things by way of informing (namely, our soul), and another that is some things by way of informing (namely, the purely sensitive soul). And on account of this difference being asserted universally, he abstracts from all these modes so that he might exclude none and contain all of them in a confused way.

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[7] As St. Thomas will say in the subsequent article (*STh* I, q. 14, a. 2), "since God has nothing of potentiality, but is pure act, it is necessary that in him the understanding and the thing understood are in all ways the same, such that he neither lacks an intelligible species (as do our intellects when we only potentially understand) nor is his intelligible species other than the substance of the divine intellect (as happens in our intellect when actually understanding). Rather, the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself." Thus, Cajetan explains this identification of the knower and the known in the case of the Godhead in his commentary: "the exclusion of these two things is proportioned to every manner of identification between the intellect and the thing understood. But by the name 'species' one should understand not only the impressed species, but universally the impressed and the expressed. For where

IV. The root of the objections, however, is illuminated if we consider the per se difference between the mode whereby the knower is the thing known and that whereby matter has form, and likewise how a single thing [*unum*] arises from the knower and the known in a different way than it does from matter and form. For the judgment of being and of the one is the same, since they signify the same nature, as is said in *Metaphysics* 4 [2, 1003b23–30].

It should be known, therefore, that the per se difference lies in this: that the knower is the very thing known, either actually or potentially, but the matter is never the form itself. From this difference relative to being follows a difference relative to unity: namely, that the knower and the thing known are more one than matter and form are (as Averroes said most excellently in his commentary on III *De Anima*, comm. 5). And he gave the argument stated just now—that a third thing does not arise from the intellect and the thing understood, as it does from matter and form; for by assigning as the reason for the greater unity the exclusion of a third thing [coming to be from them], he obviously taught that the unity consists in the fact that the one *is* the other. Whence Aristotle beforehand taught the same thing in *De*

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the intellect and the species taken universally are not distinct, there the intellect and the thing understood are wholly the same. And this, in the teaching of St. Thomas, is undoubtedly true, since a concept itself is an expressed species, which is the substance in God alone, and thus in no other thing is the exclusion of both these things preserved" (Leonine edition, p. 170).

Anima 3 [8, 431b20–23] when he said that the soul is all sensible and intelligible things.

Moreover, it is manifest that this is the true per se difference based on the fact that all the common conceptions and conclusions of the mind are consonant with it: namely, that there occurs both a diversity between and likewise a composition of the knowing [power] and the thing known; and likewise, that the thing known has an intentional existence in the knower; and that in no nature can matter and form, and subject and accident, be elevated so far that the one becomes the same as the other (as long as their notions have been preserved), as we find is the case for the knower and the thing known.

V. The necessity of asserting this, however, is born of two propositions. One is that each thing operates insofar as it is in act, as is said in *Physics* 3 [2, 202a10];[8] the other is that the thing known is the specifying principle of the knowledge, based on *Metaphysics* 11 [7, 1064a1–b7]. From these things it follows that, since the knower ought to be the sufficient principle of its own proper operation (which is *to know*)—inasmuch as this is common to perfect natures—so too it must be that it is the specifying principle of that operation (which is *to be the thing known*). Also, if you add to these things the fact, based on *De Caelo* 2 [3, 286a8], that each thing exists for the sake of its own operation, it would follow that a knowing nature is the sort of thing in itself such that it is, either actually or potentially, the very thing known—which is to be not only itself but other things as well, as is said in the text.

VI. And if you will compare these to the rest of the things that exist, you will see manifested thereby the difference between knowers and non-knowers. For the rest of the things that exist either receive forms for the sake of the operations of their forms themselves, or for the sake of the operation of a third thing (the thing composed from the one receiving and the thing received). There is an example of the first in hot water—both universally in a subject and an accidental form—for heating is not the proper operation of water, but rather of the heat. The judgment is the same of cold water in this respect, for although coldness is a natural potency of water, cooling is the proper operation of the cold, not of water. An example of the second is evident in substantial forms, for matter does not receive form for the sake of the operation of matter itself, but for the sake of the thing composed of it and form. The knower receiving the thing known, however, does not receive it for the sake of the operation of a composite resulting from them, nor for the sake of the operation of the very thing known, but for the sake of the specification of the proper operation of the knower itself. For sight receives the visible for the sake of vision's species, which latter establishes the proper operation of sight.

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[8] See also Aristotle, *Physics* 2.1, 193b14–19; 2.8, 199a8–12.

Nor is it an obstacle that the visible, as received in sight, is an accident, and sight is its subject. For this is per accidens (i.e., from the necessity of the matter), and is not primarily the thing intended per se. For the form, the intention (that is, the visible species), specifies sight not insofar as it is an accident, but insofar as it is the going forth of what is able to see into the thing seen.[9] But because this sensitive nature does not undergo this except through an intention being there, therefore, thanks to matter, it is concurrently an accident [*concurrit accidens*]. Yet this does not destroy the thing intended per se; rather, it establishes it in a less perfect grade [of cognition, or of unity]. For, as will be discussed elsewhere[10] (and is held by Averroes in his commentaries on *Metaphysics* 12 [comm. 51] and *De Anima* 3 [comm. 8]), the knower and the thing known are not one with the same intensity in all things, but in a more or less diminished way, so much so that in God alone are they wholly the same thing.

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[9] "sed inquantum visible [et] transiens in visum"; the bracketed "et" is added by the Parma edition, but our translation does not follow it.

[10] The Leonine editors suggest that q. 55, a. 3 is intended here; in light of this, Cajetan's commentary on this article is provided below.

VII. And thus is evident the meaning of the assigned difference, and how subtly here the divine Thomas has treated the nature of knowers. How it consists in this is shown not only from Aristotle and Averroes (as is evident from the things said), but even from Albert in the treatise *On the Intellect and the Intelligible* [I, tract. 3, ch. 1]. And it is necessary to hold on to this teaching most diligently, as it is foundational as often as there is a discussion of the intellect, since the conclusions of many questions hang from it, such as concerning the concurrence of the object and of the intellect for understanding, and likewise about the concurrence of the intelligible species, etc. And thereby also it will be apparent how sloppy [*rudes*] were those who, when treating inadequately understanding and sensing, judged that sensation and the sensible, and intellect and the intelligible, were just like other realities. You [thereby] will also learn to elevate your mind, and even to enter a different order of things.[11]

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On Question 55, article 3: Whether the higher angels understand through species that are more universal than those of the lower angels

Overview of the Article

I. In the title one should be attentive to the fact that because the universality of an intelligible species is not a universal in predication or being, nor is it one in causality, but rather one in representation [*in repraesentando*], "to understand through more universal species" is nothing other than to understand through species that, in their representing, extend themselves to several things. This can happen in two ways: in one, by a representation of a more universal reality, and in another way, by a representation of actually many things, in the way in which a species actually representative of animality and of all of its per se differences would be called a "more universal species," and would be more universal than one representative of animality or of humanity alone. And it is in this latter way that "more universal" is being taken in this proposal, not in the first.

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[11] "Et disces elevare ingenium, aliumque rerum ordinem ingredi."

II. In the body of this article there is a single conclusion, which answers in the affirmative, and it is proved in two ways: To the degree that angels are higher [than us] so do they understand through species that are more universal. The first proof is as follows: To the degree that intellects are naturally higher, so too are they more like God in his intellectual perfection and mode; and to the degree that they are more like him, so too do they understand through fewer species—and therefore, through more universal species.

> In things, some are higher that are closer and more like to the one first thing, which is God. Now, in God is contained the entire fullness of intellectual knowledge in one thing—namely, the divine essence, through which God knows all things. This intellectual fullness is found in created intellects in a lower way and less simply. Whence it is necessary that the things that God knows through one, the lower intellects know through many, and they understand more fully through several more to the degree that they are lower intellects more fully. Therefore in this way to the degree that an angel is higher, so to that degree will it be able to apprehend the universe of intelligible things through fewer species. And therefore it is necessary that its forms be more universal, each of them, as it

> were, extending to several things.[12]

The consequent is known because otherwise one understanding through fewer species would not have perfect knowledge of all things. But the first proposition is clear from the fact that natures are graduated according to their proximity in natural likeness to the First Being. The second is proved from the fact that God understands all things through one thing, as that by which he understands; and this belongs to unqualified perfection [*perfectionis simpliciter*]. For from this it evidently follows that one who is more like God and more perfectly obtains the force of understanding is one who understands all things distinctly through fewer things than does one who understands through more things. For the lesser fewness is closer to unity than is a multitude, and the less divided (or divisible) the light of an intellect exists more perfectly than does one divisible through many notions of understanding, so that it might understand.

The second proof introduced by the text is a sign of this, a proof that experience does not allow one to doubt. For we experience among ourselves that there are some students to whom it is necessary to say all things one at a time, as though by articulating the species through the singulars. And on the other hand, there are some who right away apprehend many things based on just one; and nor does this arise otherwise than because of the nobility of their genius [*ex nobilitate ingenii*].

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[12] *STh* I, q. 55, a. 3, c.: "[E]x hoc sunt in rebus aliqua superiora, quod sunt uni primo, quod est Deus, propinquiora et similiora. In Deo autem tota plenitudo intellectualis cognitionis continetur in uno, scilicet in essentia divina, per quam Deus omnia cognoscit. Quae quidem intelligibilis plenitudo intellectibus creatis inferiori modo et minus simpliciter invenitur. Unde oportet quod ea quae Deus cognoscit per unum, inferiores intellectus cognoscant per multa; et tanto amplius per plura, quanto amplius intellectus inferior fuerit. Sic igitur quanto angelus fuerit superior, tanto per pauciores species universitatem intelligibilium apprehendere poterit. Et ideo oportet quod eius formae sint universaliores, quasi ad plura se extendentes unaquaeque earum."

> And one can in a way observe an example of this among us. For there are some who cannot grasp an intelligible truth unless is explained one part at a time through singulars. And there are also those of a stronger intellect who can grasp many things based on few.[13]

Scotus's Objections

III. Scotus's objections arise in reference to both the arguments mentioned and the conclusion.[14] He rejects the first argument, saying that the proposition "to the degree that angels are more like God, so too do they understand through fewer species" is false. For an intellect that is more like God need not be more like him insofar as it understands through fewer species; rather, it might be more like him merely insofar as it understands with greater lucidity [*limpidius*].

IV. And he objects against the second argument, the one taken from a sign, saying that it supposes something false there—specifically that men of greater genius understand through fewer species. For as many as there are like that, there are just as many that have weaker genius but they know more quickly or more lucidly than the former.

V. Moreover, he argues directly against the conclusion in three ways. The first is that the unity of the reason for one's understanding [*rationis intelligendi*] presupposes the unity of a proportionate object [*obiecti adaequati*]—that is, one virtually containing in an objective way all the things that that species contains in a representative way; this is clear with the divine essence as the reason for the understanding and as its object. But it is impossible for one to be given such a single object containing a multitude of "whatnesses." Therefore there cannot be given any created species representing distinctly many "whatnesses."

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[13] Ibid.: "Et de hoc exemplum aliqualiter in nobis perspici potest. Sunt enim quidam, qui veritatem intelligibilem capere non possunt, nisi eis particulatim per singula explicetur; et hoc quidem ex debilitate intellectus eorum contingit. Alii vero, qui sunt fortioris intellectus, ex paucis multa capere possunt."

[14] Bl. John Duns Scotus, *Sententiarum* II, d. 3, q. 10.

The second is that every reason for one's knowing can have an act proportionate to it. But such a species could not have an act proportionate to it. Therefore it is not granted. The minor premise is proved as follows: according to you [i.e., St. Thomas], an angel cannot simultaneously actually understand in a distinct way several species.

Third, he argues to the same thing from the side of the habit, by reducing it to the same incongruity: namely, that an angel will simultaneously know distinctly many natures.

Moreover, he brings in one other argument against those holding that there is any species in an angel that does not represent many things, because it can represent many. This he in fact says it is not necessary for us [i.e., Thomists] to hold. And it is well that he says this in speaking about whatnesses. For it is otherwise with singulars. And on account of this, when we will treat below[15] the representation of the infinity of singulars through one angelic species, his argument will be resolved.

Response to the Objections Against the Arguments

VI. We say, in response to the objection against the first argument, that one should note that there are two genera of perfections found in God. For some are communicable to creatures, like wisdom and goodness, but others are incommunicable, like infinity, divinity, and understanding all things distinctly through one's own substance, and other things of the sort. For not only do these perfections differ among themselves, but in different ways do creatures approach being like God by means of them. For the approach according to the first sorts of perfections is viewed according to the formal notion of that perfection, whereas the approach according to the incommunicable perfections is viewed according to a greater withdrawal from its opposite. For one is more like the Godhead if his nature withdraws more from non-existence, etc. Second of all, note that not only is understanding an unqualified perfection, but so too is understanding all things through one. This is clear from the definition of unqualified perfection, asserted by Anselm, *Monologion*, ch. 15 [PL 158:162–64]. Nor is it relevant in the proposed matter whether [understanding through one] is separately an unqualified perfection and concerns what is per se [*de per se*], or whether it is a grade or mode of the unqualified perfection [that is understanding], as when I say "pure act." Third, note that the highest part of the universe, the angels, by their own nature claim [*vindicant*] for themselves a likeness to God, not according to some unqualified perfections, but according to all of them, yet more so or less so according to their grades. This is clear by running through all the unqualified perfections.

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[15] See St. Thomas, *STh* I, q. 57, a. 2.

And founded on this is the argument of St. Thomas showing that the angels, to the degree that they are higher, understand through fewer species to that degree: because they are more like God according to all the unqualified perfections, and consequently according to this one as well. Whence this exception is unreasonable and alien to all philosophy. For why should this be excepted more than any of the others?

Secondly, it is said that the argument is founded upon the essential gradation of intellects as follows: for to the degree that an intellect is higher, so too it is more perfect; however, to the degree that it is more perfect, so too is it more united, such that (if I may be allowed to speak this way) the united power has dispersed itself more. However, it is certain that an intellect that is less divided by intelligible species is more one and individual than one that must be divided through multiple species in order to know singular things. And consequently, to the degree that an intellect is more perfect, so too it is more like God, not merely in the fact that it knows with greater lucidity, but even in the fact that it knows through fewer species.

VII. To the objection against the second argument it is said that St. Thomas is not taking as the sign the fact that more ingenious men understand through fewer species (since this is hidden [*latet*]). Rather, what is being taken as evident is the fact that those who present a greater genius apprehend things based on fewer principles, and without a distinct proposal of the singulars. For this is the evident sign: that someone apprehends many things in one, nor does he need to have the singulars proposed separately, which attests to the magnitude of one's intellect.

Response to the Objections Against the Conclusion Itself

VIII. To the objections against the conclusion, however, it is said that one can understand in two ways [Scotus's] claim that the unity of the species presupposes the unity of the first and proportionate object. In one way, such that it presupposes a *formal and real unity* of it as of what exists in the nature of things—and in this way it need not be true, as is clear concerning the intelligible species, in us, of the bovine nature. For such a reality is not this way in the nature of things, such that it would be proportionately presented through its species; and on account of this, no one singular reality is found in the nature of things proportionately answering to it. Or one can understand it in another way, such that it presupposes *only a formal unity* of the object, insofar as the species of the lion nature might be impressed upon some intellect by God—and in this way it is universally true that every species supposes the unity of its object, since every power also is relative primarily to one formal notion. And in this way, I say, the objecting argument is ensnared by its taking the major premise as true in the first way, whereas it is true only in the case of God. In the rest, in fact, it is enough that every species is relative primarily to one formal notion. And this is how it stands with angelic species.

IX. To the second objection, on the side of act, it is conceded that every angel can have an act proportionate to each of its species. Nor do we ourselves say the opposite when saying that it cannot understand several things simultaneously. For we are speaking formally, and we intend that it cannot simultaneously understand several things *as several*; but it is not understanding several as several when many things are understood through one species, or even when many things are understood through several species standing in some single order, or in their order to one, etc.

X. One might oppose this same conclusion because it seems to contradict things said earlier [in q. 55, a. 1], since it follows from them that some angel could be granted who understands things through his essence alone. And this consequence holds, when joined with your other proposition—namely, that God *could* make a substantially more perfect angel than any one that he has in fact made.[16] For it follows from this that if there come to be another angel higher than an existing angel who understands all things through two species (that is, its own essence and one added to this), this [new angel] one would understand through fewer species, and thus, through only one, which no doubt would be its essence.

To this we briefly respond by denying the consequence follows. For letting that hypothesis stand (whatever might be the case about it), it is said that if the higher angel be created, a new species would necessarily be added to all the lower angels whereby they could understand him distinctly. And in this way, in the one that *was* highest there will be three species, but in the one newly made would be only two [species], and consequently fewer [than in all the others]. And so in the same way one should say that, if one goes on to infinity, the higher will always have fewer species, but not by having less than two, but by an addition or multiplication of the plurality of species in the lower angels.

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[16] See *STh* I, q. 25, a. 6.

A Doubt about St. Thomas's Response to an Objection

XI. Now, a doubt arises about a proposition in the response to the last objection in the text, which is:

> To the third one should say that the same thing cannot be the proportionate proper notion of several things. But if it excels them, the same thing can be taken both as a proper notion and as a likeness of diverse things. For example, in a man there is a universal prudence as regards all the acts of the virtues, and it can be taken both as a proper notion and as a likeness of the particular prudence that is in a lion as regard its acts of magnanimity, and of that which is in a fox as regards its acts of caution, and so on for others. Likewise the divine essence is taken, on account of its own excellence, as the proper notion of the individual things, since there is within it that whence the individual things become like it according to their proper notions. And in the same way one should speak about the universal that is in the mind of the angel—that through it, on account of its excellence, many things can be known with proper knowledge.[17]

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[17] *STh* I, q. 55, a. 3, ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod idem non potest esse plurium propria ratio adaequata. Sed si sit excellens, potest idem accipi ut propria ratio et similitudo diversorum. Sicut in homine est universalis prudentia quantum ad omnes actus virtutum; et potest accipi ut propria ratio et similitudo particularis prudentiae quae est in leone ad actus magnanimitatis, et eius quae est in vulpe ad actus cautelae, et sic de aliis. Similiter essentia divina accipitur, propter sui excellentiam, ut propria ratio singulorum: quia est in

The doubt is that the proposition—that the species of the angelic intellect, on account of its excellence, is the notion or likeness of *many* things distinctly, just as the divine essence is the notion of *all* things—seems to be false and impossible. For such excellence is either *in being* or *only in representing*.

But it cannot be said to be a notion or likeness merely in representing, first, because its notion or proportionality to the divine essence would be null [*nulla*], since the divine essence, on account of its excellence in being, has excellence in representing all things because it possesses in advance every notion and mode of existing. And a second reason is that by offering "because it is excellent" (that is, because it represents in an excellent way) as the reason why the angelic species, being one, is distinctly representative of many, this would be to clarify by just repeating oneself, and it offers no cause other than verbal. For it is the same thing to represent many things distinctly and to represent individual things in an excellent way or disproportionately [*inadaequate*].

And neither could it be said that this is on account of its excellence in being [*in essendo*]. For, first, it would follow that one species in the mind of the angel would be more excellent in being than many specifically distinct sensible substances, indeed than many angelic substances—indeed, maybe even than all actually created substances lower than the highest angel, since angels understand lower things through excelling species of this sort. And second, because that species would be even more noble in being than the essence of its own angel, since what is of so great an excellence in being—such that it has within itself that whence all lower things would become like it according to their own proper quiddities—would be nobler in being than what does not have it. And third, because this is repugnant to

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ea unde sibi singula similentur secundum proprias rationes. Et eodem modo dicendum est de ratione universali quae est in mente angeli, quod per eam, propter eius excellentiam, multa cognosci possunt propria cognitione."

the teaching of St. Thomas,[18] and to common teaching, for to the degree that it cannot be communicated to the substance of an angel that it be of so great an excellence in being that it be the proper notion of many, so too neither can such an [intelligible] species be communicated to the angel. For each of these [i.e., angelic substance and intelligible species] is something created and determined to a genus and species.

Response to the Doubt

XII. To present a clear resolution to this difficulty one must take note, first, of the fact that there are two genera of beings: some have been instituted for the sake of existing [*ut sint*], even though perhaps secondarily they might represent other things, and these we call "realities" [*res*]; but some have primarily been instituted naturally for the sake of representing other things [*ut alia repraesentent*], and these we call "intentions of realities" [*intentiones rerum*], and sensible or intelligible "species." Now, the necessity of positing these two genera of realities is because a knower must be not only itself but other things as well, and an intellect must be all things (as is clear from q. 14 [a. 1]), and by the common conception of the mind of the philosophers, who agree about this, "like is known by like."[19] Nor can the natures of realities be in the knower according to their very selves (since there is no stone in the soul), nor can the knower itself, according to its own finite substance, be of so great an excellence that it would have within itself that whence it would become distinctly like the nature of knowable realities according to their proper notions. Whence what is left is that, because neither the existence of the knowing nature is the reason for the things that are knowable, nor is the natural existence of the knowable things according to itself in the knower, an intentional existence would have to be established by nature, that by which a thing that can know would be the things knowable by it.

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[18] See *STh* I, q. 55, a. 1, ad 3.

[19] See Aristotle, *On the Soul* 1.2, 404b18, 405b16, and 3.3, 427a29.

XIII. One must take note, second, that what can know and the intentional [*cognoscitivum et intentionale*] are not distinguished as two orders of realities, but rather as things concurring for the perfection of a single order: that is, of natures that can know. For the intentional is the intrinsic complement of what can know: it is its *complement* because it is found so as to supply what is owed to a substance that can know—that is, to be the things it can know [*esse cognoscibilia*]—and it is *intrinsic* because it is joined to it as perfecting and eliciting its intrinsic operation.

Whence because of this they stand proportionally, both as regards act and potency and as regards the height of the grade [*altitudinem gradus*]. This is as regards act because implanted in what actually knows is an actual intentional being whereby it is its own knowable objects, whereas in what potentially knows that intentional being is potentially present; this is clear both in our intellectual and sensitive soul. And it is as regards the height of the grade because to the degree that a knowing power is higher, to that degree does it stand in a more united way to its knowable objects; this is clear by ascending from the particular senses to the common sense, and so on upward from there. However, to the degree that a knowing power is more united, so much less does it need diversity in the intentional being whereby it is its knowable objects; and thereby, to the degree that a knowing power is of a higher order, so much more so does it claim for itself a higher, and consequently less distinct and more universal in representing, intentional existence whereby it is the knowable objects. And this is nothing other than what we call an "intelligible species."

And in this way the wondrous grade of the intellectual nature, arising in order from the First Intellect, is assessed. For He is all things through his own substance, and through it He knows all things. And although this could not be communicated with other things—since beings are finite—it was bestowed on them that there be such substances and of so great perfection that what they could not have according to their substantial existence they would have according to intentional existence. And this would be more or less so universally, according to the greater or lesser perfection of the knowing substance, to the point that our soul, the last in the order of intellectual things, would be divisible according to intentional existence with just as great a diversity as is matter according to natural existence.

XIV. With these things established we can say, to the arguments behind the doubt [in XI], that here the discussion is indeed about *excellence in being*. Now, this can be understood in two ways: either with respect to the things that are being represented, or with respect to the different species representative of the same objects. If excellence be understood with respect to the knowable natures, it can only be understood in the *mode of being*, in reference to the degree in which the species of a higher angel has a mode of being of a higher order than not only sensitive things have, but even than lower angels have; and on account of such excellence there can be a distinct notion of several things. But if excellence be understood with respect to the intelligible species, then what is intended shines forth more clearly and more easily and without ambiguity. And it is understood of an excellence not only in mode of being, but *in the very perfection of being*. This will be such that we might imagine that, since within our soul there are diverse species according to the diversity of the realities represented by them (such as the species of cow, the species of lion, the species of eagle, etc.), by ascending, one will be able to grant a single species of a higher order, a species excellently or eminently equivalent [*aequivalentem excellenter* *seu eminenter*] to those three or four species; and consequently, it itself representing distinctly in a higher mode the things that are represented by the four species. For this is to know specific objects through a universal notion, which belongs to the greatest perfection.

XV. And in this way it clearly becomes evident that the objections adduced present no obstacle. For one need not say that a more universal species is more perfect than the natures represented; rather, it is more perfect than the natures' proportionate representatives. That *is* necessary.

Nor must there be the same judgment of an angel's substantial existence and of the intentional existence within it; rather, the judgment need only be proportional. That they are not the same is clear from the fact that it is wholly impossible that we admit that to be an angel according to its own substantial existence would represent the proper difference of a stone; and we right away grant equally that it represents it according to an intentional existence added to it. Whence it is clearly repugnant to finite substantial existence that it be limited to a determinate nature *and* representative of another according to its proper difference. On the other hand, this is not repugnant to intentional existence, for the species of cow within the soul is a being (among the accidents) defined in relation to the determinate nature of a being, and yet it is representative of the proper bovine difference [for example]. And the reason for this diversity is what we have touched upon above, for an intentional being was first established by nature for the sake of representing, so as to complete the knowing substance, whereas the very realities of which they are the intentions are first established just for the sake of existing.

Moreover, the judgment about intellectual substance is also proportional to intentional existence. For to the degree that a substance is higher, so much the more so is the intentional existence proper to it higher. Indeed, the elevation of the intention arises from the elevation of the substance, and the elevation of the substantial grade in the angel indicates a greater perfection (albeit an equivocal one) than does the altitude of the intention. For this latter posits nothing other than eminent equivalence to the proportionate representatives of the realities.

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